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A Chinese amphibious transport ship 
leaves port in the Netherlands in January 
2015. In “Surging Second Sea Force: 
China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement 
Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the 
Gray Zone and Beyond,” Andrew Erickson, 
Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst analyze 
the growth of China’s sea services and  
the coordination between the gray hulls  
of the PLA Navy and the white hulls of  
the China Coast Guard as together they 
work to enhance China’s maritime law- 
enforcement activities throughout the 
western Pacific.
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FROM THE EDITORS
The challenge of the People’s Republic of China to American interests and global 
order continues to focus the attention not only of American policy makers but of 
friends and allies as well� In “Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime Law-
Enforcement Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond,” 
Andrew S� Erickson, Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst provide a comprehensive 
overview and audit of the newly consolidated China Coast Guard and its role as a 
powerful adjunct of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and instrument for main-
taining and extending Chinese control of its home waters� This study employs the 
rigorous methodology using multiple Chinese-language sources developed in re-
cent years by the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, in which 
Andrew S� Erickson is a research professor� Joshua Hickey is a senior analyst for 
the Department of the Navy; Henry Holst consults for a private defense firm�
In “U�S� Conventional Access Strategy: Denying China a Conventional First-
Strike Capability,” Sam Goldsmith provides a broader analysis of the implications 
of China’s growing conventional challenge to the U�S� presence in the western 
Pacific and what the United States should be doing to deter a potential first strike 
against American forces and bases in the region� Of particular interest are his 
suggestions concerning the role of Australia in supporting the appropriate U�S� 
strategy� Sam Goldsmith is a defense consultant and a PhD candidate at the Royal 
Melbourne Institute of Technology�
The last several years have seen a dramatic increase of interest in wargaming 
throughout the Department of Defense, including the Department of the Navy� 
At the Naval War College, it is fair to say, wargaming has achieved unparalleled 
levels of sophistication and rising demand from its extensive customer base� But 
wargaming also has important applications outside the military sphere� As Shay 
Hershkovitz shows in “Wargame Business: Wargames in Military and Corporate 
Settings,” gaming can be used in a variety of ways in business settings to improve 
a corporation’s understanding of its strategic environment and how to cope 
with sudden changes in it, as he illustrates with reference to three such exercises 
recently conducted with business organizations in Israel� Shay Hershkovitz is a 
former senior intelligence official in the Israel Defense Forces�
In “Peacetime Naval Rearmament, 1933–39: Lessons for Today,” Jamie Mc-
Grath revisits a salient but forgotten chapter in the history of America’s navy: 
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   3 2/25/19   10:40 AM
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the long period of rebuilding of U�S� naval forces and shipbuilding capabilities 
initiated and overseen by President Franklin D� Roosevelt in close collaboration 
with Congress, in particular Representative Carl Vinson� This effort was vital to 
the nation’s ability to expand its navy rapidly in response to the requirements of 
war against Japan when that materialized in 1941� McGrath draws particular at-
tention to the need for a deliberate nurturing of the naval defense industrial base 
of the kind that occurred in the 1930s, pointing out that China today is in a much 
better position than the United States to ramp up naval construction quickly, ow-
ing to its very extensive commercial shipyard capability� Captain Jamie McGrath, 
USN, is a professor in the department of Joint Military Operations at the Naval 
War College�
Finally, in “Running Silent and Algorithmic: The U�S� Navy Strategic Vision 
in 2019,” Sam J� Tangredi performs a commendable service by reviewing the cur-
rent state of play of Navy strategy documents and their relationship to broader 
Department of Defense strategy and guidance statements of recent years� He 
carefully analyzes the tensions and seams among these various documents and 
the degree to which each remains authoritative within the Navy, and provides his 
own synthesis of the Navy’s strategic vision going forward� He calls particular at-
tention to the extent to which the “ideology of jointness” has provided significant 
obstacles to the coherence of such a vision� Captain Sam Tangredi, USN (Ret�), 
is the director of the recently established Institute for Future Warfare Studies at 
the Naval War College�
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W309, 330, 333, 
334, 335)� For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236)�
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   4 2/25/19   10:40 AM
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President 
of the U.S. Naval War College. The College is respon-
sible for educating future leaders, developing their 
strategic perspective and critical thinking, and en-
hancing their capability to advise senior leaders and 
policy makers.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer 
whose sea-duty assignments have included command 
of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 9, and 
Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet / Expeditionary 
Strike Group 7 / Task Force 76. During his command 
of Milius, the ship participated in combat operations 
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and his crew 
won the Battle Efficiency Award and the Marjorie 
Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall combat 
readiness.
Admiral Harley attended the University of Minne-
sota, graduating with a bachelor of arts in political 
science, and received master of arts degrees from the 
Naval War College and the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Additionally, he 
served as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign 
Relations in New York City.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
AS IT HAS BEEN SINCE ITS INCEPTION, the Naval War College’s 
primary mission is to educate and develop future leaders. Our 
talented and highly motivated graduates complete their studies in Newport and 
then go on to serve in demanding positions in our military services, in those of 
our allies, and throughout the government’s national security sector. In these 
positions they apply the critical-thinking skill sets that were refined and honed 
at this great institution. Their close interaction with our extraordinary faculty 
and staff sparks a desire for lifelong learning that continues to pay dividends for 
our students both as national security practitioners and as informed and engaged 
citizens.
At the end of the day, the greatest resource the College provides to our ser-
vices, agencies, and nations is our alumni! In important assignments around the 
globe, they are often the critical voices that make the arguments that carry the 
day. In commands and organizations large and small, they provide a foundation 
of ethical decision-making in the complex, dynamic, and volatile world in which 
we live. There is no better case study on the value of networks and interpersonal 
relationships than the one demonstrated by our extraordinary alumni.
While the majority of our alumni are from the United States, we recognize 
that the Naval War College is a major player on a global scale. Our global reach is 
reflected in the fact that we are honored to claim more than 4,700 international 
graduates, representing 137 nations. The record of success for these international 
alumni is remarkable, with nearly half of all Naval Command College graduates 
having attained flag or general officer rank, and nearly a quarter of these alumni 
having become Chiefs of their Services.
Global Reach, Global Engagement, and Global Impact
7287_President'sForum.indd   7 3/1/19   10:58 AM
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Our global engagement efforts seek to maintain a robust alumni network that 
can enhance graduate effectiveness in the international environment� We con-
stantly hear from our graduates, who express praise for the way in which their 
College experiences enhance their effectiveness in maintaining global maritime 
partnerships� We continue to strengthen these partnerships through our aggres-
sive Regional Alumni Symposium series of academic conferences� They are de-
signed to encourage professional interaction among like-minded military leaders 
and allow our graduates to foster the “Newport connection” across graduating 
classes and generations�
Regional Alumni Symposia are co-hosted by the President of the College and 
a regional partner navy� Participation is open to all international and U�S� gradu-
ates of the College� Past Regional Alumni Symposia have taken place around the 
globe, including in Brazil, Germany, Peru, the Philippines, Oman, and Malaysia, 
and on our home campus in Newport, Rhode Island� The College’s seventeenth 
annual Regional Alumni Symposium will be held in Bergen, Norway, in April 
2019, co-sponsored by the Royal Norwegian Navy� The symposium will explore 
a wide range of topics under the overarching theme of “Challenges in Arctic and 
Cyber Security�”
Symposia routinely include keynote speeches by prominent military leaders 
and faculty-led panels addressing current strategic and operational issues� All 
participants are encouraged to exchange their insights and perspectives� Such 
networking develops professional linkages among military officers at critical 
junctures in their careers when international relationships prove invaluable�
These events validate the value of partners and friends in a world where you 
can surge ships and other assets rapidly to the scene of confrontation, but you 
cannot surge trust—a commodity that must be nurtured across many years� As 
former U�S� Chief of Naval Operations and founder of our modern international 
education programs Admiral Arleigh A� Burke wrote: “Most important among 
navies or among nations is friends�”
Over the past two years, we have revitalized our alumni programs with an aim 
to strengthen relationships through real-time alumni-to-alumni engagement by 
hosting in-person events such as Regional Alumni Symposia, as well as through 
a significant expansion of our online networks and learning opportunities� You 
can learn about, and participate in, our alumni programs at myUSNWC�com, or 
on Facebook at facebook�com/USNWCAlumni, or on LinkedIn at linkedin�com/
school/usnwc�
Finally, we trust that you will continue to leverage all aspects of our alumni 
network and use them as unmatched resources for professional development in 
war fighting, naval and joint operations, and maritime policy� Together, we will 
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   8 2/25/19   10:40 AM
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 P R E S I D E N T ’ S  F O RU M  9
have global impact as we build trust and confidence among our graduates and 
continue our ongoing efforts to operationalize and internationalize your U.S. 
Naval War College.
JEFFREY A. HARLEY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is a professor of strategy in 
the China Maritime Studies Institute and the recipi-
ent of the inaugural Civilian Faculty Research Excel-
lence Award at the Naval War College. He serves on 
the editorial board of the Naval War College Review 
and is an associate in research at Harvard Univer-
sity’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. 
In 2013, while deployed in the Pacific as a Regional 
Security Education Program scholar aboard USS 
Nimitz, he delivered twenty-five hours of presenta-
tions. Erickson is the author of Chinese Anti-ship 
Ballistic Missile Development (Jamestown Founda-
tion / Brookings Institution, 2013).
Joshua Hickey is a senior analyst for the Department 
of the Navy, with over fifteen years of direct subject-
matter experience.
Henry Holst is a consultant for Deloitte.
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SURGING SECOND SEA FORCE
China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement Forces, Capabilities,  
and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond
Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst
 China’s armed forces are divided into three major organizations, each of which has a maritime subcomponent� The gray-hulled People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) claims a growing portion of the PLA’s personnel and resources; 
the People’s Armed Police (PAP) leads, and increasingly reflects the paramilitary 
character of, China’s white-hulled maritime law-enforcement (MLE) forces, in-
cluding the China Coast Guard (CCG); and the militia contains a growing propor-
tion of sea-based units, the blue-hulled, PLA-controlled People’s Armed Forces 
Maritime Militia (PAFMM)� Each of China’s three sea services is the world’s larg-
est in terms of ship numbers� Unlike America’s military-focused shipbuilding 
industry, China’s massive commercial shipbuilding industry subsidizes overhead 
costs for construction of all three sea forces’ vessels� That explains in part how 
China has been able to build and modernize all three services so expeditiously, 
none more rapidly than its second sea force, centered on the consolidating CCG� 
Using a platform-based approach that spans ongoing organizational changes, 
complexity, and overlap, this article assesses these vessels, their order of battle, 
and their capabilities, as well as likely future trends and implications�1
Over the past decade-plus, China has undertaken a massive MLE modern-
ization program that has increased greatly its capability to operate MLE vessels 
in remote areas� A key contributor to near-seas maritime operations to further 
disputed sovereignty claims in the “gray zone” between peace and war, these 
CCG-centered MLE forces afford Beijing increasing influence over the regional 
maritime situation without the direct use of PLAN warships, demonstrating 
power while reducing the risk of escalation and allowing the PLAN to focus on 
other, more “naval” missions farther afield�2
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This build-out has yielded Beijing a formidable “second navy�”3 Today China 
boasts not only the world’s largest navy but also the world’s largest maritime 
law-enforcement fleet—by a sizable margin� As of 2017, China’s 17,000-plus 
CCG personnel crewed 225 ships of over five hundred tons capable of operating 
offshore, and at least another 1,050 vessels confined to closer waters, for a total 
of over 1,275—more hulls than the coast guards of all its regional neighbors 
combined�4 At more than ten thousand tons full load each, its two Zhaotou-class 
patrol ships are the world’s largest MLE ships�
China is applying lessons learned from the U�S� and Japanese coast guards as 
well as indigenous experience, including the incorporation of new ship features 
such as helicopters, interceptor boats, deck guns, and high-capacity water can-
non� Most recently constructed CCG ships now have high-output water cannon 
mounted high on their superstructures� The 2014 Haiyang Shiyou (HYSY) 981 oil 
rig standoff demonstrated their ability to inflict damage by breaking pilothouse 
windows, damaging bridge-mounted equipment, forcing water down exhaust 
funnels, and breaking bones of crewmembers on Vietnamese vessels� Many new 
CCG ships have quick-launch boat ramps astern, allowing for rapid deployment 
of interceptor boats�
China’s MLE buildup is slowing, but far from over; in 2020, China’s coast guard 
is expected to have 260 ships capable of operating offshore�5 Many are capable 
of operating anywhere in the world�6 Numbers of small craft are not expected 
to change significantly; we estimate that the CCG will continue to own at least 
another 1,050 smaller vessels confined to closer waters, for a total of more than 
1,300 hulls� From 2005 to 2020, this represents overall a fifteen-year net increase 
of four hundred total coast guard ships, among them 202 additional ships capable 
Type (tonnage) 2005 2010 2017 2020 15-Year Net Increase
Oceangoing patrol ships (2,500–10,000)  3  5  55  60  +57
Regional patrol ships (1,000–2,499)  25  30  70  80  +55
Regional patrol combatants (500–999)  30  65  100  120  +90
Subtotal: Ships that can operate offshore  58  100  225  260  +202 (+350%)
Coastal patrol craft (100–499)  350  400  450  450 +100 (approx�)
Inshore patrol boats / minor craft (<100)*  500+  500+  600+  600+ +100 (approx�)
Total: All China Coast Guard 900+ 1,000+ 1,275+ 1,300+ +400 (approx.)
TABLE 1
CHINA COAST GUARD FORCE LEVELS (2005–20)
Note:
* There are forty-ton interceptor boats stationed on at least one (probably all) of China’s offshore islands. With forward basing available in the South 
China Sea disputed areas, size is less relevant than it was previously.
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of operating offshore, representing 350 percent growth in that category� As table 
1 indicates, all types of CCG ships have increased in numbers, with the most 
significant force-level increases, proportionately, occurring in oceangoing patrol 
ships (those over 2,500 tons)�
FOUNDATION
China’s MLE modernization program has proceeded in three major phases, the 
latter two of which overlap� Phase 1 (2000–10) focused on modest, dual-role 
research and patrol ships� These were relatively small (mostly 1,000–1,750 tons, 
with several larger ships) and generally unarmed� Only a few had helicopter fa-
cilities� Phase 2 (2010–17) yielded dozens of new purpose-built offshore patrol 
ships� Much larger than phase 1 vessels (three thousand to ten thousand tons full 
load), these ships featured improved sea keeping and endurance, as well as more-
advanced (military-style) electronic systems� Internet photographs indicate that 
all CCG ships built within the last five years have a datalink antenna (such as the 
HN-900), similar to those on PLAN vessels and to the U�S� Navy’s Link 11; older 
CCG ships now are being retrofitted with such antennae� Most vessels have he-
licopter decks, some with hangars� Some ships have high-pressure water cannon 
and ten-meter-long fast-interceptor boats with twin outboard engines enabling 
a thirty-five-knot top speed, well suited for dispatch to land features for local se-
curity operations� Most new ships built in phase 2 have 30 to 76 mm guns� Phase 
3 (2014–18) backfilled with coastal law-enforcement units, primarily dozens of 
modern, capable, fast patrol combatants with guns, oriented toward traditional 
law-enforcement functions� Several medium-sized patrol ships were built to pro-
vide command and control�
In 2013, China consolidated four of its five major maritime law-enforcement 
agencies (the “five dragons”) into a new agency called the CCG� The four dragons 
thus consolidated are the former State Oceanic Administration (SOA) and its 
subordinate China Marine Surveillance (CMS); the former Maritime Police and 
Border Control, previously administered by the Ministry of Public Security; the 
former Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLE), previously administered by the Min-
istry of Agriculture; and the former Maritime Anti-smuggling Police, previously 
administered by the General Administration of Customs (GAC)� Only one major 
MLE agency remains independent of the CCG: the Maritime Safety Administra-
tion (MSA)� Another non-CCG organization, China Rescue and Salvage (CRS), 
plays a supporting non-MLE role� The latter two will be discussed briefly just 
before the conclusion of the article�
More than twenty naval and commercial shipyards have produced CCG ves-
sels over the past decade� With overhead costs reduced by a strong commercial 
shipbuilding industry, construction of coast guard and other MLE vessels is both 
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cheap and efficient� Use of commercial, off-the-shelf drivetrains and electronics, 
combined with a lack of complex combat systems, facilitates rapid assembly, with 
multiple units built simultaneously� According to contract and media details, 
typical total construction time (from start to commissioning) is twelve to eigh-
teen months for a large (over one thousand tons) patrol ship (designated WPS) 
and nine to twelve months for a smaller (under one thousand tons) patrol craft 
(WPC) or patrol combatant (WPG)�
By 1999, China had made a national-level decision to start expanding and 
modernizing its MLE agencies�7 The majority of the shipbuilding budget was 
allocated to the organization 
then known as CMS, primar-
ily responsible for enforcing 
Chinese maritime territorial 
claims and conducting off-
shore law enforcement�8 Prior 
to the turn of the century, the 
CMS force consisted primar-
ily of a limited number of 
1970s-built dual-use patrol 
and research ships, most of which were relatively small and intended for opera-
tions in near-coastal areas� None of these ships was configured specifically for 
law-enforcement duties, as no guns, helicopters, fast-interceptor boats, water 
cannon, or other MLE equipment was fitted�9
Initially, the CMS ship-modernization program focused on the acquisition of 
dual-use ships of several sizes that could perform patrol and surveillance duties, 
as well as limited research and survey activities� This initial acquisition program 
began in earnest in 2004, with most new ships launched and commissioned 
by the end of 2005� CMS received three Shuyou-class “1,000-ton” patrol ships 
(1,428 tons full load), three Shuwu-class “1,500-ton” patrol ships (1,740 tons 
full load), and the first Shucha I “3,000-ton” patrol ship (4,000 tons full load), 
which were distributed relatively evenly among the three CMS branches (North, 
East, and South)� Typical of earlier dual-use patrol ships (known colloquially as 
“WAGORs”), all three classes were fitted with stern A-frames and cranes to 
enable them to handle hydrographic and oceanographic research equipment, 
although few ever have been seen performing such roles�10 Significantly, the 
Shucha I class was fitted with a helicopter landing deck and hangar facilities—
not previously fitted to any CMS ships—giving the first indication that CMS 
intended to perform offshore missions requiring helicopter support� However, in 
keeping with the missions of SOA and CMS—stated publicly as being primarily 
Unlike America’s military-focused shipbuild-
ing industry, China’s massive commercial ship-
building industry subsidizes overhead costs for 
construction of all three sea forces’ vessels. . . . 
China has been able to build and modernize 
all three . . . expeditiously, none more rap-
idly than . . . the consolidating China Coast 
Guard.
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scientific—none of these new ships was armed with any permanent weapons�11 
Central to the CMS ship buildup was the thirty-six-hull program that began in 
2010� Supplied to provincial and municipal MLE organizations, these ships dis-
placed six hundred to 1,500 tons�
China’s other maritime law-enforcement agencies, which historically only had 
limited offshore roles and capabilities, began to acquire a small number of ships 
capable of operating offshore� By 2007, the PAP Maritime Police acquired its first 
large patrol ship, the Haixun II class’s solitary vessel, Zhong Guo Hai Jing 1001 
(now known as Hai Jing 31101). Historically, the PAP Maritime Police had oper-
ated only small, fast, heavily armed patrol craft in support of its primary respon-
sibilities of border defense, antismuggling efforts, and immigration enforcement 
(as well as regime security)� Hai Jing 31101 was equipped with a 37 mm main gun 
and a helicopter deck� It had more than four times the displacement of most PAP 
Maritime Police patrol craft, and its restricted initial operations revealed the PAP 
Maritime Police’s discomfort with operating larger ships; most PAP Maritime 
Police patrol craft crewmen were drawn from land-based defense forces rather 
than maritime backgrounds� The PAP thus had difficulty adapting to the twenty-
four-hour cycle of activity that is required when a ship goes out for days or weeks 
at a time; this was not part of its organizational culture�12 For most of its early 
career, Hai Jing 31101 rarely ventured beyond coastal waters� It was seen largely 
as a ceremonial “status” platform for the PAP Maritime Police, although in recent 
years under the CCG it has played a slightly more active offshore role�
The Bureau of Fisheries oversaw China Fisheries Law Enforcement, which 
already operated several dozen aging offshore patrol ships used for resource 
protection and fisheries enforcement� FLE began its own modest moderniza-
tion program in the first few years of the new century� This consisted mostly of 
introducing new coastal patrol craft classes, but culminated in the construction 
of the then-impressive Zhongyang-class patrol ship Zhong Guo Yu Zheng 310, 
which was launched in 2010�13 As with other MLE agencies’ recent acquisitions, 
FLE chose to equip WPS 310 with a helicopter deck and hangar—even though 
FLE did not actually own any helicopters� In its initial years, FLE used WPS 310 
extensively for offshore patrol duties, and in later years the ship would serve as 
a proof of concept for at least one follow-on class that now forms the backbone 
of the FLE fleet�
Early in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the fourth major maritime 
law-enforcement agency, GAC, had just finished building over thirty new two-
hundred-ton patrol craft (of the Hailin I and II classes) for coastal countersmug-
gling operations� It did not have a significant ship-construction program ongoing 
after about 2003�
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MSA continued its own construction program, acquiring a variety of ships 
to fulfill its specialized missions, ranging across buoy tending, environmental 
cleanup, search and rescue, light maritime towing and salvage, and port opera-
tions� MSA also acquired several large patrol ships that were able to respond to 
offshore maritime disasters and emergencies and interact with major coast guard 
organizations from other Pacific countries� MSA was the first of the five dragons 
to obtain purpose-built patrol ships large enough for transoceanic operations, 
with the two Shubian-class ships attending joint exercises in Hawaii and other 
distant locales� Unlike China’s other MLE agencies, MSA consistently has main-
tained a close working relationship with the U�S� Coast Guard, the Japan Coast 
Guard, and other regional MLE organizations�14 Unlike the other dragons, MSA 
historically has acquired a large portion of its funding from collection of port 
fees from commercial shipping, allowing it some degree of budget autonomy and 
insulation from the country’s leadership and national budget issues�15
MOVING FORWARD: CHINA’S NEW COAST GUARD
As previously noted, 2013 saw the integration (at least on paper) of four of these 
agencies into a new agency called the China Coast Guard� This reform had been 
anticipated for several years by the individual agencies, several of which appar-
ently began aggressive construction programs after 2010, perhaps in an attempt 
to assert dominance within the new organization’s command structure�16 There 
was little cooperation, with each organization (particularly FLE and CMS) appar-
ently focusing on its own ship designs�
Shortly before CCG integration, the CMS force also acquired several auxiliary 
ships that recently had been retired from PLAN service� These transfers likely 
were intended to fill gaps in patrol capabilities as China began to pursue maritime 
expansion more assertively in the South and East China Seas� The vessels in-
cluded three former intelligence-collection ships (the icebreaking Yanbing-class 
former AGI 723, the Xiang Yang Hong 9–class former AGI 852, and the Haiyang-
class former AGI 411), as well as a few other old PLAN auxiliaries, including a 
converted cable layer, a minelayer, and three large ocean salvage tugs� The former 
PLAN ships were pressed into service immediately (largely without naval guns 
and electronics), while the ship-construction program of CMS—a leading com-
ponent of the soon-to-be CCG—proceeded�17
One hallmark of CCG modernization in recent years has been the clear spe-
cialization of ships and craft toward particular missions, an outcome of procure-
ment programs initiated in the era of the five dragons�18 Moreover, China’s mas-
sive shipbuilding industry (and, presumably, shipbuilding budget) has allowed 
the CCG to focus on a variety of designs oriented toward specific requirements, 
rather than building jack-of-all-trades ships that were more flexible but less 
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capable of specific functions� However, all these ships and craft remain highly ca-
pable of acting in other roles, particularly those related to promoting sovereignty 
in disputed South and East China Sea areas�
A second hallmark of CCG modernization is a preference for evolutionary 
design modifications� Since 2010, various initial designs have been followed by 
frequent revisions in configurations and capabilities� For instance, China has 
made four sequential variations of its “regional thousand-ton” patrol-ship design 
since the program started almost a decade ago� The original variant (the Shuyou 
class) was essentially a dual-purpose research and patrol ship for CMS� It was 
equipped with A-frames and cranes at the fantail to accommodate survey activi-
ties� As the design progressed to the Shuke I, II, and III classes, the ships clearly 
evolved toward a law-enforcement role, with cranes and A-frames removed; da-
vits for small, fast boats added; and hull and superstructure modifications made 
to allow them to handle open-water operations better�
Similar upgrades have been made in other classes� These changes were both a 
result of close observation of other modern MLE ships (primarily those operated 
by the U�S� Coast Guard and Japan Coast Guard) and lessons learned by CMS, 
FLE, and other CCG agency ships operating farther offshore for longer periods�
MARITIME CUSTOMS AND ANTISMUGGLING
The segment of the CCG that performs maritime customs enforcement (for-
merly GAC) has been active in acquisitions in recent years, replacing most of 
its 1980s/1990s-built fleet of small patrol craft with three new classes of ships 
intended specifically for maritime law-enforcement and customs duties� The new 
Zhaogao-class patrol ship, of which three were built, gives the CCG additional ca-
pability for exclusive economic zone (EEZ) patrol activities, such as intercepting 
smugglers farther offshore� The 1,750-ton ship is 308 feet long and thirty-nine 
feet in beam� Unlike most CCG patrol ships, which have maximum speeds of just 
over twenty knots, the Zhaogao design has four powerful diesel engines that like-
ly allow it to reach top speeds of nearly thirty knots, with a range of five thousand 
nautical miles (nm) at fifteen knots�19 These ships also are equipped with two 
quick-launch davits for fast-interceptor boats that can be deployed while under 
way� The ships are fitted with a 30 mm automatic main gun and a helicopter deck�
A second specialty class, the Hutao I patrol combatant, is configured for 
extended patrols deep into China’s EEZ� Like the Zhaogao, the Hutao I is fitted 
with four diesels providing a full-power speed of over thirty knots via four shafts 
and propellers, and a range of five thousand nautical miles at fifteen knots� The 
625-ton Hutao I measures 223 feet long and 28�5 feet in beam� It has dual quick-
launch stern ramps, allowing it to launch and recover fast-interceptor boats while 
under way, and is armed with a single 30 mm gun, two smaller guns, and water 
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cannon� At least eight Hutao Is are operational already, and additional units con-
tinue to be built�
A third class, the Hulai II, is cosmetically similar to the ubiquitous Dutch Da-
men Stan Patrol 4207, a patrol craft operated by over a dozen navies and coast 
guards internationally� However, the Hulai II adds a third engine, once again 
giving it a top speed of over thirty knots, for missions inside China’s EEZ, particu-
larly maritime customs interdiction, and a range of 1,200 nm at eighteen knots� 
The 330-ton Hulai II is 177 feet long and twenty-four feet in beam, and also is 









 3 (Hai Jing) 33103 (Zhejiang), 
44104 (Guangdong), 46014 
(Hainan)
308 1,750  30
Hutao I 
WPG
8 (3+ new units) (Hai Jing) 31101, 31103, 
33104, 35104, 44105, 44106, 
45103 + more
223  625  30
Hutao 
III WPG
 2 44109, 44110 223  625  30
Haihei  
WPC
 2 (Hai Guan) 905 + another 205  450  37
Haifeng 
WPC
 5 (Hai Guan) 900–904 190  440 14�5
Hulai II 
WPC
15 (+ new units) (Hai Jing) 33004, 35007, 
37001, 44005, 44008, 44015–
18, 44020, 44021, 45001, 
45002, 46003 + more
177  330 14�5
Hailin I 
WPC
 25+ (Hai Jing) 44059, 44068, 
44069; (Hai Guan) 853–80 
(pennant numbers probably 
changed)




 10+ (Hai Jing) 21091, 31088, 
33086, 35089; (Hai Guan) 
881–90 (pennant numbers 
probably changed)
170  230  23
Type 611 
WPC
~10 (Hai Jing) 33028; (Hai Guan) 
823–30 (pennant numbers 
probably changed)
145  170 14�5
Haigao  
WPC
 10+ (Hai Guan) 810–20 (pennant 
numbers probably changed)
140  100 14�5
Notes:
WPC = coast guard patrol craft; WPG = coast guard patrol gunboat; WPS = coast guard patrol ship. 
The China Coast Guard overall has several hundred classes of ships; to keep this and subsequent tables manageable, only the most significant classes 
are included.
TABLE 2
CHINA COAST GUARD MARITIME CUSTOMS: NOTABLE CLASSES
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equipped with a fast-launch stern-ramp system, allowing it to deploy its intercep-
tor boat while under way� It has small arms and a smoke grenade launcher, high-
capacity water cannon, and reinforced hull rub rails� In recent years, variations 
of both the Hutao I and the Hulai II designs have been sold to export customers 
(the latter to Pakistan), indicating that these are competitive, effective designs in 
a crowded international patrol craft market� Over a dozen Hulai IIs have been 
built in the last few years, and as many as thirty total units may be built to replace 
the CCG’s older Type 611– and Hailin I/II–class patrol craft built in the 1980s 
and ’90s�20
LONG-RANGE FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT
Fisheries enforcement and other resource protection in furtherance of China’s 
territorial claims always has been a primary mission of China’s maritime agen-
cies, specifically the former FLE� FLE’s progressive integration into the CCG 
likely improved the budgetary situation for the former, which to execute its 
mission historically had relied on a jumble of older, less-capable patrol ships, a 
hodgepodge of patrol craft, and assorted converted fishing boats� Over the past 
decade the CCG’s former Fisheries Enforcement Branch embarked on an active 
program to replace and modernize its entire fleet�
Most notable with regard to long-distance fisheries enforcement is the new 
Zhaoyu-class large patrol ship, of which a dozen were commissioned from 2014 
to 2016� At 360 feet long and forty-six feet in beam, the 3,500-ton Zhaoyus have 
a traditional combatant-style hull optimized for long-distance cruising in heavy 
seas, as these ships are intended for operations well outside China’s disputed 
maritime periphery—in theory, anywhere�21 This class has an estimated top speed 
of twenty-five knots, with a range of 7,500 nm at fourteen knots� Design modi-
fications were based on lessons learned from FLE’s former flagship, the one-off 
Zhongyang-class patrol ship Zhong Guo Yu Zheng 310, which recently was trans-
ferred to the Sansha City municipality� FLE likely identified some design and 
stability flaws in the ship, and subsequently improved the Zhaoyu configuration 
by reducing the superstructure by one deck (for roll stability) and adding a stern-
launch boat ramp to deploy interceptor and boarding craft from beneath the 
helicopter deck� Additional fittings include a helicopter hangar and a substantial 
armament of one single 30 mm gun and four single automatic 12�7 mm guns�22
New to this category is the Zhaochang patrol ship, purpose-built for long-
distance fisheries enforcement with a new tumblehome hull design and a 30 mm 
gun�23 The 3,500-ton ship is 360 feet long and forty-nine feet in beam� A proof 
of concept for the CCG’s first ship with electric-drive propulsion, complete with 
diesel generators, the sole Zhaochang built to date yields a top speed of only 
twenty knots, but has a long range: ten thousand nautical miles at fifteen knots�
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Zhaochang WPS  1 (Hai Jing) 2301 360  3,500  30
Zhaoyu WPS  12 (Hai Jing) 1301–1304, 2302–
2304, 3301–3305, 46305
360  3,500  30
Zhaotim WPS 14–15 (Hai Jing) 1102–1104, 
3104–3106, 21115, 31115, 
33115, 35115, 37115, 46115; (Yu 
Zheng) 45005, 45013, 45036
269  1,764  30
Dalang I WPS 
(ex-PLAN)
 1 (Hai Jing) 3411 370  4,500  30
Zhongeng WPS 10+ (Yu Zheng) 13001, 32501, 
33001, 33006, 35001, 37008, 
44061, 45001, 46012 + more
180 ~1,000 14�5
Zhongwen WPS  1 (Yu Zheng) 21103 195  850 unknown
Zhongke WPG  6+ (Yu Zheng) 21101, 21111, 
27061, 33018, 33205, 45002 + 
possibly more
180  ~500 unknown
Zhongem WPG  2 (Yu Zheng) 37361 190  550 14�5
Zhongtao WPC 50+ (Yu Zheng) 12002, 21006, 
21009, 21137, 21202, 21401, 
32511, 32521, 32528, 32543, 
32545, 33012, 33015–19, 33023, 
33025, 33129, 33316, 33416, 
33417, 37001, 37005, 37015, 
37529, 37601, 45012, 46013 + 
more
160–70 300–450 14�5
Zhongsui WPC  6 (Yu Zheng) 35199, 44601–603, 
44606, 45003
165  ~350 14�5
Duancude WPC 10+ (Yu Zheng) 21402, 31006, 
37057, 37206, 37518 + more
130  ~200 none
Nanhua Type A 
WPC
 ~10 (Yu Zheng) 44025, 44081, 
44121, 44168; (Hai Jian) 9040, 
9060 (additional units operated 
by China MSA and PLA MTS)
110  150  23
Zhongbong 
WPC
10+ (Yu Zheng) 13203, 13301, 
32511, 37078, 37163, 37606, 
37607 
100–20  ~150 none
Fisheries patrol 
trawlers
30+ (Yu Zheng) variety of designs 
and numbers
100–20 250–600 none,  
generally
Red Arrow WPB 50+ 4-digit, ending in H 40  15 none
TABLE 3
CHINA COAST GUARD FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT ORDER OF BATTLE (SELECTED)
Notes:
MSA = Maritime Safety Administration; MTS = Maritime Transport Squadron (Army Logistics); PLA = People’s Liberation Army; PLAN = People’s Libera-
tion Army Navy; WPB = coast guard patrol boat; WPC = coast guard patrol craft; WPG = coast guard patrol gunboat; WPS = coast guard patrol ship.
The six classes at the bottom of the table (beginning with the Zhongsui WPC), while relatively small in tonnage, are deployable to Chinese-occupied 
features in the South China Sea, and may well be used thus.
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For regional fisheries-enforcement operations—particularly in disputed 
fisheries areas adjacent to Vietnam (e�g�, the Gulf of Tonkin), Japan, and the 
Koreas—the CCG built a large class of smaller patrol ships, the Zhaotim class� 
The fourteen or fifteen 269-foot-long, thirty-nine-foot-beam, 1,764-ton ships in 
this class are optimized for regional, medium-endurance patrols, with a reported 
7,500-mile range at thirteen knots, an ice-strengthened hull (for operations in the 
northern Bo Hai [formerly known as the Gulf of Chihli]), a 30 mm gun, two small 
fast-interceptor boats, and a moderate towing capability to assist disabled fishing 
boats� With their regional, near-shore focus, Zhaotims lack helicopter facilities� 
The relatively beamy, low-slung hull design, with bulbous bow, indicates that sea 
keeping in heavy weather and efficiency were key design factors, rather than the 
high speed and maneuverability prioritized in other CCG ships intended for in-
terdiction duties� (Fishing boats, typically low speed, cannot outrun even patrol 
ships whose top speed does not exceed twenty knots, such as the Zhaotim class�)
Provincial-level fisheries law-enforcement agencies also have undertaken a 
major modernization program� As late as the 1990s, PRC coastal fisheries en-
forcement predominantly was performed by converted fishing boats and vari-
ous older patrol craft� However, in the last decade local forces have built about 
a dozen different designs of thirty-five-to-sixty-meter coastal patrol craft and 
combatants for more-local, short-endurance enforcement duties� Most notably, 
the fifty-meter, 450-ton Zhongtao class has been in constant production since 
the early years of this century, with over fifty units built at six shipyards to date�
All units share a common hull and basic superstructure design, but vary sig-
nificantly in how they are fitted out topside, depending on operational location 
and typical weather conditions� For operational areas where assertive fishermen 
may use collisions and shouldering as a defense against enforcement (e�g�, the 
Gulf of Tonkin), Zhongtao units have reinforced ribbing along the hulls� For op-
erational areas with heavier sea conditions (e�g�, the East China Sea), Zhongtao 
units may have raised bow bulwarks� Some units stationed in the Yellow Sea and 
Bo Hai may have ice-strengthened bows� Earlier units used small, davit-launched 
interceptor boats, while later units have a stern gate and quick-launch ramp� The 
Zhongtao class is yet another example of coast guard designers adapting and 
learning operational lessons when building new ships and patrol craft�
OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, AND  
SOVEREIGNTY ENFORCEMENT
While the CCG in its entirety has a general role of performing offshore surveil-
lance and patrol (particularly with its larger patrol ships), as well as border de-
fense and territorial enforcement, historically these roles were played primarily 
by two former dragons: CMS and the PAP Maritime Police� CMS was primarily 
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responsible for offshore duties, with much of its force composed of larger ships 
capable of longer-endurance operations and dual hatted as oceanographic re-
search ships�
As a component of the well-funded SOA, CMS substantially bolstered its new 
shipbuilding programs during and after the consolidation with orders for several 
new classes of large ships (most of which eventually were commissioned into the 
now-consolidated CCG)� New CMS ships clearly were built with a primary role 
of open-seas, long-term patrol and surveillance duties, and were less equipped for 
law-enforcement interception, fisheries administration, oceanographic research, 
or safety of life at sea (SOLAS) 
roles than CCG ships built 
prior to 2012�24
The most notable of the 
new ships built for the CCG 
in recent years were the two 
massive Zhaotou-class flag-
ships, one each based in the south and the east� The Zhaotous have received an 
inordinate amount of media attention owing to their great size: with a length of 
165 meters (541 feet), a beam of more than twenty meters (over sixty-five feet), 
and a full load of more than ten thousand tons, their displacement is greater than 
that of modern naval destroyers� Their estimated speed is twenty-five knots, their 
range 15,000 nm�
However, the substantive rationale for construction of these ships is unclear, 
as they do not offer any technical advantages vis-à-vis other, smaller, patrol ships 
built recently for the CCG�25 There are Internet rumors that the ships were or-
dered in direct response to Japan’s deployment of its 9,500-ton Shikishima-class 
cutters to the Senkakus in 2013, which at the time dwarfed any ships in the CCG 
inventory, suggesting that construction of the Zhaotou class represents a point 
of pride for China—to have the world’s largest coast guard ships—rather than 
an actual capability requirement� While that rationale is speculative at best, the 
Zhaotou design nonetheless does provide the CCG with a large platform that can 
operate anywhere in the world with maximum endurance, while carrying a heli-
copter and mounting a 76 mm main gun� It is unlikely that any additional units 
of this class will be built, however, owing to the ship’s berthing requirements and 
the presumably higher cost of operations without any tangible benefit in capabil-
ity compared with smaller CCG patrol ships�26
Since consolidation, the CCG’s three most effective new classes of large patrol 
ships have been the Shucha II, Shuoshi II, and Zhaolai classes, all of which are 
based on earlier classes that were operational before the CCG reform� The Shucha 
II, of which ten units are currently operational, is based on the Shucha I design 
CCG-centered MLE forces afford Beijing in-
creasing influence over the regional maritime 
situation without the direct use of PLAN war-
ships, demonstrating power while reducing the 
risk of escalation.
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originally built for CMS early in the new century� When built, the Shucha I was 
the most modern ship in the CMS inventory, combining long-distance endur-
ance with a substantial ability to perform oceanographic research� The Shucha II 
improved on this design and oriented the mission strictly toward patrol activities 
by eliminating the survey handling equipment and stern A-frame, replacing them 
with a larger helicopter deck and launch facilities for small interceptor boats� The 
Shucha II, like its predecessor, is equipped with a hybrid diesel-electric power 
plant—providing good cruising efficiency and range—and a drivetrain that uses 
steerable electric propulsor pods—giving it excellent maneuverability� Moreover, 
Shucha II has positions available for installation of 30 mm main guns in the fu-
ture, if required�27
Arguably comprising the most capable and versatile class in the CCG, the four 
Shuoshi II–class units are based on MSA’s flagship Hai Xun 01, built several years 
earlier� With a length of 130 m and beam of 16 m (fifty-two feet) and a 5,800-ton 
displacement, it is similar in overall size and design to the U�S� Coast Guard’s 
Legend-class National Security Cutter� The Shuoshi II design is configured for 
long-distance open-ocean operations in any weather conditions� It is fitted with 
high-capacity water cannon and a helicopter landing deck and hangar, and has 
design provisions for the future fitting of a 76 mm gun� However, unlike that of 
many other large, purpose-built patrol ships the CCG operates, a Shuoshi II’s 
aft area is considered a “working stern,” capable of performing light rescue and 
salvage operations and moderate towing of ships at sea, giving this class a well-
rounded capability that is not limited to law-enforcement operations� While it 
remains unclear whether additional hulls will be built, this is one of the world’s 
most capable, versatile MLE vessels�28
The Zhaolai-class patrol ship likely was an off-the-shelf design intended to 
provide the capability quickly to interact with Japanese and Vietnamese vessels in 
the Senkakus and the South China Sea� The Zhaolai is based closely on the CRS 
Hai Jiu 111–class salvage and rescue ship, giving it a heavy-duty hull, a powerful 
engineering plant, and the ability to operate in even the worst sea and weather 
conditions� The 4,800-ton Zhaolai design eliminated the large salvage cranes 
present on the CRS variant and added davits for small interceptor boats� Each of 
the CCG’s four Zhaolais also is equipped with a helicopter landing deck and has 
a mount position forward for a 76 mm gun, should the CCG desire to backfit the 
ship with one� Among CCG ships, the Zhaolai is configured best for heavy towing 
and shouldering of other ships, and its large, high-mounted water cannon can be 
used both for firefighting and for dousing smaller foreign ships during close-in, 
nonkinetic dissuasion operations� As the Zhaolai was initially an off-the-shelf 
stopgap solution to CCG capability shortfalls and is inferior to more-specialized 
designs, it is unlikely that additional units will be built�29
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Zhaotou WPS  2 (Hai Jing) 2901, 3901 541 10,000+ 76, 30
Zhaoduan WPS  6 (Hai Jing) 31301–303, 46301–303 450  4,000+ 76
Zhaojun WPS  9 21111, 33111, 35111, 37111, 44111, 45111, 46111–13 328  2,700 76
Shuoshi II WPS  4 (Hai Jing) 1501, 2501, 2502, 3501 426  5,800 76 (prov�)
Zhaolai WPS  4 (Hai Jing) 1401, 2401, 3401, 3402 325  4,800 76 (prov�)
Shucha II WPS  10 (Hai Jing) 1305–307, 2305–308, 
3306–308 321  4,000 30
Hai Yang WPS  
(ex-PLAN)
 1 (Hai Jing) 3368 345  3,325 none
Kanjie WPS  
(ex-PLAN)
 1 (Hai Jing) 2506 425  5,830 removed
Type 053 
Jiangwei I WFF 
(ex-PLAN)
 3 (Hai Jing) 31239 [former PLAN 
FF 539], 31240 [former PLAN FF 
540], 31241 [former PLAN FF 541]
367  2,000 37
Shusheng WPS  5 (Hai Jian) 1010, 2115, 3015, 7008, 
9010
290  1,750 14�5 (prov�)
Shuke I/II/III 
WPS
20 I: (Hai Jing) 1127
II: (Hai Jing) 1123, 1126, 2166, 
3175
III: (Hai Jing) 2112, 2113, 3111– 
13; (Hai Jian) 1002, 1013, 2032, 
2168, 4001, 4002, 4072; (Yu Zheng) 
46016 
245–65  1,450 none
Shuyou WPS  3 (Hai Jing) 1117, 2146, 3171 242  1,000 none
Shuwu WPS  3 (Hai Jing) 1115, 2151, 3184 288  1,750 none
Tuzhong WPS  
(ex-PLAN)
 3 (Hai Jing) 1310, 2337, 3367 278  3,300 none
Haixun II WPS  1 (Hai Jing) 31101 311  1,900 37, 23
Haijian 
WAGOR/WPS
 4 (Hai Jian) 1118, 2149, 3172, 3174 230  1,350 none
Shuzao II/III 
WPG
 15 II: (Hai Jian) 9012
III: (Hai Jian) 1015, 1116, 1117, 
2030, 3011, 3012, 4067, 4073, 5030, 
7018, 7028, 7038, 8003, 8027
215 600 12�7
TABLE 4
CHINA COAST GUARD OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, AND SOVEREIGNTY- 
ENFORCEMENT ORDER OF BATTLE (SELECTED)
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Meanwhile, the PAP Maritime Police was primarily a coastal and riverine force 
not known for its members’ seamanship skills, as most of its personnel origi-
nated in ground-based PAP units�30 The CCG currently is building a significant 
number of patrol ships from two new, highly capable classes that apparently were 
ordered before CCG consolidation by the then PAP Maritime Police (i�e�, the old 
coast guard)� The larger of these classes, the Zhaoduan (Type 818), is the CCG’s 
newest and fastest class under construction� It is based directly on the PLAN’s 
Jiangkai II (Type 054)–class guided-missile frigate, using an almost identical 
hull and likely the same powerful 2+2 combined diesel and diesel (referred to as 
“CODAD”) power plant� This naval design has proved highly reliable in PLAN 
antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden� The overall configuration of the Zhao-
duan is similar to the Jiangkai II above the main deck as well, but with an ad-
ditional superstructure deck added and some other topside changes� The Zhao-
duan lacks the powerful combat systems of the Jiangkai II, eliminating the HQ-16 
vertical-launch surface-to-air missile system, close-in-weapon systems, and long-
range military electronics�31 However, the Zhaoduan does retain the same 76 mm 
main gun as the Jiangkai II� Together with two 30 mm guns, this makes it the 
CCG’s most heavily armed ship� Its helicopter landing area and hangar accom-
modate Z-9, AW109, or EC135 helicopters� With the propulsion system from the 
Jiangkai II but a reduced displacement of something over four thousand tons, the 
Zhao duan likely can attain a top speed of over thirty knots, making it one of the 
world’s fastest large coast guard ships, with a ten-thousand-nautical-mile range 
at fifteen knots� These qualities will make the Zhaoduan a go-to workhorse for 
the CCG� Six units of this class have been launched to date, and additional units 
have been ordered, according to some media sources�32
The CCG also is building the smaller Zhaojun (Type 718)–class cutter, using 












30+ (Hai Jing) 015,* 12001, 13101, 
13102, 21101–104, 31102, 32102, 
33101, 33102, 35101–103, 37101, 
37102, 44101, 44103, 45101, 45102, 
46101, 46102, 46105, 46106 + 
more
201–208 650 25 or 30
CHINA COAST GUARD OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, AND SOVEREIGNTY- 
ENFORCEMENT ORDER OF BATTLE (SELECTED) CONTINUED
Notes:
PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy; prov. = provisional (i.e., collar fitted but no gun mounted); WAGOR = oceanographic research ship; WFF = coast 
guard frigate; WPS = coast guard patrol ship.
* This is a training vessel subordinate to the Maritime Police Academy, but is nonetheless fully combat capable.
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long and forty-three feet in beam� Its estimated maximum speed is twenty-five 
knots, its range 6,500 nm� At least nine of these patrol ships have been launched 
to date, with several already operational, and additional units are possible� The 
Zhaojun has a helicopter deck and a small interceptor boat–launch facility� Like 
the Zhaoduan, it is fitted with a 76 mm main gun forward�33
Capable of operating offshore for regional security missions, Type 618B-II pa-
trol combatants performed with distinction in the 2014 HYSY 981 oil rig stand-
off� They displace 650 tons, 
are up to 208 feet long and 
thirty feet in beam, and have 
a large power plant capable of 
around thirty knots top speed 
and a two-thousand-nautical-
mile range� They are also very 
maneuverable� The CCG’s more than twenty-five hulls of this type each have a 
25 mm or 30 mm main gun and high-capacity water cannon� Some units have a 
fast-boat launch ramp at the stern�
Aside from these purpose-built border-defense ships and craft, the CCG has 
accepted three former PLAN Jiangwei I patrol frigates� Their missiles and most 
naval systems have been removed, but each retains twin 37 mm guns and a heli-
copter hangar� These ships are only two thousand tons in displacement, 367 feet 
in length, and 40�7 feet in beam; their strength is a top speed of around thirty 
knots and a range of 4,500 nm at eighteen knots�
FACILITIES
In recent years, copious open-source information has indicated that China is 
consolidating its myriad MLE facilities into a smaller number of larger bases with 
substantial berthing capacity and other shoreside infrastructure� Although the 
precise number of CCG maritime facilities in China is difficult to determine, the 
service is thought to have over two hundred total facilities at which ships or small 
craft are stationed�34 However, fewer than forty of these are regarded as large 
bases that can accommodate offshore-capable patrol ships� The rest provide bas-
ing for coastal or local patrol craft and patrol boats� Many of these smaller bases 
are collocated with or near fishing harbors, and are home to FLE patrol craft that 
require limited shoreside infrastructure� Many other facilities host even smaller 
inshore patrol boats, and essentially are just a small pier or jetty with a single 
support building, if that�35
In recent years, the most substantial CCG bases have been expanded signifi-
cantly, with much larger piers to accommodate all the new ships and substantial 
shoreside capacities, including barracks, athletic facilities, and, in some cases, 
Today China boasts not only the world’s larg-
est navy but also the world’s largest maritime 
law-enforcement fleet—by a sizable margin  
. . . —more hulls than the coast guards of all 
its regional neighbors combined.
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Location Province or Equivalent Coordinates  (approx. latitude/longitude)
Beihai Guangxi 21�485, 109�084
Fangchenggang Shiping Guangxi 21�626, 108�316
Qinzhou Guangxi 21�736, 108�639
Jinzhou Liaoning 40�846, 121�103
Fuzhou Guling Fujian 26�055, 119�353
Fuzhou Tingjiang Fujian 26�074, 119�513
Xiamen downtown Fujian 24�467, 118�065
Xiamen China Coast Guard (CCG)
base
Fujian 24�511, 118�065
Dalian Mianhuadao Shandong 39�006, 121�675
Dalian Wantong Shandong 39�010, 121�709
Yantai Yangma Dao Shandong 37�444, 121�582
Yantai Zhifu Bay Shandong 37�545, 121�392
Tianjin port area Tianjin  38�985, 117�728 (vicinity)
Guangzhou Taihe Guangdong 23�109, 113�395
Huangpu Changzhou Guangdong 23�077, 113�432
Huangpu Luntou Guangdong 23�078, 113�375
Shantou Guangdong 23�353, 116�688
Zhanjiang Tiaoshun Guangdong 21�286, 110�409
Qinhuangdao fishing wharf Hebei 39�921, 119�617
Qinhuangdao coal terminal Hebei 39�935, 119�668
Shanghai Fuxing Dao Shanghai 31�288, 121�561
Shanghai Gaoqiao Shanghai 31�357, 121�614
Shanghai port facility Shanghai 31�384, 121�549
Nantong Jiangsu 31�908, 120�910
Haikou port Hainan 20�031, 110�278
Haikou Haidian River Hainan 20�025, 110�323
Sanya Hainan 18�233, 109�492
Wenchang Hainan 19�560, 110�825
Qingdao Tuandao Inlet Shandong 36�050, 120�298
TABLE 5
SELECTED MAJOR CHINA COAST GUARD FACILITIES
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limited ship-repair facilities� Growing emphasis on ship repair shows both an 
understanding of a maturing fleet’s operational needs and a desire to avoid being 
subordinated to the PLAN for access to maintenance� As part of these efforts, the 
CCG built its first floating dry dock� The dock can be moved to different locations, 
including South China Sea “features,” and can accommodate smaller patrol ships�
Although the CCG reform began in 2013, in most cases the service’s facilities 
remain somewhat segregated according to organizational mission; that is, bases 
that previously hosted FLE ships continue to host ships that perform fisheries-
enforcement activities� It is unclear whether duplicative facilities will be elimi-
nated in the future�36
CHINA MARITIME SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
MSA was not included in the 2013 CCG consolidation and remains an indepen-
dent agency with its own fleet and facilities� MSA is responsible for the control 
and securing of China’s maritime ports and commercial maritime traffic, for aids 
to navigation (buoys, lighthouses, etc�), for pollution control, and for SOLAS, 
among other missions� MSA’s presence largely is limited to China’s territorial 
waters, although the agency does have several large patrol ships that occasionally 
take long voyages for joint exercises with other nations’ coast guard forces or to 
participate in search-and-rescue operations (such as searching for the missing 
plane from Malaysia Airlines Flight 370)� However, the great majority of the MSA 
fleet is composed of hundreds of coastal patrol craft; thousands of inshore patrol 
boats; and a variety of specialized vessels used for buoy tending, hydrographic 
survey, pollution cleanup, and other utilitarian roles�37
MSA, while considered a law-enforcement agency, generally is not involved 
in territorial disputes (such as in the South China Sea or Senkakus), fisheries 
enforcement, customs, or other countercriminal activities� MSA maintains a 
good working relationship with regional forces, including the U�S� Coast Guard, 
Location Province or Equivalent Coordinates  (approx. latitude/longitude)
Qingdao port area Shandong 36�082, 120�309
Qingdao Huangdao Shandong 36�005, 120�272
Zhoushan Waichangzhi Zhejiang 29�980, 122�082
Ningbo CCG Academy Zhejiang 29�945, 121�710
Wenzhou Lucheng Zhejiang 28�025, 120�672
SELECTED MAJOR CHINA COAST GUARD FACILITIES CONTINUED
Source: Located via Google Earth.
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the Japan Coast Guard, and South Korea’s Korea Coast Guard, and often works 
jointly with these forces�38
CHINA RESCUE AND SALVAGE
CRS, while not a law-enforcement organization, nonetheless is a government- 
run agency under China’s Ministry of Transportation that has a substantial pres-
ence in China’s maritime realm� CRS operates both in an official capacity (in 
support of SOLAS) and in a commercial capacity, taking on contract work rang-
ing from towing stranded ships and salvaging sunken ships to transporting and 
placing commercial oil rigs�
Profits from this commercial side provide CRS with a substantial independent 
budget, much of which CRS spends on constant modernization of its impres-
sively large fleet of rescue, salvage, heavy-transport, semisubmersible, and large 
crane ships� The most visible CRS units are the thirty-plus modern rescue and 
salvage ships, which spend most of their time loitering in busy maritime traffic 
areas and roadsteads off Chinese ports�
CRS has several major bases, some of which are collocated with or near CCG 
or MSA facilities, but CRS generally does not operate with or interact heavily 
with CCG forces�39 While CRS’s large ships may be present in the vicinity of mari-
time disputes, they typically are there only to provide rescue in case of damage 
to other-agency (or foreign) ships and do not get involved in any enforcement or 
deterrence activities�
CRS is highly regarded in the international maritime community owing to 
its courageous, professional, and experienced personnel, strong rescue ethic, 
modern and highly capable fleet of ships, and lack of involvement in maritime 
disputes� CRS ships often are contracted to perform transport and other work 
around the globe�40
In building both the world’s largest coast guard and the largest overall MLE 
force, China has achieved an impressive increase in its maritime capabilities� It 
has leveraged massive capacity for building all sizes of patrol ships, cost relief 
from commercial construction profits, and domestic production of most systems 
(including engines and electronics) to field a formidable number and variety of 
ships specialized for different roles and operating areas� Enhanced CCG capacity 
is envisioned to allow the PLAN to focus on naval roles beyond the first island 
chain, with a commensurate reduction in PLAN small patrol craft over the past 
decade�41 Moreover, new CCG ships capable of long-distance operations in 
higher seas—the largest capable of operating globally—could permit extended 
deployments beyond maritime East Asia (e�g�, to conduct antipiracy patrols or 
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perform escort duties along sea lines of communication)� CCG modernization 
and expansion afford China presence and influence to further its East and South 
China Seas sovereignty claims while maintaining both domestic and interna-
tional law-enforcement capability regionally�
China will continue to modernize its MLE agencies’ respective fleets, with pri-
mary emphasis on the consolidated CCG� However, the winding down of the ma-
jor ship-construction program of 2010–17 portends less class variation and more 
focus on future construction 
of a few (perhaps three or 
four) major classes and sever-
al minor classes, to streamline 
logistics and operations� Em-
phasis on size is giving way to 
emphasis on speed and filling capability gaps� The CCG likely will continue to grow 
numerically but is unlikely to repeat the rate of growth of the past decade—primarily 
because China by now has replaced virtually all its older, less-capable large patrol 
ships�
In the coming decade, China likely will prioritize smaller coastal-patrol craft 
and patrol combatants to continue replacement of the large fleet of small craft 
that were built largely in the 1990s and are nearing the end of their operational 
life spans� The CCG undoubtedly will focus on remedying its major remaining 
areas of weakness: severe rotary-wing limitations (only about fifty helicopter-
capable ships and few helicopters); uneven existing crew training, with seaman-
ship competency depending on former agency; and ships being produced faster 
than new crewmembers can be trained�42 To improve situational awareness, the 
CCG likely will acquire additional maritime-patrol aircraft, including helicopters 
(imported or domestic)� It will strive to strengthen planning, communications, 
and operational control�
While China will continue to focus on security enforcement of its established 
territorial waters and EEZ, the CCG will continue to operate regularly through-
out waters within the first island chain to support China’s maritime claims, as well 
as to perform enforcement and surveillance operations� Forward-basing CCG 
units on augmented features in the Paracels and Spratlys will enhance operational 
tempo and facilitate coordination with the PLAN and PAFMM�
These expanding CCG capabilities support a decisive shift in Chinese mari-
time strategy: from a three-sea-force focus on regional seas to an evolving divi-
sion of labor in which its first sea force—the PLAN—significantly increases its 
overseas missions and focus� While regional operations likely will remain the 
focus for China’s second sea force, its MLE forces centered on the CCG, the 
larger CCG ships increasingly could deploy out of area into the Pacific and Indian 
[M]assive infrastructure builds, evolutionary 
ship designs, and extensive use of commercial, 
off-the-shelf components offer China the abil-
ity to surge CCG ship construction rapidly.
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Authors’ note: The information in this article 
does not rely heavily on other finished aca-
demic papers or analyses, although several of 
these are cited for context� Instead, the great 
majority of supporting information derives 
from the authors’ compilation and original 
analysis of a vast body of available open-
source, firsthand information, almost all of 
which is posted on the Internet� The majority 
comes directly from tens of thousands of spe-
cific Internet and media sources that cannot 
be listed individually� For a full discussion of 
the documentation methodology and sources 
used herein, see the China Analysis from 





 1� This article surveys China’s principal MLE 
ships from a platform-centric perspective, 
organized by mission set� Broadly catego-
rized, MLE forces include the national-level 
China Coast Guard; the portion of China 
Marine Surveillance (CMS) and Fisheries 
Law Enforcement (FLE) vessels organized at 
the subnational level (which still exist and are 
active in the “gray zone,” but are not included 
in the CCG); Maritime Safety Administration 
(MSA) vessels, which exist outside the CCG 
even at the national level; and China Rescue 
and Salvage (CRS) vessels, which are outside 
the CCG even at the national level and generally 
play only supporting (not MLE/sovereignty-
upholding) roles� The present analysis 
spotlights the CCG as the core organizing 
entity for the majority of China’s MLE forces 
at the national level, whose consolidation 
remains a work in progress, and refers to 
them broadly as “China’s coast guard�” The 
article also addresses some of the most 
important non-CCG ships, including from 
provincial-level—but not municipal—MLE 
organizations� This ecumenical, organization-
ally flexible approach, which acknowledges 
the complexities and vicissitudes of China’s 
evolving empirical reality, has the virtue that 
the vessels themselves remain discrete and 
readily identifiable amid substantial changes 
in leadership, control, and nomenclature� 
China’s MLE organizations have been recon-
figured tremendously in recent years (and 
reforms remain ongoing), and vessels have 
shifted both among them (as well as having 
been transferred in from the PLAN) and in 
their relationship to the gray zone� The past 
decade also has witnessed multiple firsts in 
terms of China’s MLE assets operating in cer-
tain areas� MLE fleet usage, like the general 
regional situation, is fluid� Ships from all the 
agencies (including FLE, General Adminis-
tration of Customs [GAC], and MSA) have 
been observed participating in, or at least in 
the vicinity of, conflicts in the gray zone� For 
instance, while GAC vessels are absent from 
many gray-zone operations, GAC patrol craft 
can be seen in photos of the China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation Haiyang Shiyou 
(HYSY) 981 oil rig operations� Accordingly, 
our coverage includes some MLE ships and 
forces (e�g�, GAC, MSA, and CRS) that are 
not always involved in gray-zone operations, 
but conceivably could become involved in the 
future, particularly as features the Chinese 
have augmented in the South China Sea offer 
forward-deployment options� Moreover, not 
Oceans, both to increase presence and influence and to participate in joint coast 
guard exercises with other major countries, including the United States, Japan, 
South Korea, Russia, and India�
As before, designs will be adapted to suit new missions� Moreover, massive in-
frastructure builds, evolutionary ship designs, and extensive use of commercial, 
off-the-shelf components offer China the ability to surge CCG ship construction 
rapidly, if desired� When it comes to rapidity of fleet expansion and moderniza-
tion, China’s second sea force already is leading the way�
N O T E S
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all CCG ships are relevant to gray-zone op-
erations� Some are too small to be considered 
“oceangoing,” although this is a subjective 
term� For instance, many ships perform-
ing disputed-area operations and similar 
functions displace fewer than five hundred 
tons, leaving no identifiable size cutoff in 
this regard� Conversely, some ships outside 
the CCG are relevant to rights-protection/
gray-zone missions� The CCG reorganiza-
tion in 2013 incorporated only national-level 
assets, not provincial, county, or municipal 
MLE vessels� For example, the Zhongtao class 
is not actually part of the CCG, but rather is 
part of provincial-level fisheries-enforcement 
resources� CMS also has provincial-level 
cutters� Guangdong and Hainan Provinces 
have provincial-, county-, and municipal-
level cutters relevant to rights-protection/
gray-zone missions� One vessel dramatically 
encapsulates the value of a platform-centric 
approach: Having joined FLE in November 
2010, Zhongyang-class patrol ship Zhong Guo 
Yu Zheng 310 conducted multiple rights- 
protection missions when it was homeported 
in Guangzhou, including the 2012 Scar-
borough Reef standoff and its March 2013 
jamming of Indonesian Ministry of Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries vessel Hiu Macan 001� 
From July 2013 to May 2015 the vessel was 
designated CCG 3210 and participated in the 
2014 HYSY 981 incident� Redesignated Sansha 
City Comprehensive Law Enforcement 1 in 
May 2015, the ship now is based in Sansha 
City and engages in further sovereignty 
missions� Scott Bentley, “Indonesia’s ‘Global 
Maritime Nexus’: Looming Challenges at Sea 
for Jokowi’s Administration,” The Strategist, 
September 24, 2014, www�aspistrategist 
�org�au/; Ryan D� Martinson, “The Lives of 
a Chinese Gunboat,” U�S� Naval Institute 
Proceedings 142/6/1,360 (June 2016), pp� 
34–39� For the leading organization-centric 
analysis of the CCG, see Ryan D� Martinson, 
Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in 
Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy, China 
Maritime Study 15 (Newport, RI: Naval War 
College Press, February 2018), available at 
digital-commons�usnwc�edu/� The authors 
thank Ryan Martinson and Barney Moreland 
for helpful inputs�
 2� For analysis of Chinese MLE participation in 
gray-zone operations, see Andrew S� Erickson 
and Ryan D� Martinson, China’s Maritime 
Gray Zone Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2019)�
 3� Ryan D� Martinson, “China’s Second Navy,” 
U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings 141/4/1,346 
(April 2015), available at www�usni�org/�
 4� Lyle J� Morris, “Blunt Defenders of Sover-
eignty: The Rise of Coast Guards in East and 
Southeast Asia,” Naval War College Review 70, 
no� 2 (Spring 2017), p� 84� Japan’s coast guard 
has around eighty hulls and South Korea’s 
forty-five, and the U�S� Coast Guard has fifty� 
Unless otherwise specified, all such numbers 
represent the authors’ estimates based on 
open sources�
 5� Tonnage and displacement are not an ac-
curate measure of sea keeping� For example, 
many PAFMM boats can operate across the 
ocean, but most are below five hundred tons� 
In contrast, some vessels of greater than a 
thousand tons are not suited to offshore 
operations� For ease of readability and 
metrics, this article’s tables group vessels as 
“oceangoing” or “offshore capable,” but in 
reality there is no set measure for assigning a 
ship to such categories� The phrase capable of 
operating offshore and the numbers associated 
with it are the product of analysis aimed at 
determining which specific ships can operate 
competently at significant distances from the 
coast� Ships that cannot operate offshore are 
not included, regardless of displacement�
 6� The CCG lacks underway replenishment 
capabilities, so port access is essential when 
additional supplies are needed�
 7� Ryan D� Martinson, “From Words to Actions: 
The Creation of the China Coast Guard” 
(paper presented at the “China as a ‘Maritime 
Power’ Conference,” CNA conference facility, 
Arlington, VA, July 28–29, 2015), p� 14, avail-
able at www�cna�org/�
 8� Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: 
New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st 
Century (Washington, DC: 2015), pp� 44–45, 
including fig� 5-3 (“Regional Maritime Law 
Enforcement Comparison”); Martinson, 
“From Words to Actions”; Swee Lean Collin 
Koh, “Beijing’s ‘White Hull’ Challenge in the 
South China Sea,” National Interest, January 
13, 2016, www�nationalinterest�org/�
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 9� Stephen Saunders, China listings in IHS Jane’s 
Fighting Ships, 116th ed� and earlier�
 10� Most U�S�-allied military organizations used 
this term during the 1990s and early years of 
the following decade to describe white hulls� 
WAGOR = (W)AGOR, with W indicating a 
nonnaval designation and AGOR signifying 
an oceanographic research ship�
 11� Masafumi Iida, “Maritime Expansion by 
China,” Sasakawa USA, October 22, 2014, 
spfusa�org/�
 12� By contrast, SOA drew its officers primarily 
from among retired PLAN officers and MSA 
drew its officers from the merchant fleet, so 
both services had an easier time adapting 
to larger offshore vessels� Barney Moreland 
[Capt�, USCG (Ret�)], personal interview, De-
cember 3, 2018� Captain Moreland is a former 
U�S� Coast Guard liaison officer to China�
 13� Its launch was delayed by several years be-
cause the 2008 Wenzhou earthquake caused 
the government to sweep unspent moneys to 
effect recovery, which pushed back shipbuild-
ing schedules� To cover the gap, FLE took 
possession of an old PLAN submarine rescue 
ship and recommissioned it as FLE 311, 
until the purpose-built cutter 310 could be 
constructed� Ibid�
 14� The Fisheries Law Enforcement Command 
also has had a very close working relationship 
with the U�S� Coast Guard�
 15� Xiao Ming, “China Maritime Safety Admin-
istration in the New Millennium: Challenges 
and Strategies,” Paper 424 (dissertation, 
World Maritime Univ�, 2000), especially pp� 
13, 21, available at commons�wmu�se/�
 16� See, for example, Yang Chang, “Zhongguo 
Haijian Tianjin Shi weiquan zhifa chuandui 
guapai” [CMS Tianjin rights-protection 
law-enforcement fleet is set up], China Ocean 
News, April 19, 2013, p� 4; Martinson, “From 
Words to Actions,” pp� 18, 44–45; Ryan Mar-
tinson, “Power to the Provinces: The Devolu-
tion of China’s Maritime Rights Protection,” 
Jamestown Foundation China Brief 14, no� 17 
(September 10, 2014), available at jamestown 
�org/�
 17� 孙鼎 [Sun Ding], 海监队员是怎样炼成
的 [“How CMS Personnel Are Trained”], 中
国海洋报 [China Ocean News], December 
27, 2013, p� 3; Martinson, “From Words to 
Actions,” pp� 14, 22; 海洋发展战略研究所
课题组 [China Institute for Marine Affairs 
Special Topic Group], 中国海洋发展报告 
(2013) [China’s Ocean Development Report 
(2013)] (Beijing: Ocean, 2013), p� 267�
 18� Very few of the “new,” more specialized ships 
were constructed after the CCG consolida-
tion of 2013� The consolidation happened 
only five years ago, so most ships launched 
by the time of publication were ordered, or at 
least planned, before that happened� To date, 
the postconsolidation CCG has not received 
many new ships of its own�
 19� Despite Internet speculation, however, the 
Zhaogao is not based on the Jiangdao-class 
corvette�
 20� “China Coast Guard Gets New Patrol  
Vessel Based on PLAN’s Type 056 Corvette,” 
Navy Recognition, February 4, 2016, www 
�navyrecognition�com/�
 21� This refers to the same kind of joint patrols 
and open-ocean fisheries surveillance that 
FLE has been doing for years with smaller, 
less-capable patrol ships�
 22� Lyle Goldstein, “Chinese Fisheries Enforce-
ment: Environmental and Strategic Implica-
tions,” Marine Policy 40 (2013), pp� 187–93, 
available at digitalcommons�unl�edu/;  
“Fisheries Law Enforcement Command,”  
GlobalSecurity�org�
 23� A ship’s tumblehome refers to the narrowing 
of its upper hull as it rises above the waterline, 
primarily to reduce radar and wake signatures�
 24� “CMS—China Marine Surveillance,” 
GlobalSecurity�org; “China Coast Guard,” 
OPLAN: China (blog), n�d�, www�oplanchina 
�blogspot�com/�
 25� The press releases that announced the Zhao-
tou flagships’ launch specifically highlighted 
that this class had hulls that were reinforced 
for ramming and shouldering, but were 
surprisingly mute regarding traditional coast 
guard capabilities (e�g�, how many boarding 
teams they could deploy, or their rescue capa-
bilities)� They have substantial command and 
control suites aboard, including conference 
rooms and command centers, and can berth 
VIPs� Apart from being a floating command 
center, they have no capabilities that smaller, 
faster, cheaper cutters do not share� Moreland 
interview, December 3, 2018�
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 26� China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, 
hundreds of press releases 2005–17, available 
at www�csic�com�cn/�
 27� Notably, as the Shucha II class became opera-
tional, in recent years the two Shucha Is were 
transferred back to SOA’s scientific branch 
and renamed with Xiang Yang Hong prefixes, 
not the Zhong Guo Hai Jian and Hai Jing 
prefixes on the newer ships�
 28� Firsthand design analysis based on photogra-
phy of the MSA Shuoshi I– and CCG Shuoshi 
II–class ships�
 29� Firsthand analysis of design, compared with 
CRS heavy salvage ships�
 30� “People’s Armed Police,” GlobalSecurity�org�
 31� Photography from Super Base Camp Military 
Forum, www�cjdby�com, and other web 
forums, compared with the known configura-
tion and design of the Jiangkai II frigate�
 32� SinoDefence forum and blog articles, www 
�sinodefenceforum�com/�
 33� Hobbyshanghai web forums and blogs, www 
�hobbyshanghai�net�cn/�
 34� This is based on extensive examination of 
press articles, photography, and commercially 
available satellite imagery (Google Earth, 
etc�)�
 35� China Defense�com forum and blog, www 
�china-defense�com/� This discussion forum 
has an extensive subforum devoted to discus-
sion of maritime and naval basing in China, 
which was used to supplement firsthand 
searches via open-source imagery�
 36� Google Earth, www�google�com/earth� This 
open-source imagery program is available 
online� Results are from personal searching of 
China’s coastline over several years, revealing 
confirmed and probable base locations for 
CCG ships� Google Maps (www�google�com/
maps) then was used to determine the locality 
names of these bases and facilities� See also 
China Defense�com forum and blog�
 37� China MSA official website, various dates 
2005–18, en�msa�gov�cn/� The material 
includes thousands of official press releases 
detailing MSA ship launches, ship orders, 
ship ceremonial events, operational mission 
details, and photography�
 38� According to MSA’s extensive and compre-
hensive daily press releases� Ibid�
 39� It does coordinate frequently with MSA�
 40� China Rescue and Salvage official website, 
various dates 2005–18, en�crs�gov�cn/� CRS 
regularly posts press releases and photogra-
phy of CRS contracts, ship launches, opera-
tions, and rescue/salvage work� Multiple CRS 
bureaus also maintain their own websites� 
Details of CRS missions, basing locations, 
and order of battle from Song Jiahui [Capt�], 
Director-General, CRS, “Maritime Rescue 
and Salvage in China: A General Introduction 
and Some Typical Cases” (PowerPoint presen-
tation, November 2009), available at www 
�transportation�gov/�
 41� While China’s three sea forces already have 
made some progress in implementing this 
division of focus, the pushback on China’s 
maritime expansionism from immediate 
neighbors as well as the United States and 
other Western countries is keeping much 
of the PLAN currently pinned down in the 
South and East China Seas upholding China’s 
expansive claims�
 42� Ryan D� Martinson, “The Arming of China’s 
Maritime Frontier,” China Maritime Report 2, 
U.S. Naval War College, June 2017, www 
�usnwc�edu/�
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 The People’s Republic of China makes extensive territorial claims over Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea� China’s neighbors openly dis-
pute these claims and the international community does not recognize most of 
them� The Chinese government views the settlement of these disputes on terms 
favorable to China as a national priority� Ideally, the Chinese government would 
like to resolve these disputes through diplomatic channels or by using coercive 
and paramilitary techniques that fall short of triggering armed conflicts�1 How-
ever, concurrently the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is preparing war plans 
and acquiring capabilities to resolve these disputes through the use of armed 
force� The Chinese government views all its territorial disputes as “core interests” 
and has signaled its willingness to achieve these core interests through the use of 
armed force� The U�S� government openly opposes any coercive or aggressive ac-
tivities that upset the status quo, putting it at odds with the Chinese government�2
The problem is that the Chinese leadership appears unconvinced that the 
United States would risk a conflict with China—one that could escalate to a 
nuclear war—over disputes concerning territo-
ries that geographically are distant from the U�S� 
mainland and seemingly are unrelated to core U�S� 
national security interests�3 However, the PLA has a 
relatively small nuclear arsenal, estimated at fewer 
than four hundred warheads, in contrast with the 
U�S� arsenal, which has around 1,550 warheads�4 
Any nuclear strike China made on the United 
States would involve only a fraction of the PLA’s 
overall arsenal, because it would need to retain 
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some reserve to deter other nuclear-armed neighbors, such as Russia and India� 
If the Chinese leadership authorized a nuclear strike against the U�S� homeland, 
or even a limited nuclear strike against forward-deployed U�S� forces, it would 
be inviting overwhelming devastation from the considerably larger U�S� nuclear 
force�5 For these reasons, China likely would aim to confine itself to the use 
of conventional weapons during any potential high-intensity conflict with the 
United States—particularly given that China already possesses a lethal array of 
long-range, conventional, theater-strike options�6 Such a strategic, conventional, 
first-strike option is one that the United States should seek to deny China by 
developing an effective conventional access strategy�
The U�S� military has three principal strategic objectives� The first is to protect 
the U�S� mainland and offshore U�S� territories from armed attacks�7 The second 
is to foster a stable, rules-based, global security order through an interconnected 
web of alliances and partnerships� The third is to deter and, if necessary, decisive-
ly defeat aggressors through the projection of military power� Under the national 
military strategy that the Joint Staff published in 2015, the U�S� military would 
deter and defeat state aggressors by leveraging U�S� forward-deployed units, 
force-projection capabilities, alliances, communications networks, and “resilient 
logistics” infrastructure�8 This strategy appears identical to the U�S� military’s 
force-projection approach to the 1991 Gulf War�9 But the central problem with 
emulating the Gulf War style of force-projection operations is that in future de-
cades the U�S� military no longer will enjoy uncontested use of its forward bases 
or the ocean�10
Operation DESERT STORM required the U�S� military to transport around five 
hundred thousand personnel, 6�1 million tons of fuel, and 3�7 million tons of 
equipment and stores to the Persian Gulf theater� Building up sufficient person-
nel, equipment, stores, and supplies required seven months of intense air and 
sealift operations, as well as access to bases in Saudi Arabia�11 Because of the range 
limitations of tactical aircraft and payload-laden airlifters, the U�S� Air Force 
(USAF) was forced to use in-flight refueling tankers to form “air bridges�” Air 
bridges allowed aircraft with range limitations to cross oceans by flying between 
in-flight refueling tankers until they reached the desired theater of operations� 
USAF in-flight refueling tankers also supported U�S� and allied short-range tacti-
cal aircraft, flying around 16,868 sorties to deliver four hundred thousand tons 
of fuel in flight�12 The U�S� military deployed a total of around 1,600 short-range 
tactical aircraft that operated from in-theater air bases and six U�S� Navy (USN) 
aircraft carriers stationed in littoral waters�13 Long-range, precision-guided mu-
nitions accounted for around 5 percent of all air-to-ground ordnance delivered, 
supported by around sixteen Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites�14 U�S� 
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military satellite constellations also gathered intelligence and provided global 
communications�15
The PLA keenly observed the 1991 Gulf War, particularly American exploita-
tion of conventional, long-range, precision strikes�16 The PLA also observed how 
two USN carrier strike groups intervened during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis� 
Both developments highlighted the PLA’s technological inferiority and inability 
to prevent USN sea power from threatening the Chinese mainland�17 In response, 
the PLA has developed a “counterintervention strategy,” designed specifically to 
negate traditional U�S� advantages in global force projection� The core problem is 
that the PLA’s counterintervention capabilities could be used to undermine the 
U�S� military’s credibility to deter and defeat state aggressors—thereby increasing 
the likelihood of a China-U�S� armed conflict�
PLA COUNTERINTERVENTION STRATEGY
Strategically, the PLA is tasked with using its counterintervention strategy to 
deter the United States and deny the U�S� military access to the western Pacific� 
The primary purpose of this strategy is to provide the Chinese government with 
the ability to isolate and coerce U�S� allies or regional countries to accept Chinese 
sovereignty demands in a number of territorial disputes�18 The PLA might be 
directed to apply this counterintervention strategy in relation to the disputed 
sovereignty over Taiwan, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China 
Sea�19
The PLA’s counterintervention strategy requires four main types of military 
operations: theater strike, denial of service, antiaccess, and area-denial operations� 
Ideally, all four types of operations would be carried out simultaneously; howev-
er, the PLA’s finite resources might force it to prioritize� If the PLA were forced to 
prioritize, it would place the greatest emphasis on neutralizing forward-deployed 
U�S� forces, followed by denying critical services to the U�S� military, followed by 
activities to prevent the U�S� military from reinforcing the Pacific theater� Theater- 
strike operations would be required to disable or destroy forward-deployed U�S� 
military assets, including aircraft, ships, and submarines, in addition to infra-
structure at U�S� bases located west of Pearl Harbor�20 Strikes against these targets 
would be executed rapidly at the outset of a conflict to catch adversaries unpre-
pared and achieve decisive in-theater superiority�21 
In carrying out this strategy, the PLA will employ each of its four subordinate 
service branches: the PLA Army, the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force 
(PLAAF), and the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)� PLAN submarines would execute 
undersea attacks against U�S� ships and submarines in port or at sea and strike at 
land targets with cruise missiles�22 The PLAAF would execute air strikes against 
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U�S� aircraft on the ground or in the air, as well as U�S� ships and submarines in 
port or at sea� Strikes against U�S� bases would occur with extended-range mis-
siles launched from PLAAF combat aircraft or conventional ballistic missiles 
launched from the Chinese mainland�23
PLAAF combat aircraft can deliver antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) out to 
two thousand kilometers (km) from the Chinese mainland, and PLAAF H-6 
long-range bombers can deliver land-attack cruise missiles out to 3,300 km from 
the Chinese mainland� Air-launched cruise missiles would be supplemented by 
PLARF conventional ballistic missiles� The PLARF’s DF-16 short-range ballistic 
missile would strike land targets at a range of around eight hundred kilometers� 
The PLARF’s DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) would strike land 
targets or moving ships in the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) configu-
ration at a range of around 1,500 km�24 The PLARF’s DF-26 intermediate-range 
ballistic missile (IRBM) would strike land targets or moving ships in the ASBM 
configuration at ranges around three thousand kilometers�25
Denial-of-service operations would aim at denying the United States unfet-
tered use of its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure�26 Successful PLA 
denial-of-service operations would hinder the U�S� military’s ability to execute 
land-attack strikes from USN submarines in the western Pacific, receive up-to-
date intelligence from USN submarines on patrol, marshal combat resources 
to reinforce the Pacific theater, and communicate with surviving U�S� forces in 
the western Pacific� One method would be for the PLA to apply its antisatellite 
(ASAT) technologies to incapacitate, disrupt, or destroy U�S� military satellite 
constellations used for global communications, satellite navigation, and intel-
ligence gathering�27 PLA ASAT technologies include lasers, microwave technolo-
gies, and hard-kill methodologies�28 Cyberwarfare capabilities also provide the 
PLA with a sophisticated method to disrupt or deny the U�S� military’s use of its 
C4ISR infrastructure�29
Antiaccess operations would degrade or deny USAF and USN force- 
projection capabilities for accessing the western Pacific, thus isolating U�S� al-
lies�30 Denying USN seaborne force-projection capabilities would be a priority 
because over 90 percent of all U�S� military assets, stores, and equipment are 
transported by sea�31 PLA antiaccess operations would force USN task forces to 
run a gauntlet of layered offensive PLA capabilities during the approach to the 
western Pacific�32 Surviving USN task forces likely would arrive in theater with 
depleted missile magazines, having suffered fleet-wide damage or ship losses, or 
both, just to come within range of the Chinese mainland� Weapons and vessels 
available for Chinese antiaccess operations include DF-21D ASBMs, potentially 
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DF-26 ASBMs, air-launched ASCMs, diesel-electric and nuclear-powered attack 
submarines, and surface combatants�33
U�S� airpower also could be denied access to the western Pacific through the 
deployment of PLAN aircraft carrier battle groups� Other options might include 
arming PLAN nuclear-powered attack submarines with submarine-launched, an-
tiair missiles to shoot down USAF in-flight refueling tankers and cargo-transport 
aircraft� Concurrently, some PLA units would aim to interdict U�S� follow-on 
forces outside the western Pacific, particularly in Hawaii and Australia, with the 
aim of harassing and interfering with the deployment of U�S� and allied forces 
into theater�34
Area-denial operations would be required to limit the freedom of maneuver of 
air or maritime forces in coastal areas close to the Chinese mainland� PLA capa-
bilities that could be used for area-denial operations include advanced sea mines, 
diesel-electric submarines, maritime strike aircraft, surface combatants, Type 
022 missile patrol boats armed with ASCMs, coastal ASCM batteries, land-based 
air-defense systems, and land-based conventional and rocket artillery batteries�35
PLA PASSIVE DEFENSES
Concurrently, the PLA has invested in three types of passive-defense capabilities 
designed specifically to enable continuity of PLA conventional and nuclear war-
fighting capabilities, even if the Chinese mainland comes under heavy attack� 
PLA passive-defense capabilities include land-based sensor networks; land-based 
command, control, and communications (C3) networks; and hardened facilities�
First, the PLA has invested in extensive land-based sensor networks to provide 
persistent wide-area surveillance of the western Pacific to enable PLA land-
based, long-range strike capabilities� The PLA uses land-based Skywave over-the-
horizon (OTH) radar technology to track aircraft and ships at ranges of several 
thousand kilometers from the Chinese mainland�36 The PLA uses Surfacewave 
OTH radar arrays to track aircraft and ships at long ranges from the Chinese 
mainland�37 These capabilities are being augmented with other infrared, pulsed-
Doppler radar, phased-array radar, and passive radar detection technologies�38 
The PLA uses passive undersea sensors to detect and track submarines operating 
within Chinese littoral waters�39 The PLA’s land-based intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are augmented by PLAAF airborne warn-
ing and control system aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and ISR satellites�40
Second, the PLA has invested in survivable, land-based C3 systems designed 
specifically to enable the Chinese national command hierarchy to retain basic 
C3 functions over all PLA branches, even while under heavy attack�41 PLA 
C3 systems include underground fiber-optic cables; microwave relays; and 
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long-range, high-frequency radio technologies augmented by civilian commu-
nication channels�42
Third, the PLA has invested heavily in aboveground hardened structures 
(HSs), shallow-underground HSs, deep-underground HSs, and strategic hard 
and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) (see table 1)� The purpose of these hardened 
facilities is to enable the Chinese national command hierarchy, strategic assets, 
and other key capabilities such as logistics to survive and remain operational, 
even after a nuclear strike�43 The PLA has invested in strategic HDBTs to protect 
the Chinese national command hierarchy in the event of an armed conflict�44 
These HDBTs are connected to the outside world through extensive land-based 
communications networks that enable the Chinese national command hierarchy 
to remain in command of its sea, air, and land forces�45 
The PLARF has an extensive network of hardened tunnels and facilities buried 
deep underground and within mountains that can protect land-based strategic 
assets such as road-mobile ballistic missiles, launchers, and PLARF personnel�46 
Some reports indicate that the PLARF has 4,856 kilometers of such hardened 
and deeply buried tunnels, some as deep as one thousand meters� The tunnels 
form part of an extensive underground web of HDBT facilities and are serviced 
by internal transport or train networks that move ordnance and launchers� These 
facilities have surface-level entrances where the missile transporter-erector-
launchers (TELs) can access surface-level launchpads�47
The PLAAF has hardened its air bases to protect its combat aircraft�48 PLAAF 
air bases feature hardened aboveground HSs, such as aircraft hangars, with re-
inforced concrete protection estimated to be between 0�9 and 1�2 meters thick� 




Aboveground HS: aboveground facilities or structures that are protected from ki-
netic and air-blast weapons effects because of their aerodynamic shape that deflects 
blast waves—typically covered with earth and reinforced concretea
Shallow-underground HS: underground facilities or structures up to twenty meters 
below the earth’s surface 
Deep-underground HS: underground facilities or structures twenty or more meters 
below the earth’s surface 
Hard and deeply buried target
(HDBT)
Underground facilities one to seven hundred meters below the earth’s surface that 
protect a country’s national command structure, critical activities, equipment, 
personnel, or strategic military response options from nuclear weapons effects 
TABLE 1
TYPES OF HARD TARGETS
 Note:
 a. National Research Council of the National Academies, Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons (Washington, DC: National Academies 
Press, 2005), p. 14.
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storage facilities� Some of the PLAAF underground HSs are very large, provided 
with multiple entrances, constructed inside mountains, and covered by anywhere 
from twenty to sixty meters of concrete, dirt, and rock� Other passive measures 
include revetments between parked aircraft and long paved areas that can be 
used as emergency runways, as well as multiple points of access for runways� 
These measures usually are augmented by advanced camouflage and advanced 
air-defense systems�49
The PLAN also has constructed extensive underground HSs to protect its 
submarine forces, accessed by sea-level tunnels in coastal areas� These facilities 
offer PLA submarines the ability to deploy covertly and return without being vis-
ible to U�S� overhead surveillance capabilities�50 The PLAN naval base on Hainan 
Island currently is equipped with hardened underground submarine facilities of 
this nature�51 The PLAN also plans to construct a significantly larger and more 
modern underground HS naval base sufficient to protect and house its nuclear-
powered, ballistic-missile submarines�52
PLA CONVENTIONAL FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY
The PLA’s most significant counterintervention capability is its inventory of long-
range conventional ballistic missiles, particularly given that the U�S� military does 
not field an equivalent capability� PLA DF-21 MRBMs and ASBMs have ranges 
around 1,500 km; PLA DF-26 IRBMs and ASBMs have ranges around three 
thousand kilometers� It is also important to note that the PLA currently possesses 
between two and three hundred MRBMs and likely will expand this inventory 
with the introduction of the DF-26� The long range and growing inventory of 
PLA conventional ballistic missiles would force relatively slow U�S� maritime as-
sets to run a lethal gauntlet of PLA ASBMs while they are unable to return fire 
and degrade the threat�53
The U�S� Office of Naval Intelligence has assessed that the PLA’s conventional 
ballistic missiles use maneuvering reentry vehicles (MARVs) equipped with 
infrared and radar seekers, enabling PLA ballistic missiles to acquire fixed or 
moving targets during the terminal phase of flight� PLA MARVs are difficult 
opponents because of their significant agility and high reentry speeds (around 
Mach 12), as well as electronic warfare, decoy, chaff, and flare countermeasures�54
PLA conventional ballistic missiles have the potential to carry submunitions 
warheads capable of inflicting wide-area destruction, which increases their threat 
profile�55 Against fixed land targets, however, MARV penetrator warheads pro-
vide the capability to inflict serious damage to hardened targets�56 MARV pen-
etrator warheads could sink USN ships outright, whereas submunitions warheads 
could inflict a range of damage to them�57 For instance, aircraft carrier flight 
decks, arresting gear, catapults, and landing signal systems could be damaged, 
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thereby preventing flight operations.58 Similarly, USN cruisers and destroyers 
could suffer damage to phased-array radar panels and Mk 41 vertical launch-
ing system (VLS) missile batteries. Damage of either type likely would result in 
a “mission kill,” rendering the damaged ship unfit to fight. The predicted high 
lethality and significant impact of PLA conventional ballistic missiles pose a seri-
ous challenge to the survivability of U.S. forces operating in the western Pacific 
and thus to U.S. force-projection capabilities.
The PLA’s unmatched conventional ballistic-missile arsenal and rapidly evolv-
ing military capabilities, combined with a perception of relative invulnerability to 
U.S. retaliatory strikes, could lure Chinese leaders into a belief that a conventional 
first strike might deliver temporary PLA regional superiority, during which time 
Chinese leaders could settle regional disputes coercively, on their terms.59 A 
perception of PLA superiority in a conventional theater strike is not helped by 
the U.S. military’s apparent lack of a strategy outlining a credible response to an 
overwhelming PLA conventional first strike.60 Without clear U.S. deterrence, the 
risk of miscalculation only will increase—particularly as the PLA’s confidence in 
its own capabilities grows in future decades.61
TOWARD A U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY
The Cold War concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) maintained rela-
tive stability between the United States and the Soviet Union.62 Underpinning 
MAD was the knowledge that both sides possessed credible nuclear second-
strike capabilities—the ability to absorb a nuclear first strike and still retain 
sufficient operable capability to respond with unacceptable devastation.63 This 
understanding provided a relative degree of stability, since both sides clearly 
understood their mutual vulnerability and that any preemptive nuclear first 
strike would receive a response in kind.64 Using Cold War deterrence theory as 
an underlying basis, this article advocates that the U.S. military should consider 
introducing a conventional access strategy, designed specifically to balance the 
PLA’s counterintervention strategy. The purpose would be to provide the U.S. 
military with an improved capacity to deter a PLA conventional first strike, and, 
if necessary, degrade PLA capabilities with long-range conventional strike forces, 
to facilitate access for follow-on U.S. forces.
Strategically, a U.S. conventional access strategy would provide Chinese lead-
ers with a clearer understanding of how the U.S. military can impose costs on 
China, even in the aftermath of a PLA conventional first strike. Operationally, it 
would increase the permissiveness of the western Pacific for forward-deployed 
and follow-on U.S. forces. The Department of Defense’s Joint Operational Access 
Concept (JOAC) states that “in-range combat forces at the beginning of a crisis 
can facilitate operational access” for other forces in antiaccess/area-denial (A2/
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AD) environments�65 The primary operational objective of a U�S� conventional 
access strategy would be to degrade the effectiveness of the PLA’s conventional 
strike capability, as opposed to seeking its complete eradication, so as to facilitate 
access for U�S� forces entering the western Pacific� The JOAC states that the U�S� 
military must be able to strike deep into enemy A2/AD capability networks to 
“disrupt the integrity of the enemy defensive system” and that preferred targets 
include “logistics and command and control nodes, long range firing units and 
strategic and operational reserves�”66 The secondary operational objective would 
be to deny the PLA unfettered use of communications, logistics, and transport 
capabilities such as airfields, airports, ports, rail networks, land-based C4ISR 
networks, and fuel or ordnance stocks� By degrading PLA strike and war-fighting 
capabilities, forward-deployed U�S� forces could increase the permissiveness of 
the western Pacific for U�S� forces arriving in theater�
A U�S� conventional access strategy would require four distinct capabilities� 
A theater-wide passive-defense capability would enhance the ability of forward-
deployed U�S� forces to survive initial PLA conventional strikes� A conventional 
theater-strike capability would enable the U�S� military to begin degrading PLA 
capabilities immediately at the outset of a conflict, without access to in-flight 
refueling tankers or usable runways� A theater-recovery capability would restore 
basic runway access in the aftermath of PLA conventional strikes� A rapid-
response capability would allow long-range USAF bombers and fighter escorts to 
deploy rapidly to U�S� bases in the western Pacific, capitalizing on freshly repaired 
runways as well as pre-positioned stocks of aviation fuel and conventional earth-
penetrating ordnance�
Theater-Wide Passive-Defense Capability
The PLA aims to be capable of striking at intercontinental distances with hyper-
sonic boost-glide (HBG) missiles by 2020 and capable of striking at interconti-
nental distances with hypersonic aircraft by 2025�67 The 2013 Air-Sea Battle Con-
cept (ASBC) states that in a future armed conflict, U�S� bases could be attacked 
and that “even the US homeland cannot be considered a sanctuary�”68 Both factors 
indicate that the United States should consider hardening its infrastructure in the 
western Pacific and at key locations across Hawaii and the continental United 
States, so as to deny any adversary a relatively easy way to degrade or deny U�S� 
force-projection capabilities�
Within this context, a theater-wide passive-defense capability would require 
improvements in the hardening of critical fixed sites to withstand kinetic threats, 
and the hardening of critical C4ISR systems to resist nonkinetic strikes� Hard-
ening of critical fixed sites might include building aboveground HS submarine 
pens, aboveground HS aircraft shelters, and deep-underground HS fuel- and 
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ordnance-storage facilities, as well as deep-underground HS or HDBT shelters 
for theater-strike missiles, personnel, and base-repair kits� A 2007 study from 
the RAND Corporation notes that major U�S� forward bases should protect their 
in-theater fuel stocks in underground HSs and that stores should be sufficient 
to enable several weeks of high-intensity air operations�69 Hardening of critical 
C4ISR systems might include the protection of base computer networks and 
electronic infrastructure from the effects of cyber, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), 
and high-powered microwave (HPM) weapon effects� At the bare minimum, 
such improvements in hardened infrastructure should be rolled out across all 
U�S� bases in the western Pacific� It also might be desirable for the U�S� military to 
consider selectively rolling out similar hardened infrastructure packages across 
key Hawaiian and mainland installations, such as Pearl Harbor and San Diego�
Conventional Theater-Strike Capability
A conventional theater-strike capability would allow forward-deployed U�S� 
forces to respond within minutes or hours of a PLA conventional first strike� A 
U�S� conventional theater-strike capability would enable the U�S� military to begin 
degrading PLA strike and C4ISR capabilities at the outset of a conflict, even if 
U�S� bases, air assets, and naval assets were destroyed or otherwise unavailable� 
A conventional theater-strike capability should consist of theater-strike missiles, 
hypersonic undersea strike missiles, ASAT weapons, cyberstrike weapons, and 
autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs)� As mentioned earlier, the purpose of 
such strikes would not be to destroy these capabilities outright but to degrade 
PLA strike and war-fighting capabilities, thereby achieving the JOAC objective 
of helping ensure access for follow-on U�S� forces attempting to enter the theater 
of operations�70
Theater-Strike Missiles. Theater-strike missiles would enable forward-deployed 
U�S� forces to execute conventional strikes against heavily defended targets on the 
Chinese mainland, without support from in-flight refueling tankers or in-theater 
runway access� Conventional missile strikes could take place in immediate re-
sponse to, or in the aftermath of, a PLA conventional first strike� For U�S� bases 
to retain a credible conventional theater-strike capability, theater-strike missiles 
would have to be stored in hardened facilities�
One option might be road-mobile IRBMs with conventional warheads and 
a range of 5,500 km, sufficient to strike at Haixi City in Qinghai Province from 
Guam or the Cocos Islands� Another option might be an HBG missile with in-
tercontinental or intermediate range, consisting of a rocket booster stack and 
hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)�71 After the boost phase, the HGV would exhibit 
a limited ballistic trajectory before sharply reentering the atmosphere, followed 
by the HGV’s transition into a high-altitude glide phase of flight to the intended 
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target�72 The United States is developing an HGV that can be deployed from a 
modified USAF intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) rocket booster�73 Either 
option could carry a variety of conventional warheads, including penetrators for 
hardened targets, submunitions for wide-area destruction, and EMP or HPM 
warheads to cripple electronic infrastructure�
HGVs could exploit hypersonic terminal speeds and combine with exist-
ing conventional penetrator technology to threaten PLA HSs� The GBU-39 is 
a small-diameter bomb that weighs 130 kilograms (kg) and can penetrate over 
four meters of reinforced concrete�74 The GBU-28 is a 2,268 kg bomb capable of 
penetrating over thirty meters of earth or over six meters of reinforced concrete�75 
The GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator (MOP) weighs 13,600 kg and is ca-
pable of penetrating over sixty meters of five-thousand-pounds-per-square-inch 
reinforced concrete�76 One option is for theater-strike missile HGVs to deploy 
existing GBU-39 ordnance, as GBU-28 and GBU-57 ordnance is too large and 
heavy� The other option is for the United States to develop a new penetrator that 
combines hypersonic speeds with the GBU-57’s penetration technology, which 
would be sufficient to threaten all grades of HSs up to one hundred meters be-
low the earth’s surface� Using GBU-39 technology could provide HBG theater-
strike missiles with the ability to neutralize aboveground HSs, such as ordnance 
magazines and hardened aircraft shelters, and also to inflict heavy damage to 
paved areas necessary for flight operations� Using the GBU-28 technology could 
provide theater-strike missiles with the ability to neutralize all grades of shallow- 
underground HSs and some grades of deep-underground HSs� Using the GBU-
57 technology could provide theater-strike missiles with the ability to neutralize 
most grades of deep-underground HSs�
HBG theater-strike missiles ideally should be capable of being launched from 
road-mobile TELs� Road-mobile HBG strike missiles would enable forward-
deployed U�S� bases, such as Guam, to protect ordnance and launchers from 
PLA conventional strikes in HDBT facilities� After a PLA conventional strike, 
the TELs could be driven out of their hardened facilities and launched� Road-
mobile weapons also would increase the tactical survivability of deployed TELs, 
as they would be better dispersed and camouflaged compared with fixed missile 
batteries�
HBG theater-strike missiles should be used to target the weakest points of PLA 
hardened facilities and infrastructure� Typically, these will be a hardened facility’s 
communication links to the outside world and the surface-level entrances� The 
reason for attacking entrances is that every underground hardened facility, by its 
very nature, will have some surface-level access point� This is a vulnerability that 
can be exploited by U�S� HBG theater-strike missiles to collapse the entrances to 
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PLA hardened facilities, sealing all personnel and ordnance inside, or at the very 
least impeding the movement of PLA assets in and out of the facility� In the case 
of PLA HSs inside mountains, surface-level entrances would be vulnerable to 
landslides, which could be triggered by U�S� HBG warhead detonations higher 
up the mountain� However, the main problem with targeting the entrances of 
PLA HSs is that they are likely to be camouflaged and “virtually undetectable by 
current imagery assets�”77 Locating a significant portion of PLA hardened facility 
entrances would require years of dedicated intelligence gathering by the entire 
U�S� Intelligence Community, using its wide array of collection techniques�
Hypersonic Undersea Strike Missiles. Hypersonic undersea strike missiles would 
enable forward-deployed U�S� forces to strike at heavily defended but not hard-
ened targets across the Chinese mainland� Prime targets would include but not be 
limited to Chinese civilian airports, military airstrips, military and civilian ports, 
electrical power grids, communications nodes, and fuel depots� The purpose of 
striking at these targets would be to deny the PLA unfettered use of these facili-
ties, which otherwise could be exploited to enhance PLA operations�
Until the project’s apparent termination, the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (known as DARPA) was developing the Arclight HBG weapon, 
designed around the RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 booster stack and designed to 
achieve full compatibility with strike-length Mk 41 VLS naval batteries� Arclight 
was built to deliver an HGV payload with a total mass of 45–90 kg out to a range 
of 3,700 km in less than thirty minutes�78 Although budget reports suggest that 
the Arclight program has been terminated, it does provide insight into the types 
of capabilities that might be feasible�
Any future hypersonic undersea strike missile would need to be fully compat-
ible with the U�S� Navy’s undersea wide-diameter payload tubes, which measure 
2�2 meters in diameter and currently store seven UGM-109E Tomahawk land-
attack missiles�79 Ideally, a future hypersonic undersea strike missile also would 
be fully compatible with strike-length Mk 41 VLS cells� Full compatibility with 
both launching systems would enable the same missile design to be supported by 
Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), Virginia-class nuclear-
powered attack submarines (SSNs), and Ohio-class nuclear-powered guided-
missile submarines�
Undersea towed payload modules (TPMs) are another launch option for fu-
ture USN undersea strike weapons� TPMs essentially are containers fitted with 
vertically launched undersea ordnance that would be submerged and towed by 
submarines into theater�80 TPMs are the most attractive option for several rea-
sons� First, TPMs lack the expensive crew life support, hotel loads, fuel storage, 
and propulsion systems of surface combatants and submarines, and they can be 
acquired in large numbers� Second, TPMs could be pre-positioned in littoral 
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waters near Guam years in advance of any conflict� Third, targeting data could 
be uploaded by the towing submarine into a TPM computer system prior to 
launch� An onboard TPM computer system would enable the TPM to activate 
on a time delay, giving the towing submarine time to escape the area before the 
TPM launch cycle compromised its location� At the outbreak of hostilities, one or 
more submarines could tow the pre-positioned TPMs to within striking distance 
of the Chinese mainland�
Antisatellite Strike and Cyberstrike Weapons. ASAT strike weapons would en-
able the U�S� military to neutralize Chinese military and civilian satellite constel-
lations rapidly�81 Similarly, cyberstrike capabilities would enable the U�S� military 
to degrade the effectiveness of PLA C4ISR networks� These targets would be a 
high priority for the United States since PLA counterintervention capabilities rely 
on space-based assets to enhance OTH targeting of U�S� bases and moving ships 
at sea�82 In theater, ASAT capabilities are launched from ground-based missile 
launchers� Out of theater, ASAT capabilities enter by way of destroyer-launched 
ordnance�
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles. Long-range AUVs with large conventional 
warheads would enable forward-deployed U�S� forces to strike at Chinese port 
infrastructure, PLA naval bases, and PLA hardened submarine pens accessed 
by sea-level undersea tunnels� Notice that only the entrance to a PLA hardened 
sea-level tunnel would need to be sealed or rendered impassable to generate a 
mission-kill effect and trap any submarines inside the PLA undersea facility�
Boeing’s Echo Voyager unmanned undersea vehicle measures 2�6 by 2�6 by 
15�5 meters, is fully autonomous, and has a range of around 12,038 km� It also 
has a maximum diving depth of three thousand meters and seagoing endurance 
of several months, is fitted with non-GPS navigation technologies, and is capable 
of carrying very large payloads of up to eight tons, with a total internal space of 
14�75 square meters� The Boeing Echo Voyager uses an inertial navigation system 
(INS), Doppler velocity logs (DVLs), depth sensors, and various other technolo-
gies to navigate independent of GPS satellite navigation constellations� Given the 
exceptional range, seagoing endurance, diving depth, GPS-independent naviga-
tion technologies, and large payload, Boeing’s Echo Voyager could be an ideal 
baseline from which to build an AUV tailored specifically for neutralizing or 
rendering inoperable Chinese ports, PLA naval bases, and PLA hardened subma-
rine pens, particularly by attacking sea-level tunnel entrances� To ensure the sur-
vivability of AUVs from PLA conventional strikes, AUVs should be submerged 
in littoral waters close to shore, or alternatively stored in hardened underground 
facilities ashore�83
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The PLA has invested extensively in capabilities to deny U�S� forces access to 
satellite-based C4ISR and GPS navigation systems, particularly given its percep-
tion that space-based satellite constellations are a major vulnerability�84 Conse-
quently, a credible U�S� conventional theater-strike capability would need to be 
capable of functioning in denied war-fighting environments� In practical terms, 
this means that HBG theater-strike missiles, Arclight HBG weapons, ASAT 
weapons, and AUVs must be capable of executing their respective roles without 
access to last-minute intelligence from C4ISR, space-based communications 
systems, and space-based navigation systems� Instead, all these proposed con-
ventional theater-strike capabilities should rely on high-end autonomous navi-
gation systems (ANSs)� ANSs might include INSs fitted with advanced-inertial- 
measurement-unit components, DVLs, and advanced computing systems�85
Because of the threat that PLA kinetic and nonkinetic strikes pose against 
C4ISR capabilities, at the outset of a conflict forward-deployed U�S� forces may 
not have access to late-minute intelligence�86 Furthermore, computer networks 
containing critical information might be disabled or destroyed� As a contingency, 
the United States could deliver hard-copy intelligence packets with targeting data 
to forward-deployed forces� This would enable forward-deployed forces to target 
at least China’s fixed land and coastal targets, even if C4ISR is unavailable�
Theater-Recovery Capability
A theater-recovery capability would enable the U�S� military to regain use of its 
in-theater bases and space-based infrastructure after a PLA conventional first 
strike� Central to this capability would be the ability to repair damage to bases by 
relying only on resources forward deployed at each base, resources deployed by 
assets that would not require runway access, or both� A theater-recovery capabil-
ity would consist of hardened in-theater facilities, pre-positioned air-base-repair 
kits and machinery, airdrop repair teams, airships, and microsatellite launches�
Hardened facilities would shield personnel, supplies, repair kits, and reserve 
air- and missile-defense (AMD) systems from a PLA conventional first strike� 
Ideally, hardened facilities would be buried deep underground� Airdrop repair 
teams would enable the U�S� military to repair damaged runways at bases with-
out requiring USAF C-5 and C-17 airlifters to land� The USAF maintains prime 
base engineer emergency force (Prime BEEF) units that execute on-site repairs, 
largely using equipment and stores located at each base� Prime BEEF units are 
supplemented by USAF rapid engineer deployable heavy operational repair 
squadron engineer (RED HORSE) units, which specialize in repairing air bases 
under combat conditions� RED HORSE units can be air-dropped into distant 
locations, and they aim to be capable of operating without support for limited 
durations�87 
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If current heavy machinery is too heavy or bulky to be air-dropped and a 
PLA conventional first strike were to render most on-base heavy repair equip-
ment unusable, it would be more difficult for air-dropped RED HORSE teams to 
repair major damage such as large-diameter craters� One solution might be for 
the USAF to develop a suite of custom, lightweight, facility-repair machines that 
could be air-dropped, along with RED HORSE units and supporting stores, into 
theater from C-5 and C-17 airlifters�
Large-payload airships would bolster repair capabilities without use of run-
ways� An extended-range variant of the Lockheed Martin P-791 hybrid airship 
could fulfill such a role; the current version has a range of 2,592 km carrying a 
payload of 21,000 kg�88 To reach Guam, an extended-range P-791 would need a 
range of around 3,300 km to deploy nonstop from Darwin Royal Australian Air 
Force (RAAF) air base, in northern Australia� Alternatively, an existing P-791 
airship could island-hop from Wheeler Army Airfield on Oahu to Midway Atoll 
(around 2,087 km), from Midway to Wake Atoll (around 1,900 km), and from 
Wake Atoll to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam (around 2,400 km)�
Microsatellite launches would enable the United States rapidly to supplement 
or replace USAF navigation, communications, and intelligence satellites lost to 
PLA ASAT strikes�89 The airborne launch assist space access (ALASA) vehicle, 
as deployed from USAF fourth-generation aircraft, could fill this role, given its 
ability to launch several microsatellites at short notice�90
Rapid-Response Capability
In the aftermath of a PLA conventional first strike, runways on Guam and other 
U�S� islands in the western Pacific likely would be inoperable, at least until re-
paired by Prime BEEF or RED HORSE teams� After initial repairs were complete, 
the United States could fly long-range stealth bombers into theater, from Hawaii 
and the U�S� mainland, so as to execute long-range conventional strikes against 
hardened targets across the Chinese mainland� The pre-positioning of GBU-57 
ordnance in HDBTs on Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands would signifi-
cantly enhance a USAF rapid-response capability, as the logistics burden would 
be greatly alleviated�
USAF B-2 Spirit stealth bombers have an unrefueled combat radius of around 
5,500 km�91 However, the USAF inventory contains only twenty B-2s, as the 
acquisition program was reduced significantly from an original order of 132 
aircraft�92 The USAF also is replacing its legacy B-1B and B-52H bomber fleets 
with one hundred B-21 Raider long-range stealth bombers�93 However, the 
B-21 Raider could have an unrefueled combat radius as short as 4,600 km— 
significantly shorter than the B-1B at 6,900 km and the B-52H at 8,100 km�94 
Assuming that the B-21 Raider has a combat radius of at least 5,500 km, both 
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B-2s and B-21s would be capable of executing deep strikes across the Chinese 
mainland without access to in-flight refueling—as deep as Haixi City from Guam 
or the Cocos Islands� Both the B-2 and B-21 can deliver the enormous GBU-57 
MOP, which measures eighty centimeters in diameter by 6�25 meters in length 
and weighs 13,600 kg per bomb� The B-2 is capable of carrying two GBU-57 
MOPs, one in each internal weapons bay�95
If a PLA conventional first strike denied use of runways on Guam and the Co-
cos Islands, USAF B-2s and B-21s could operate from the RAAF Learmonth air 
base, in western Australia, outside the range of most PLA conventional strike ca-
pabilities�96 Assuming the B-21 Raider has an unrefueled combat radius of 5,500 
km, USAF B-2s and B-21s operating from RAAF Learmonth could be refueled 
from RAAF in-flight refueling tankers orbiting the Cocos Islands, followed by 
strikes out to 5,500 km� The return journey would be the mirror opposite, with 
in-flight refueling above the Cocos Islands before returning to RAAF Learmonth� 
The advantage of this option is that it would depend only on in-flight refueling 
tankers and RAAF air bases outside the range of most PLA conventional strike 
capabilities, and thus would provide a robust contingency plan�97
However, a fleet of 120 long-range stealthy bombers (twenty B-2s and one 
hundred B-21s) is unlikely to meet the U�S� military’s operational needs during a 
China-U�S� conflict, for several reasons� First, the high number of targets across 
the Chinese mainland, exacerbated by the significant distance from Guam, will 
reduce drastically the fleet-wide sortie rate—the number of targets that a bomber 
can strike per twenty-four-hour period�98 Second, only a fraction of the entire 
fleet will be available for combat operations, as the rest will be needed for train-
ing, maintenance, and reserve functions�99 For instance, a combat-coded force of 
160 B-21 Raiders would require an overall fleet of two hundred aircraft�100 Third, 
the B-2s and B-21s would play a disproportionate role in the air war portion of 
any China-U�S� conflict�101 This is because B-2s and B-21s would be the only 
aircraft in the USAF inventory with sufficient stealth to penetrate advanced PLA 
air defenses; sufficient unrefueled range to strike at the Chinese mainland from 
Guam, without depending on in-flight refueling tankers; and sufficient payload 
to carry the GBU-57 MOP for neutralizing PLA HSs� In 2015, the Mitchell Insti-
tute for Aerospace Studies found that the USAF might require a total fleet of two 
hundred stealthy long-range bombers, particularly given reduced sortie rates, 
combat coding, payloads, and the risk of force attrition�102
INVENTORY ESTIMATES
During any armed conflict nothing ever works perfectly or goes entirely accord-
ing to plan� As Clausewitz once stated, this concept of “friction” means that the 
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outcome of military operations is inherently uncertain and that any element of a 
plan can fail�103 In the cases of conventional theater-strike, theater-recovery, and 
rapid-response operations, the United States would need to consider how many 
stores of various types are sufficient to respond to operational uncertainties that 
might arise� For instance, conventional theater-strike capabilities could exhaust 
in-theater ordnance stores, theater-recovery capabilities could run out of base-
repair kits, and a rapid-response capability could run out of in-theater ground-
penetrating ordnance�
To insulate against operational uncertainties, U�S� forward bases would need 
large pre-positioned inventories of theater-strike missiles sufficient for at least 
two strikes per PLA target� This estimate of two strikes per PLA target is based 
on the RAND Corporation’s assessment that two weapons per hard target would 
be needed to generate a kill probability of greater than 90 percent�104 In addi-
tion, the U�S� military would need to retain a strategic reserve of ordnance, in 
the event that in-theater stores were exhausted, as well as for use in other global 
contingencies�
For the theater-recovery capability, U�S� forward bases likely would need very 
large inventories of base-repair kits and ALASA ordnance with microsatellite 
payloads pre-positioned and sufficient to execute two full base repairs or ALASA 
salvos, plus strategic reserves at mainland facilities for an additional four full base 
repairs and four ALASA salvos� These reserves might be necessary if the PLA 
executes persistent strikes and ASAT attacks throughout a protracted conflict�105
A rapid-response capability might need very large inventories of pre- 
positioned GBU-57 MOP ordnance and aviation fuel, in shallow-underground 
HS facilities at U�S� forward bases� This might require sufficient ordnance for two 
strikes per PLA target, plus a strategic reserve for further combat sorties or use 
in other global contingencies�
ADVANTAGES OF A U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY
A conventional access strategy would provide six major advantages� The first is 
that it would deny the PLA a conventional first-strike capability against U�S� bases 
and forward-deployed forces, through passive-defense measures, a conventional 
theater-strike capability, a theater-recovery capability, and a rapid-response capa-
bility� With passive hardening of critical military infrastructure, a greater portion 
of U�S� forces might survive the initial waves of PLA conventional strikes� Surviv-
ing in-theater forces could then execute land-based, undersea, ASAT, and AUV 
strikes against a variety of PLA targets, across the Chinese mainland and in orbit� 
This would enable the U�S� military to begin degrading the PLA’s capabilities at 
the outset of a conflict, enabling theater-recovery capabilities to operate more 
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effectively� With airfields repaired, B-21 and B-2 stealth bombers could then be 
flown into theater to commence strikes against PLA targets across the Chinese 
mainland�
The second advantage is that degrading PLA conventional strike capabilities 
at the outset of a conflict would increase the permissiveness of the entire theater 
for other force-projection assets� Undermining the PLA’s capability to execute 
ASBM and ASCM strikes against USN task forces and logistics ships would pro-
vide USN assets with greater freedom of action and enhanced survivability� With 
intense and persistent conventional strikes, PLA capabilities might be degraded 
sufficiently to enable USN aircraft carriers eventually to operate with relative 
impunity close to the Chinese coastline, significantly increasing the sorties gen-
erated by carrier air wings�
The third advantage is that it would buy time for U�S� force-projection capa-
bilities to be mobilized, marshaled, and deployed to the western Pacific� With 
significant air and naval assets deployed globally, the military would require time 
to redeploy and logistically support a significant force in theater� For example, a 
1993 General Accounting Office report stated that with a total projected force of 
twelve USN aircraft carriers, six carriers could deploy with thirty days’ notice and 
nine carriers with sixty days’ notice�106 Equivalent times likely would be required 
to deploy or redeploy the full range of U�S� air, land, and sea assets necessary to 
execute theater-wide, joint-service campaigns in the Pacific�
The fourth advantage is that it would focus the military’s attention on criti-
cal capabilities needed to enhance the survivability and operational effective-
ness of traditional force-projection assets: tactical aircraft, in-flight refueling 
tankers, aircraft carriers, surface combatants, logistics ships, and sealift ships� 
For instance, prioritizing long-range strike capabilities not dependent on U�S� 
bases or in-flight refueling would in turn drive the military to prioritize conven-
tional theater-strike missiles, undersea-launched hypersonic missiles, ASAT and 
cyberstrike weapons, and AUVs, combined with a large fleet of B-21s with range 
similar to the B-2 Spirit�
The fifth advantage is that a credible U�S� conventional theater-strike capabili-
ty would force the PLA to reevaluate its allocation of resources to offensive versus 
defensive systems� The PLA might be driven to divert sizable defense funding to 
harden its vulnerabilities further across the vast Chinese mainland and improve 
costly AMD systems� This would reduce the funding available for the PLA to 
pursue offensive war-fighting systems�
The sixth advantage is that a U�S� capacity to execute a conventional theater 
strike from the Cocos Islands would complicate significantly the PLA’s opera-
tions to defend the Chinese mainland� During a South China Sea or East China 
Sea crisis, the PLA could deploy most of its AMD systems along China’s east and 
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southeast coastlines� However, if the Australian government allowed the U�S� 
military to operate conventional B-21s or HBG theater-strike missiles from the 
Cocos Islands, the PLA would have to defend a significantly greater area� For 
instance, PLA AMD units would have to be more thinly dispersed along China’s 
vast coastline as well as along the land borders of its Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yun-
nan provinces� Consequently, U�S� strike bombers and theater-strike missiles 
would have an improved capability to penetrate PLA AMD networks and neu-
tralize the intended targets�
LIMITATIONS OF A U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY
A conventional access strategy would incur seven major limitations�
Homeland Sanctuary
The first limitation is the vexing issue of homeland sanctuary: the concept that 
nuclear powers refrain from attacking the homelands of other nuclear powers, to 
avoid triggering a nuclear response� The argument is that in a China-U�S� conflict 
each side would initially avoid strikes against the other’s homeland, even with 
conventional ordnance, to minimize the risk of nuclear escalation�107 It has been 
pointed out that this asymmetry could allow China to strike at U�S� territories in 
the western Pacific, such as Guam and the Northern Marianas, without retalia-
tory U�S� strikes on the PLARF and Chinese mainland—at least initially�
Four problems arise out of this argument� First, forward-deployed U�S� forces 
at overseas territories such as Guam and the Northern Marianas are likely to be 
heavily inundated by barrages of PLA ordnance in the initial phase of any China-
U�S� conflict� Such PLA strikes are likely to inflict very heavy losses in terms of 
personnel and combat assets and other matériel�108 In such a scenario, the United 
States might inadvertently honor homeland sanctuary as a direct result of suc-
cessful PLA strikes degrading U�S� in-theater capabilities� However, high losses 
also would trigger significant pressure from Congress, cabinet secretaries, senior 
officials, and the general public for the president to authorize robust conventional 
strikes against targets across the Chinese mainland�
Second, even if the United States suffered very heavy initial losses in person-
nel and matériel, it eventually would execute high-intensity conventional strikes 
across the Chinese mainland, if U�S� force-projection assets were able to deploy into 
theater� For instance, the JOAC, which contains the ASBC and Gaining and Main-
taining Access Concept (GMAC), aims to execute high-intensity, war-fighting 
operations and strikes against the homelands of A2/AD adversaries�109 Notice 
also that the GMAC explicitly states that U�S� Army and Marine Corps special 
forces might be inserted covertly into an adversary’s homeland to “provide hu-
man contact to complement other intelligence�”110
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Third, the U�S� Department of Defense openly acknowledges that the military 
must be ready to execute joint military operations against A2/AD adversaries 
“at the outset of a contingency to avoid delays for buildups�”111 The JOAC states 
that “joint forces will attempt to penetrate into the depth of an enemy’s anti-
access/area-denial defenses � � � to disrupt the integrity of the enemy defensive 
system�”112 The ASBC states that deep strikes against A2/AD adversaries have the 
objective of “disrupting, destroying or defeating an adversary’s A2/AD capabili-
ties�” The ASBC also states that “even the US homeland cannot be considered a 
sanctuary�”113 The deep-strike objectives of Pentagon operating concepts and the 
notion of covert special forces teams operating across the Chinese mainland, 
combined with the stated need to be ready at the outset of a conflict and open 
acknowledgment that the U�S� homeland could be targeted, strongly suggest that 
the U�S� military does not plan on granting the PLA homeland sanctuary during 
a China-U�S� conflict�
Fourth, the United States, owing to its geographic distance from the western 
Pacific, could be seen by global public opinion as a largely unnecessary target� 
This is in stark contrast to the Chinese homeland, which out of necessity would 
be seen as a valid target for conventional U�S� strikes, since the vast majority of 
PLA conventional-strike capabilities are land-based ballistic missiles and long-
range bombers� Consequently, if the PLA executed conventional strikes against 
the U�S� mainland, particularly in a conflict in which China was viewed globally 
as the aggressor, then global public opinion could strengthen the scale of coali-
tion forces levied against the PLA� This would be true particularly in the case of 
U�S� allies and security partners that otherwise might opt out of direct participa-
tion in a China-U�S� conflict� As the RAND Corporation has noted, in a short 
conflict third parties would make little difference, but in a more protracted con-
flict between China and the United States the implications could be significant�114 
Despite these counterarguments, the Chinese government still might believe 
that the PLA could strike at U�S� forces in the western Pacific with minimal risk 
of conventional strikes against the Chinese mainland, given an asymmetry in 
homeland sanctuary� 
Treaty Limitations on Aircraft
The second limitation is that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 
START) severely handicaps the acquisition of B-21 Raider long-range strike 
bombers, since the aircraft will be capable of delivering both conventional and 
nuclear ordnance�115 New START requires U�S� and Russian nuclear arsenals not 
to exceed 1,500 nuclear warheads and eight hundred nuclear delivery vehicles, 
with seven hundred deployed and one hundred not deployed�116 Under New 
START, nuclear delivery vehicles are defined as ICBMs, submarine-launched 
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ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers�117 A nuclear bomber is defined by New 
START as an aircraft that has a maximum one-way range exceeding eight thou-
sand kilometers and that could carry nuclear weapons�118 The problem is that a 
B-21 Raider with an unrefueled combat radius of 5,500 km, as needed to strike 
deep into the Chinese mainland from Guam, would give the aircraft a total range 
of around eleven thousand kilometers� Given that the B-21 will be capable of 
delivering both nuclear and conventional ordnance, it will be counted under 
New START� Consequently, the challenge for the USAF will be finding a way to 
increase the size of its combat-coded conventional long-range stealth bomber 
force without violating New START�
One solution would be to produce a nonnuclear-capable variant of the B-21, 
since nonnuclear variants would not count� According to the treaty, a nuclear 
bomber is no longer counted once it has been permanently modified to be inca-
pable of delivering nuclear ordnance and is visibly distinguishable from nuclear-
capable variants�119 Modifications include ensuring that all mechanisms of the 
internal weapon bays are “incapable of employing nuclear armaments�”120 Other 
modifications would need to be made to the external design of a conventional 
B-21 variant to render it visibly different from the nuclear variant�121 With a 
conventional-only B-21 variant, the United States theoretically could produce as 
many conventional B-21s as it requires without breaching New START� Another 
solution might be to reduce modestly the USAF’s inventory of nuclear-armed 
ICBMs, from four hundred under New START to three hundred�122 This would 
allow the USAF to order a total of two hundred B-21 Raiders and still comply 
with New START� Ultimately, either solution would increase significantly the 
number of combat-coded B-21s, greatly enhancing the capacity of the USAF to 
execute long-range strikes across the Chinese mainland from Guam� Moreover, 
increasing the B-21 Raider production order to two hundred or more units would 
drive down acquisition costs by distributing fixed research, development, and 
other costs over a larger production run�
Treaty Limitations on Weapons
The third limitation is that the acquisition of conventional theater-strike HBG 
weapons could breach New START, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty, or both� Under New START, an ICBM is defined as a nuclear-
capable system that travels for most of its flight path in a ballistic trajectory, with 
a range exceeding 5,500 km�123 The INF Treaty requires that U�S� and Russian 
militaries dismantle all ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km� 
The INF Treaty defines a ballistic missile as a weapon that follows a ballistic tra-
jectory for the majority of its flight path�124
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However, HBG weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory for the majority of 
their flight path and thus would not be subject to limitations under New START 
or the INF Treaty�125 Consequently, the U�S� military could develop an HBG 
weapon with a range of 5,500 km or greater, yet avoid breaching either treaty�
First-Strike Risk
The fourth limitation is that launching one or more HBG weapons could be mis-
construed by the PLA, Russia, or both as a U�S� nuclear first strike� This risk has 
been discussed since the conceptualization of hypersonic boost-glide systems, 
because they depend on long-range rocket boosters similar to those that nuclear-
armed ballistic missiles use�
However, the nonballistic flight path of hypersonic boost-glide weapons, plus 
a brand-new rocket booster design, would make a U�S� hypersonic boost-glide 
system appear distinct on Chinese and Russian nuclear early-warning systems�126 
If the United States were able to assure China and Russia that its hypersonic 
boost-glide systems were used exclusively for conventional payloads, this would 
further reduce the likelihood of HBG-weapon use being misinterpreted as a 
nuclear first strike�
Potential Nuclear Aggression
The fifth limitation is that striking at the PLA’s conventional ballistic-missile 
manufacturing and maintenance facilities, storage facilities, and launchers could 
be misconstrued as an attempt by the United States to degrade the PLA’s nuclear 
deterrent�127 This risk would arise because U�S� theater commanders would be 
unable to distinguish readily between nuclear and conventional versions of the 
PLA’s ballistic-missile arsenal, particularly if U�S� C4ISR systems were degraded 
by PLA ASAT and cyber strikes�
This problem could be solved through a U�S�-China bilateral agreement for the 
PLA to separate clearly its nuclear ballistic missiles from its conventional arsenal 
and a mutual commitment to exclude all nuclear deterrents from targeting� The 
net result would be a reduced risk of U�S� conventional strikes inadvertently tar-
geting PLA nuclear capabilities�
Hardened Structures
The sixth limitation is that a U�S� conventional access strategy might not over-
come the PLA’s extensive investments in hardened structures� This is a very 
real possibility� To paraphrase Moltke, no plan, however good, survives contact 
with the enemy�128 However, the measures proposed under a U�S� conventional 
access strategy would provide a reasonable ability to neutralize PLA hardened 
facilities, such as underground tunnels and sea-level submarine pens� This con-
ventional access strategy prioritizes advanced penetrator ordnance delivered by 
HBG theater-strike missiles and B-2s and B-21s, as well as AUVs armed with 
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large conventional warheads for sea-level tunnels and submarine pens� While 
the penetration capabilities of all ordnance might not be able to overcome PLA 
HDBTs, such as tunnels buried deep within mountains, what this ordnance could 
do is target the most vulnerable points of these structures� For instance, these 
weapons could target external communications links and surface-level entrances� 
By targeting surface-level entrances of PLA hardened facilities, U�S� penetrator 
ordnance could be sufficient to seal the structures from the outside world, or at 
the very least impede the movement of traffic in and out of the facilities� The ad-
vantage of targeting surface-level entrances is that every underground hardened 
structure must be accessible from the surface, making them a vulnerability of all 
PLA HSs and HDBTs that can be exploited�
Survivable and Capable Force-Projection Capability
A seventh limitation is that the United States might consider fielding a highly 
survivable and capable force-projection capability designed to achieve the same 
objective as the proposed conventional access strategy, just with less risk of es-
calation� While it is true that the United States could field a highly capable and 
survivable force-projection capability, funding levels will determine whether it 
will do so�
To field a force structure capable of defeating A2/AD adversaries, the U�S� 
military would need to invest in many of the nine following critical capabilities: 
arsenal ships; additional future guided-missile frigates (FFG-Xs); additional 
Virginia-class SSNs; a large number of AUVs; a new, sixth-generation, long-range, 
carrier-based strike aircraft; a new, sixth-generation, long-range, land-based 
air-superiority fighter; additional B-21 Raiders; a new, stealthy C3 intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) aircraft; and a new, stealthy, in-flight 
refueling tanker (see table 2)� The numerous new research, development, and 
acquisition programs needed would cost hundreds of billions of dollars, even 
without accounting for significant additional orders of DDGs, FFG-Xs, SSNs, 
and B-21s�
In short, the United States can field a highly survivable and capable counter-
A2/AD force—it is just a question of the funding and political willingness to do 
so� Conversely, a U�S� conventional access strategy aims to achieve similar power-
projection objectives with less of a burden to the U�S� taxpayer, or fewer seismic 
departures from the planned military force structure, or both�
The PLA’s counterintervention capabilities could be used to execute a conven-
tional first strike against U�S� bases and forward-deployed forces west of Hawaii� 
The Chinese leadership could be convinced that a decisive conventional first 
strike, in conjunction with other PLA capabilities, would provide the PLA with 
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   57 2/25/19   10:40 AM
63
Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 5 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
temporary regional superiority, giving China a rare window of opportunity to 
settle regional disputes through coercion and on terms favorable to China� Any 
such perception would undermine seriously the U�S� military’s ability to deter 
Chinese aggression in the western Pacific� 
The solution is not for the U�S� military to build a larger force structure but 
rather for it to rearrange its thinking around a conventional access strategy� This 
would require the U�S� military to acquire four critical capabilities: a theater-
wide passive-defense capability, a conventional theater-strike capability, a 
Capability Description
Arsenal ships The U�S� Navy could consider a new class of large-displacement surface 
ship, armed with 288–512 strike-length Mk 41 vertical launching system 
cells and a larger, more capable ballistic missile–defense radar than the 
AN/SPY-6� 
Additional FFG-Xs The U�S� Navy could consider expanding its order of FFG-Xs to serve 
as capable surface combatant escorts for convoys of fleet oilers and dry-
cargo and resupply ships, as would be needed to sustain high-intensity 
combat operations in the western Pacific�
Additional nuclear-powered attack sub-
marines (SSNs)
The U�S� Navy could consider accelerating the acquisition of Virginia 
Payload Module–equipped SSNs, particularly given the projected 
undersea strike shortfall when the fourth Ohio-class nuclear-powered 
guided-missile submarine is retired in 2028�a
Autonomous underwater vehicles 
(AUVs)
The U�S� Navy could consider acquiring AUVs armed with lightweight 
torpedoes designed to deny maritime zones to PLA surface and subsur-
face forces�
Sixth-generation carrier-based aircraft The U�S� Navy could consider truncating its order of F-35Cs in favor of 
developing a sixth-generation carrier-based, long-range strike and air-
superiority aircraft�
Sixth-generation land-based aircraft The U�S� Air Force could consider truncating its order of F-35As in favor 
of developing a sixth-generation land-based, long-range air-superiority 
aircraft with sufficient unrefueled range to escort B-21s during deep-
penetration strikes�
Additional B-21s The U�S� Air Force could consider retaining its planned fleet of one hun-
dred nuclear-capable B-21s, plus a significant order of conventional-only 
B-21s, perhaps on the order of three to four hundred aircraft�
Stealthy C3ISR aircraft The U�S� Air Force could consider developing a stealthy, very high- 
altitude, long-range C3ISR aircraft, capable of replacing satellite com-
munications networks during a conflict�
Stealthy in-flight refueling tanker The U�S� Air Force could consider developing a stealthy, long-range 
in-flight refueling tanker� This aircraft should be fitted with a tail ramp 
to enable variants to support the covert insertion and sustainment of 
special operations forces deep inside hostile territory�
TABLE 2
U.S. COUNTER-A2/AD FORCE-PROJECTION CAPABILITIES
Note:
 a. Gunzinger and Dougherty, Outside-In, p. 85.
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theater-recovery capability, and a rapid-response capability� Strategically, a con-
ventional access strategy would accomplish several things: it would deny the PLA 
a conventional first-strike capability, increase the permissiveness of the western 
Pacific for follow-on U�S� forces, buy valuable time needed to mobilize and deploy 
U�S� power-projection assets, focus the military’s attention on critical capabilities, 
and impose resource constraints on the PLA� However, a conventional access 
strategy would require the United States to think seriously about developing 
and assigning a new rocket booster exclusively for use by hypersonic boost-glide 
systems, as well as to assure Russia and China that U�S� HBG weapons would 
carry only conventional payloads� Furthermore, the United States and China 
would have to give serious consideration to entering into a bilateral agreement 
for the PLA to separate clearly its nuclear ballistic missiles and for both parties to 
exclude nuclear deterrents from targeting�
Even with its limitations, a U�S� conventional access strategy would return the 
China-U�S� strategic deterrence calculus to a more stable equilibrium� One hopes 
that this would deter Chinese leaders from seeing a conventional first strike as a 
credible option� Pursuing a U�S� conventional access strategy would be a political 
decision for the president and Congress� Such a decision would have to take into 
account numerous dimensions, including military, political, fiscal, diplomatic, 
and technological maturity considerations� Such discussions fall beyond the 
scope of this article but provide ideal areas for future research�
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WARGAME BUSINESS
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 Wargames have a centuries-long history in military circles, but the world of business only adopted their fundamental principle in the late 1950s�1 
In recent decades, both corporate and military thinkers have renewed their 
interest in simulation games� Gamification (incorporating game elements into 
more-serious activities) and “serious video games” have given wargaming a more 
significant place in both business and military simulation discussions�
Wargames and business games do have some dissimilarities in their concepts 
and methodologies, but they also have similar strategic environments, planning, 
and decision-making processes� Therefore, the analysis of business game case 
studies can enrich the practice of wargames in the 
military world, and vice versa�
This article clarifies the similarities and the 
analogical relationship between the fields of war 
and business, addressing three critical constructs 
(a) to illustrate the historical shift of wargames 
from the military world to the corporate one; (b) 
to explore the shared challenges facing strategic 
planners, which wargames and business games 
can address and overcome; and (c) to present three 
business games in a corporate setting� The article 
then will describe the lessons identified from these 
three case studies and how these lessons can help 
strategic planners from both the military and the 
business worlds overcome challenges�
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF WARGAMES
The earliest wargames (e�g�, chaturanga [chess, around AD 280–550] and wei-hai 
[Go, around the third or fourth century BC]) were recreational, enabling sim-
plified forms of operational thinking� In the wake of the French Revolution, as 
well as the institutionalization and modernization of armies in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, militaries needed simulation-based thinking that 
emulated the forms, factors, and functions of battles and campaigns, with critical 
nodes and decision points� This led to sophisticated wargames that simulated 
military forces, variable topography, and even maritime combat using tabletop 
frameworks� The Prussians developed the most systematic methodology in the 
Kriegsspiel (wargame), allowing them to test their battle plans as well as educate 
their armed forces�2
At the close of the nineteenth century, wargames became a global phenom-
enon as the Russians, Japanese, French, British, and Americans assimilated this 
practice into military planning�3 In 1905, German chief of the Great General 
Staff Alfred von Schlieffen conducted a broad-ranging wargame that tested his 
plan for a decisive attack of France by way of Belgium�4 After World War I, the 
Germans conducted an investigation into their defeat, concluding that wargames 
must include political processes to simulate better the strategic environment 
in which armies function� On that basis, Germany began pioneering national 
wargames in which civilians (e�g�, politicians, diplomats, and journalists) partici-
pated for the first time� The Wargame Branch of the German military conducted 
the first political-military (pol-mil) game in 1929�5
German chancellor Adolf Hitler ended Germany’s pol-mil games, seeing 
them as an unnecessary intellectual exercise that failed to incorporate such vari-
ables as ideology and intuition� Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht (unified armed 
forces of Nazi Germany from 1935 to 1946) continued to refine Germany’s use of 
wargames, including a simulation of the invasion of Poland, the occupation of the 
Soviet Union, and an Allied invasion of Normandy� Almost all major countries 
involved in World War II conducted strategic and operational wargames�6
Indeed, similarly to other military and technological development, World War 
II was the catalyst behind wargames’ leap forward� As Joseph Wolfe has stated, 
“Modern business gaming came about through the merging of developments in 
wargames, operations research, computer technology, and education theory�”7 
Richard D� Duke has argued that “World War II spawned at least five develop-
ments which have been woven into the fabric of gaming: computers, operations 
research, the mathematical theory of games, simulation, and the early business 
games�”8
After World War II and as the Cold War progressed, wargame development 
accelerated in the United States, especially after the RAND Corporation began 
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to “game out” crisis scenarios, particularly nuclear crises, with the participation 
of senior U�S� officials�9 This heralded a return to the clear separation between 
military wargames and political strategic games� Although not mutually exclu-
sive, the former emphasized the use of military power and tended to focus on 
operations, while the latter focused on grand strategy, in which military force was 
one of many potential tools�
There are examples from the business sector as well� The former Soviet Union 
conducted a hand-scored simulation dedicated to businesspeople in 1932, mainly 
for the purpose of training managers of the Ligovo typewriter factory, and Japan 
pioneered the field of simulation games dedicated to economic studies and busi-
ness�10 The onset and subsequent disasters of World War II put an end to these 
business gaming experiments in both countries�
Following World War II, interest quickly grew in the theory of organization, 
along with some developments in game theory and its application to decision-
making�11 Therefore, it is not surprising that in 1957 the American Management 
Association developed and conducted one of the first business games—the Top 
Management Decision Simulation—followed by the Top Management Decision 
Game�12 In 1958, the Harvard Business Review published a paper assessing the 
relevance of wargames to the business world�13 The journal’s prominence meant 
that the practice received wide exposure, and business wargames gained addi-
tional momentum throughout the 1960s� Universities, research institutes, and 
independent companies developed hundreds of games in fields such as manage-
ment, business operations, finance, organizational theory, psychology, account-
ing, and marketing�
Through the mid-1980s, business games focused on strategic issues and 
matters relating to competitive intelligence, including the behavior of business 
players such as competitors and consumers, the evaluation of case studies and 
strategic responses, and the robustness of initial work plans�14 This revolution 
culminated in larger consulting firms, such as McKinsey & Company and Booz 
Allen Hamilton, incorporating gaming methodologies into their customer 
offerings�15
In recent decades, corporations have turned again to wargames, inspired by 
the following factors:
• The benefits of games such as these are clear, even to industries long consid-
ered too important to be influenced by games� The increasing availability of 
advanced computing power and information technologies also contributes to 
the success of business games�
• Wargames are perceived as being grounded in the many approaches to stra-
tegic business planning popularized since the late 1990s�16
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   69 2/25/19   10:40 AM
75
Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 7 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
• Wargames, and by extension business games, are well suited to making deci-
sions in a strategic environment in which leaders must assess a wide range of 
possible scenarios, under varied circumstances�17
Today, the two major types of business games are competitive scenarios, such as 
the entry of a market competitor or the outbreak of a crisis, and structured frame-
works to prepare for complex negotiations�18 Games also can be functional or 
general� Functional games assess specific aspects of a value chain, while general 
games take a strategic perspective relative to current and future markets�19 Gen-
eral games can be either closed games, using software and algorithms to estimate 
market behaviors in response to participants’ actions, or open games, more simi-
lar to workshops, wherein the dynamics among participants reflect the possible 
range of market conditions�20 The most popular format for business games is role 
play, wherein participants compete with each other in teams�
In parallel, militaries around the world continue to use and improve their 
wargaming techniques, further developing their extensive body of knowledge� In 
2015, U�S� Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O� Work committed the Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) to overhauling its approach to wargaming to encour-
age innovation across the department; he imposed a five-year target of using 
wargames to improve operational planning�21 In 2016, DoD requested more than 
$55 million for wargaming for the next fiscal year, and more than $525 million 
over the five-year Future Years Defense Program spending plan� As a senior CNA 
(formerly the Center for Naval Analyses) wargame expert stated, “Wargaming 
has gone through periods of popularity and disfavor, but I have never seen in the 
past 40 years any situation like this with the senior leadership�”22 
There is, therefore, no doubt that the public and private sectors can share each 
other’s experience, methodology, and lessons learned to solve both their shared 
and their unique problems�
THE MILITARY AND THE CORPORATION:  
SHARED PROBLEMS FOR STRATEGIC PLANNERS
Examining the definitions of a wargame in each domain uncovers similarities and 
ways to compare the business environment to that of the military� DoD defines a 
wargame as a “simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving 
two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict 
an actual or assumed real life situation�”23 Similarly, in his classic book, The Art 
of Wargaming: A Guide for Professionals and Hobbyists, Peter P� Perla defines a 
wargame as a “warfare model or simulation whose operation does not involve the 
activities of actual military forces, and whose sequence of events affects and is, in 
turn, affected by the decisions made by players representing the opposing sides�”24
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As for business games, the definitions reveal some similarities to military 
games� Marco Greco and his coauthors state that a wargame in the business 
world is “a game with a business environment that can lead to one or both of the 
following results: the training of players in business skills (hard and/or soft) or 
the evaluation of players’ performances—quantitatively and/or qualitatively�”25 
According to Samuel Eilon, business simulation games have a threefold purpose: 
to be used as training tools (in which players must face the consequences of their 
decisions), to provide an overall view of corporate strategic functions, and to 
simulate market trends to improve a player’s capacity to face changes�26
All these definitions describe an activity that simulates real-world conditions� 
A wargame in this context is serious, “a game whose central purposes are not 
recreational,” and represents “an exercise of voluntary control systems in which 
there is an opposition between forces, confined by a procedure and rules in order 
to produce a disequilibrial outcome�”27
Despite the differences between environments, military and business leaders 
encounter similar challenges, particularly those related to analysis of an orga-
nizational setting, strategic planning, and implementation�28 Simulations and 
games are an effective tool for overcoming these challenges, even partially, in 
both worlds—and gaming experiences in either world produce relevant insights 
for the other�
Two types of strategic planning challenges are those resulting from individual 
and group cognitive limitations or failures, and those arising from organizational 
structures, procedures, and behaviors�
Cognitive Limitations
Planning and decision-making require an accurate appreciation of one’s strategic 
environment� The environment in which businesses (and militaries) operate, 
however, features high complexity, rapid change, and imperfect information� The 
cognitive capacity of individuals and groups to understand such information-
intensive yet ambiguous situations is limited� Moreover, time pressure often does 
not allow for both rapid assessment and effective decision-making�
Human perception is an active process in which individuals and groups build 
their own versions of reality on the basis of assumptions and conceptions�29 The 
“distorted perception” effect skews the process, however, so that decision makers 
are not aware of the basic assumptions and conditions that shape their thinking�30
Cognitive biases often arise out of distorted perceptions and systematic 
patterns or tendencies that cause errors in perception, memory, judgment, 
or thought� All individuals employ rules of thumb that help them to process 
information quickly and make decisions accordingly�31 These shortcuts al-
low people and organizations to cope in uncertain environments, but they 
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   71 2/25/19   10:40 AM
77
Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 7 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
nonetheless lead to systematic biases�32 Such individual and group biases often 
are accompanied by chronic organizational problems, and the combination can 
be devastating�
Barriers Caused by Organizational Structures, Procedures, and Behaviors
A failure to convey information accurately is a strategic threat to any organiza-
tion, with the knowledge necessary for effective strategic planning often split 
across separate organizational functions�33 The first business games were de-
veloped precisely to allow future managers to discover all the functions of the 
firm, the interdependence of those functions, and the interrelations among the 
different functions (marketing, finance, accounting, sales and purchases, etc�)� 
Furthermore, different people and functions have varied perspectives and inter-
pretations of the operating environment and of how to achieve objectives, or even 
what those objectives are�
A good example of this dynamic can be seen between intelligence officers—
both military and civilian—and elected officials� Elected policy makers gener-
ally lack professional knowledge regarding intelligence as a field and regularly 
believe that intelligence officers tend to expand, rather than reduce, the level of 
uncertainty� In most cases, intelligence officers lack the knowledge of both policy 
issues from the policy makers’ perspectives and the constraints under which they 
operate�34
In the business world, the chief strategy officer is analogous to the intelligence 
officer, and the chief executive officer to the policy maker—yet the way players 
deal with complex problems remains the same� Both realms, and both types of 
roles, are rooted in a somewhat chaotic, unpredictable, and uncertain environ-
ment; in both realms there is an inherent tension between the desire to reflect 
reality fully and the need to shape reality actively�
This lack of collaborative culture has a negative effect on organizations� 
Organizational cultures that reinforce the concept of the “expert” and promote 
ownership of knowledge at the expense of shared understanding create islands of 
information and expertise that are not distributed through organizational chan-
nels� The knowledge produced on these islands could be valuable, sometimes 
even critical, but unless it is shared it is practically worthless� Where knowledge is 
power, those who give it up will lose, and those who do not have it are weak� This 
kind of corporate culture can cause professional jealousy and friction, reducing 
the organization’s competitive effectiveness, and can create arrogance, rigidity, 
and impatience among decision makers, which restricts their ability to view a 
company’s situation in its entirety� In contrast, wargames encourage the exchange 
of knowledge and can help overcome such problems�
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THREE CASE STUDIES FROM THE ISRAELI BUSINESS SCENE
This section will examine three case studies of business games in the Israeli 
business sector in which the author participated firsthand� They convert the 
theoretical into an example-based data set and demonstrate the use of wargam-
ing methodologies in different contexts� The studies also describe the outcomes 
of these games and how organizations have incorporated these insights in their 
strategic planning� The resulting implications for military planners are then pre-
sented and discussed�
Water Drops: The Entry of a New Competitor into the  
Household Appliance Market
A household appliance company learned that a new competitor was planning 
to enter and change the market within six to eight months� Until that point, the 
original company had dominated its smaller competitors� The new challenger, 
however, had significant financial backing from a parent company that allowed 
it to enter the market aggressively and absorb losses over time� The original com-
pany’s managers sensed that this new competitor would deliver a major blow, but 
they struggled to identify the specific implications, including how it would affect 
the company, its existing competitors, and consumer spending patterns�
The primary objective of the business game, which the author led, was to 
provide participants with a broad understanding of the new operational environ-
ment, which in turn demanded a new business strategy for the household appli-
ance market� A second objective was to formulate general contingency guidelines 
on how to respond to the new competitor�
The author created this business game and led its execution in late 2012� My 
team created a two-phase game, with each phase having a different format to 
satisfy different objectives� In the first phase, participants received a description 
of the most likely scenario (on the basis of existing knowledge) to follow the new 
company’s entry into the market� They then analyzed the new strategic environ-
ment and various scenarios that might develop� In the second phase, the em-
phasis was tactical� Participants worked in groups, receiving a concrete scenario 
relating to the competitor’s products, pricing, or expected sales methods and 
channels� Each group developed a set of responses to its given scenario�
The business game began just days after the media had reported the details 
of the expected entry of the new competitor� These details troubled the original 
company’s management, and an atmosphere of urgency surrounded the game en-
vironment� At the end of the series, participants were equipped with strategic and 
operational principles to cope with future short- and long-term challenges� The 
participants went through a cognitive journey, discussing how potential strategic 
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scenarios might unfold and testing potential responses� They then compared the 
insights gained in the game with their actual capacities, plans, and procedures, 
illuminating the areas that required update or change�
Players unanimously agreed on the need to devise and implement an active 
policy rather than a reactive one and to create an environment in which the new 
competitor would operate under unfavorable conditions� At the end of the sec-
ond stage, participants realized that the original company was not sufficiently 
prepared for future competition and needed to make swift changes to its pricing 
and market position� The company’s management later explored these vulner-
abilities in greater depth�
A New Sheriff: A Telecommunications Group Prepares for the  
Appointment of a New Regulator
A major telecommunications group sought to assess the competitive arena in 
light of the expected appointment of a new minister of communications� Issues 
for the participants to consider included the fundamental changes resulting from 
the outgoing minister’s introduction of open-market competition, the entry of 
new competitors (especially mobile virtual network operators), and the con-
sumer climate following the social protests of the summer of 2011�35
The group wanted to explore a full array of possible scenarios, ranging from 
maintenance of the status quo to deep structural change in the market� For each 
of these scenarios, the company would examine predictive trends, detail their 
manifestation, and examine their implications for the company� The players also 
would rank the scenarios by likelihood and formulate a strategic action plan that 
would foster desired scenarios and thwart dangerous ones�
This business game used a combination of scenario-based planning method-
ologies spread over a series of four sessions�
1� In the first session, participants defined the two central variables that 
would affect the future of the company over approximately eighteen 
months� After a thorough review of several options, they selected (a) the 
level of change advocated by the new minister of communications, placed 
on the x axis, and (b) consumer preferences for bundled or individual 
products, placed on the y axis� Their combination created four potential 
scenarios for the future condition of the communications market�
2� In the second session, participants split into four groups, each of which 
received one of the four scenarios developed in the first meeting� Each 
group then developed a detailed description of its scenario� In addition, 
each group developed an inventory of real-world indicators that would 
signal its scenario’s emergence�
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3� In the third session, the groups presented the scenarios and discussed 
their implications for the company� Together, they identified the most 
likely scenario, the most dangerous scenario, and the most desirable 
scenario� Interestingly, all the participants agreed that the most likely 
scenario was also the most dangerous, which surprised them� Although 
they had engaged in future planning before the game, they had not 
analyzed scenarios through the prism of impact and probability�
4� In the fourth session, participants formulated strategies to promote the 
most desirable scenario and avoid the most likely and dangerous scenario�
Participants ultimately gained a deep understanding of potential scenarios 
and their inherent implications, risks, threats, and opportunities� This new level 
of knowledge, along with a discussion of the probabilities of different scenarios, 
formed the foundation for the development of a strategic plan aimed at prevent-
ing (or at least manipulating) the dangerous scenario and promoting the desir-
able one�
Health for All: A Public Health Fund Prepares for the  
Rekindling of Social Protests
A year after Israel’s social protests in the summer of 2011, many companies 
in the Israeli market were concerned about the protests’ possible renewal and, 
particularly, the chances of being the next target of consumer rage� Against this 
backdrop, a public health fund sought to examine its preparedness in the event 
it became a target�
This game used the classic methodology of role playing�36 The game structure 
divided the participants into several groups� One group played the health fund; 
three played its three competitors; a fifth played the minister of health (the regu-
lator); and the last, most diverse group played the consumers�
All participants received an opening scenario that described a rekindling 
of consumer activism, along with a series of events leading to consumer anger 
targeting all health funds� The group playing consumers developed creative cam-
paigns against the health funds, while the groups playing the competing health 
funds identified responses� Finally, the group playing the regulator created barri-
ers limiting the marketing campaigns of the health funds—a common occurrence 
in reality�
The game revealed deep failures in the health fund’s assessments of the sce-
nario� Participants were unaware that a protest directed at their competitors likely 
would harm them as well� They also lacked awareness of their own weak points 
with respect to high-volume inquiries, potentially leading to a total collapse of 
their customer-service system� This game did not include a planning stage; that 
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is, there was no stage during which participants generated guidelines toward the 
formulation of a strategic plan� In the aftermath of the game, however, the health 
fund did prepare a plan, one involving various stakeholders, that provided de-
tailed guidelines in case such a protest ever occurred�
LESSONS FOR THE MILITARY AND BUSINESS WORLDS
As the examples above demonstrate, wargames are an analytical tool designed 
to overcome the difficulties that characterize strategic planning and decision-
making� The following discussion details a few of these unique challenges�
The Strategic Environment
Wargames are an effective tool for creating a laboratory environment in which 
there is room to experiment with ideas without paying the price of failure� In 
each of the case studies described above, participants confronted a possible 
future problem and attempted to find a solution via trial and error� In the third 
case study, for example, the participants learned to develop potential reactions to 
events that might result from the behavior of other groups�
Some argue that the laboratory environment is sterile, that reality is always 
more powerful and complex, and that it is impossible to predict the future fully or 
reconstruct the past�37 These claims are correct, but they do not negate the useful-
ness of wargames� Although some wargames have shifted from training for the 
present to predicting a few possible futures (as happened during the First World 
War), wargames usually seek to provide general representations to help under-
stand the problem at hand� Wargames apply a concrete perspective to abstract 
or ambiguous problems, whether actual or potential� The case studies presented 
above did not seek to provide a full description of reality, but rather focused on 
simulating key features of the current and future competitive landscapes and in-
forming leadership of potential challenges and opportunities that might emerge 
from developments in the operating environment�
The objective of a wargame is to generate discussion of selected elements of 
the environment, given specific, defined parameters� A limited discussion is not 
less serious than an exhaustive one� On the contrary, discussions that take place 
in the context of a simulation normally occur without any pretense of predicting 
the future, instead illustrating a range of potential futures� Business games are, 
by their nature, somewhat imprecise� Their ambition is to be realistic, but not to 
reproduce the current reality and prevent or promote a certain future� Wargames 
make it possible to prepare for and shape the future by educating those who will 
operate in it� They focus on developing tools and capabilities to prepare for a 
variety of scenarios, including those not discussed here, and on implementing 
strategies in the present�
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Wargames are not effective if the insights they generate are relevant only to 
the future� In fact, a significant proportion of future scenarios examine specific 
implications and make them operational in the present� The first two case stud-
ies presented above demonstrated this emphasis� The third exposed current 
weaknesses, rather than developing contingency plans� As a result, it provoked a 
process of evaluation within the organization, which led to the development of 
plans involving similar scenarios�
The principles exercised in these games can reduce the complexity of the 
strategic environment in both the military and business domains� They give 
participants a relatively simple—but not simplistic—way to discuss future events, 
subsequent outcomes, and potential implications for the organization�
Individual and Group Cognitive Limitations
Wargames and business games are a useful tool for overcoming many cognitive 
distortions, particularly biases in decision-making, beliefs, and behavior� By 
their nature, role-playing games in business and military realms involve multiple 
perspectives and provide a framework to challenge existing conceptions by using 
scenarios� Given their isolated, self-contained environment, they allow partici-
pants to focus their thinking on the specified challenges at hand� For this reason, 
they have the potential to bypass the heuristic jumps that often create cognitive 
biases�
Role-playing games make no pretense that participants can predict behav-
ior� Rather, they encourage participants to broaden their repertoire of mental 
schemes and worldviews, allowing them to expand their points of view and take 
different perspectives� For example, in the first case study, one of the participants 
played the role of one of his own suppliers and reflected on the real-world actions 
of his company� From that perspective, he realized that his behavior alienated not 
only his competitors but also his suppliers and crucial partners in the company’s 
day-to-day activities� In the third case study, participants used their deep under-
standing of the health fund’s weaknesses to explore protest moves that would 
exploit the fund’s vulnerabilities; this revealed which issues required immediate 
attention before a certain scenario came to pass�
Wargames and business games require a group of experts to come together for 
a defined period and think together� In essence, this is the “wisdom of the crowd,” 
in the form of the wisdom of many experts together�38 The use of communities 
of experts as a supporting mechanism in strategic processes helps organizations 
overcome built-in cognitive difficulties� This, in turn, can help them overcome 
the significant complexities of strategic environments that are incomprehensible 
for individuals alone� It integrates subfield expertise with the need to present a 
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holistic, interdisciplinary picture� The use of targeted crowd wisdom, such as a 
group of experts playing out a scenario, combines the best of both worlds: that of 
the individual and that of the crowd�39
Wargames provide a space to employ the expertise and individuality of every 
participant while leveraging collaboration among participants, to generate maxi-
mum value from the intellectual encounter and cross-fertilization of ideas� That 
said, wargame participants should include experts from a wide range of fields 
within the organization, including some who are at the core of operations and 
others who work in the company’s general ecosystem�
When creating the lists of participants in all three case studies, the wisdom of 
the expert crowd was the key principle applied� Each group contained people who 
performed different business functions, including marketing, sales, finance, and 
operations� To give participants a multitude of perspectives and stimulate their 
thinking, their suppliers and contractors also were invited to attend (contingent 
on signing confidentiality agreements)� This injected outside perspectives into 
the exercise, which otherwise might not have been represented�
Finally, the division into subgroups that must compete with each other or con-
tend with different aspects of the problem (such as in different scenarios) mini-
mized the risk of individual or group bias� In the second case study, participants 
developed several futures, with the goal of preventing a focus on just one future 
that the designers presented or that the group dynamic created�
Organizational Structures, Procedures, and Workflows
Wargames, and role-playing games in general, create a unique learning process 
in which a core group from within the organization creates new knowledge and 
understanding� The product of the process is not just another book by an external 
consultant that sits unopened on the shelf� In role-playing games, every par-
ticipant contributes to the development of the resulting strategic knowledge and 
therefore is committed to implementing the results� The task of the game manager 
is to create the conditions for organizational learning and the means for effective 
implementation of the resulting insights, while also creating deep and multidi-
mensional commitment at the organizational level� Games at this level require the 
allocation of resources, including time, attention, and money� Beyond that, how-
ever, they require serious commitment and cannot be conducted as a side event�
Strategic thinking always requires time and attention and must be removed 
from everyday concerns� The investment is rewarded, however, when it enables 
decision-making that is based on careful thought and thorough investigation 
of the most serious issues� Moreover, bringing key players together in such a 
laboratory environment leads to deep and relevant insights in a relatively short 
period� It also promotes flexible, collective thinking that allows the scenario to be 
adapted to any challenge or strategic environment�
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Many organizations experience multidimensional communication problems� 
Wargames promote shared learning and require group members to set aside their 
preconceptions and engage in genuinely collaborative analysis� In this kind of 
learning, there is a free flow of ideas and thoughts among people, organizational 
functions, and hierarchical levels� These games potentially will improve vertical, 
horizontal, and external communication, provided that the participating group 
is heterogeneous and the environment allows for open dialogue, even if it is 
structured� In the three case studies presented above, each of the groups was het-
erogeneous in its composition; in the last two games, several of the participants 
noted that the experience had given them their first significant opportunity to sit 
down together to think strategically�
Games also involve learning about learning—that is, identifying patterns in the 
discourse of the participating group that reflect organizational communication 
patterns� Companies often discover that their patterns of discourse interfere with 
learning and create a closed organization with a conceptual hierarchy in which 
struggles for professional integrity freeze the organization and hinder its ability to 
produce a holistic, strategic picture� In a complex, information-saturated world, 
the basic unit of learning is the group rather than the individual� The framework 
of a wargame experience exposes decision makers to a different pattern of learn-
ing and allows them to infuse a new perspective into the corporate culture�
In addition, wargames are particularly effective as part of company proce-
dures, rather than as a detached event� The preparation of a wargame for any or-
ganization requires a deep understanding of the issues challenging the members 
of management; the challenges they perceive as central; and the language they 
use to describe the organization, its goals, and environment� The preparation also 
should take into account the organization’s short- and long-term plans� During 
the game, the game manager should connect the game processes and the issues 
that participants raise without a predefined plan for how the game will run� At 
the conclusion of the game, the game manager should identify the discourse 
and learning patterns that emerged through the process and compile them for 
management to use in future company processes� Throughout the game, the 
game manager should observe the group’s insights critically and its results in 
light of changing circumstances� Just as the laboratory experience is dynamic 
and changing, so too should organizations and their development of knowledge 
be dynamic�
Although wargames originated in a military setting rather than a boardroom, 
thinkers on both sides can learn from methods used on the other, for both ongo-
ing planning and concrete preparation for threats or opportunities�
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Surprisingly, the business world’s application of wargames is not always in 
the context of competition among players in the business environment� Business 
games are based on probable and realistic scenarios; involve a wide variety of ac-
tors and variables; and cover complex scenarios involving cooperation, negotia-
tions, and more, similar to pol-mil games�
Perhaps because they are not subject to rigid doctrines and practices, business 
games tend to be more flexible in terms of methodology, combining several types 
of methodologies in one game� Such flexibility should be encouraged in military 
wargames� The military has a tendency to compartmentalize, but in wargames it 
is worthwhile and often necessary to broaden the crowd of participants instead� 
Business environments are often similarly hierarchical, although it is easier to 
remove such barriers in the private sector� Good leaders, however, strive to break 
down those barriers so that the best ideas emerge, rather than hearing only the 
loudest voice of the most senior person� A successful wargame allows all partici-
pants to express themselves freely, which can be a key component for application 
in a military environment�
Ultimately, most strategic questions are about mysteries to be solved rather 
than secrets to be discovered� The distinction is crucial not only for a successful 
wargame but, more importantly, for successful policy planning and execution� 
As Richard Duke and Jac L� A� Geurts so accurately summarize, wargames are 
“a process that will simultaneously master complexity, optimize communication, 
stimulate creativity, lead to consensus, and develop commitment to action�”40
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PEACETIME NAVAL REARMAMENT, 1933–39
Lessons for Today
Jamie McGrath
[T]o maintain a navy which is not strong enough to win in battle is the 
worst form of extravagance.
REPRESENTATIVE CARL VINSON, 1934
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 The election of President Franklin D� Roosevelt in 1932 sparked an unprec-edented peacetime naval rearmament that ultimately prepared America 
to fight and win World War II� The Republican administrations of the 1920s, 
driven by isolationism and austerity, had made a series of decisions that left the 
fleet underresourced and therefore incapable of defending the nation from a 
determined adversary� Roosevelt’s efforts, combined with congressional action 
led by Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), turned around a decade of neglect 
of the Navy, funded a balanced fleet, and revitalized the American shipbuilding 
industry�1 The service and the industry responded immediately, building modern 
ships to designs that had been refined throughout the 1920s�
The post–Cold War decline of the U�S� fleet in many ways mirrors the decline 
that followed World War I� Calls today for a 355-ship “Navy the Nation Needs” 
appear to be in line with the actions taken in the 1930s to recover naval strength�2 
However, the principal actors differ significantly 
in their levels of commitment and coordination� 
Whereas the naval rearmament of the 1930s aimed 
to achieve desired ship numbers in under a decade, 
today’s rebuilding plan projects a completion date 
over forty years in the future� The rapid growth 
of shipbuilding contracts in the mid-1930s forced 
shipbuilders to expand their collective infrastruc-
ture and workforce, while today’s modest increase in 
projected construction rates leaves shipbuilders cau-
tiously optimistic, at best, about investing in growth�
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During the 1930s, the executive and legislative branches worked in concert 
with the Navy and industry to coordinate a rebuilding of the infrastructure need-
ed to build a fleet rapidly in time of war� That level of close coordination is miss-
ing today, which threatens to leave America unprepared for future naval conflict�
AFTER WORLD WAR I: DECLINE OF THE FLEET
On Armistice Day 1918, the United States possessed one of the most modern 
fleets in the world and was building toward a navy equal in strength to the Royal 
Navy� However, post–World War I efforts to end future conflict, initiated by the 
United States and supported by the other major world powers, began in 1921–22 
with the Washington Naval Conference� The resulting Five-Power Treaty called 
for a ten-year capital ship building “holiday” and placed restrictions on the size 
and numbers of future capital ships� To comply with the Five-Power Treaty’s lim-
its, the United States scrapped seven of nine battleships and four of six battle cruis-
ers laid down between 1919 and 1922, and America built no new battleships until 
1937�3 The treaty also restricted the construction of various smaller warships�
However, successive Republican administrations, focusing on fiscal austerity 
and isolationist policies, chose to fund American naval construction at levels well 
below treaty limits� Throughout the 1920s, the General Board of the U�S� Navy, 
tasked with advising the Secretary of the Navy on naval policy, remained frustrat-
ed with the continued refusal of presidents and Congress to fund shipbuilding, 
not merely to have sufficient ships, but to field prototypes of new technologies so 
they could be evaluated in the fleet� While this forced the Navy to explore theo-
ries on the application and operationalization of sea power, ideas alone—without 
modern ships to execute them—were insufficient for national defense� Recogniz-
ing the impact of delaying warship construction, the General Board continued 
to advocate for building to the treaty limits to maintain sufficient capability 
to defend against the Japanese, who were widely recognized at the time as the 
most likely adversary of the United States� Unfortunately, the American political 
climate of isolationism and austerity precluded such shipbuilding, so the board 
continuously tailored its annual recommendations to make them more palatable 
to a reluctant Congress�4
As a result of this congressional reluctance, the U�S� Navy designed and built 
only two classes of ships following the completion in 1923 of the World War I 
construction program� These cruisers and submarines were developed in direct 
response to the perceived threat from Japan� Starting in 1921, the Navy designed 
and built a number of submarines intended to create a force capable of operating 
in Japanese waters, in anticipation of supporting fleet operations in the western 
Pacific� The cruiser program began in response to Japanese exploitation of a 
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loophole in the Five-Power Treaty that restricted the size of individual warships 
but not aggregate tonnage� Japan used this provision to embark on an aggressive 
cruiser-building program that challenged American naval strength in the Pacific� 
The United States initiated its cruiser-building program in 1924 with two units 
and added six more in 1928� In 1927, the General Board requested authorization 
to build an additional twenty-five cruisers, but Congress cut that request in its 
enactment of the so-called Cruiser Act (also known as the Butler Cruiser Bill) on 
February 13, 1929�5
Despite this small and relatively inexpensive initiative to counter the Japanese 
naval buildup, lack of funding and presidential actions that delayed allocating 
available construction funds prevented the building of these vessels until after 
Roosevelt’s election in 1932� By the early 1930s, the fiscal constraints of the Great 
Depression further curtailed construction, leaving the U�S� Navy inferior to the 
Japanese navy in modern warships, especially cruisers and destroyers�
The General Board and other naval advocates, including Admiral William V� 
Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from 1930 to 1933, struggled with Con-
gress and the president to maintain a modern American fleet� But their attempts 
were in vain, and American underage warship numbers in the decade following 
the signing of the Five-Power Treaty lagged woefully behind those of the other 
four powers�6 In London in 1930, the world’s major maritime powers agreed on 
further limitations to cruiser, destroyer, and submarine tonnages� After the sign-
ing of what is known as the London Naval Treaty, U�S� policy continued to keep 
the Navy below the levels the treaties allowed, in an effort to lead by example on 
disarmament� By 1932, with Hoover’s proposed further reductions in several ship 
categories, there appeared to be no stopping point for naval disarmament�7
American constraint in shipbuilding ceded the initiative to the world’s other 
naval powers� The other signatories to the Five-Power Treaty continued to build 
warships aggressively in the first decade under the treaty’s constraints, as shown 
in figure 1� Japan, Great Britain, and France each executed construction pro-
grams at levels near or slightly exceeding the treaty limits� Italy’s program, while 
slightly less aggressive, also built ships near to treaty limits in numbers, if not in 
tonnage� In contrast, between January 1922 and March 1933, American warship 
construction remained well below allowable treaty limits� Because of America’s 
anemic shipbuilding program, the four other Five-Power Treaty signatories each 
outbuilt the United States, on average, by over one hundred ships and one hun-
dred thousand tons� Japan more than doubled American shipbuilding output, 
giving it the parity it desired in the Pacific�
By the end of 1933, the American fleet consisted of 187 warships, only eighty-
four of which were underage—less than half the number of underage ships in the 
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fleet when the United States signed the Five-Power Treaty in 1922. This left the 
U.S. Navy 157,280 tons below the treaty limits for underage warships, even when 
including vessels under construction. This amounted to approximately ninety-six 
vessels below treaty limits, accounting for allowances by type. During the first ten 
years under the Washington Treaty system, the United States remained caught 
in a cycle of uncertainty over whether to spend the limited funds available on 
modernizing battleships, developing carriers, building submarines, supporting 
naval aviation, or renewing the destroyer fleet.8
The dearth of naval construction in the 1920s and early ’30s left the American 
shipbuilding industry incapable of rapidly closing the gap between the shrinking 
fleet and the treaty limits. Over the course of the 1920s, the number of private 
shipyards involved in building naval vessels declined steadily. By 1933, only seven 
private shipyards capable of building warships remained, down from twenty-
seven at the end of World War I. Many of the yards that had been building naval 
vessels turned to other products, such as railroad cars, fishing vessels, or luxury 
yachts, to maintain financial solvency.
But the reduction in the number of shipyards represented only a portion of 
the decline in shipbuilding infrastructure. Capacity degraded across the entire 
range of shipbuilding capabilities throughout the 1920s. Among the significant 
losses were the physical infrastructures needed to construct ships, such as build-
ing ways, and the cranes and outfitting equipment that were sold off to cover 
lack of profit. Commercial shipbuilding also suffered during this period, further 
diminishing the shipbuilding industrial base. Shipbuilders were not the only 

















United States Japan Great Britain France Italy
Tonnage (x1,000)Ships
FIGURE 1
FIVE-POWER TREATY NATION WARSHIP BUILDING, 1922–33
Source: Derived from U.S. Navy Dept., Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for Fiscal Year 1933 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, 1933), pp. 4–5.
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systems, armor, and engineering equipment, and even steel manufacturers, also 
contracted because of the loss of shipbuilding contracts�9
The loss of private shipyards and the underemployment of navy yards further 
led to the loss of workers with critical skills� Design capability eroded as trained 
naval architects and draftsmen left the business, but the loss of shipyard labor, 
especially skilled labor, had the most dramatic impact� During the 1920s, both 
the government’s navy yards and private shipyards were unable to attract work-
ers� In 1923, when the Five-Power Treaty went into effect, private shipyards in 
America employed 68,100 workers� By 1933, less than half that number—33,800 
shipyard workers—remained at work in private yards� Because it appeared that 
jobs were not available in the shipbuilding industry, colleges saw severe declines 
in enrollment in marine engineering and naval architecture programs� Addition-
ally, fewer people were learning the mechanical trades of shipbuilding, because 
active apprenticeship programs were no longer available� Workers who possessed 
those skills, as well as experienced draftsmen and ship designers, drifted away 
from shipyards, both government and private, to other industries in pursuit of 
paying employment� This drain in skilled workers represented “one of the most 
serious handicaps to a revival of shipbuilding�”10
THE 1930s: REARMAMENT BEGINS
The efforts of American naval leaders in the decade leading up to Roosevelt’s 
election prepared the U�S� Navy to build a balanced fleet once naval construction 
authorizations and appropriations arrived� Although the General Board’s influ-
ence waned during Admiral Pratt’s tenure as CNO in the early 1930s, the road 
map outlined in the board’s 1922 U.S. Naval Policy served as a guide for the naval 
rebuilding program of the mid-1930s�11
Three mutually dependent concepts—War Plan ORANGE, the “balanced fleet,” 
and the “treaty navy”—helped secure internal cohesion and external support for 
naval construction when funding again became available� War Plan ORANGE did 
not constitute a specific plan, but it represented the manner in which USN plan-
ners envisioned fighting a war in the Pacific, using “orange” as the code word 
for Japan in U�S� planning parlance� The need to transit the vast open-ocean 
areas of the Pacific to reach the expected battle zone drove fleet and warship 
design throughout the 1920s and ’30s�12 The balanced fleet concept recognized 
that, while battleships remained the cornerstone of the Navy’s ability to control 
the seas, a range of smaller vessels played crucial roles in that effort as well� The 
treaty navy concept that Pratt espoused provided the “magic formula for securing 
appropriations” despite American distrust of war machines and war manufactur-
ing�13 The 1930 London Naval Treaty extended the capital ship building holiday 
to 1937, but it also extended tonnage limits across other classes of warships, so 
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Pratt advocated for building ships within the available treaty tonnage that sup-
ported the aging battle line� Additionally, by the 1930s, the importance of aircraft 
carriers and their associated aircraft had been demonstrated, so—with over 
fifty thousand tons of aircraft carrier tonnage available under the London Naval 
Treaty—the Navy encouraged expansion of the American carrier force�14
Pratt’s successor as CNO, Admiral William H� Standley, and the chief of 
the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Rear Admiral Emory S� Land, worked 
closely with Representative Vinson to shape legislation that satisfied the Navy’s 
construction needs and met congressional expectations for rebuilding American 
naval capability�15 This level of close cooperation between the Navy leadership 
and Congress allowed the Navy to execute shipbuilding plans rapidly when funds 
became available�
Legislation and Directives
A naval enthusiast since his time as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt possessed an excellent grasp of naval 
issues� Now, as president, Roosevelt had authority over domestic and foreign af-
fairs, which allowed him the resources to achieve the American naval supremacy 
in which he believed�16 In May 1933, as part of his effort to bring the country 
out of the Depression, Roosevelt submitted massive public works legislation that 
became the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which included provisions 
for funding naval construction� Under this legislation, Roosevelt allocated $238 
million to the Navy—nearly seven times the shipbuilding appropriation for fiscal 
year (FY) 1934� Since shipbuilding was a very labor-intensive activity, its value 
as a work-relief program alone justified this spending, but the boost in deliveries 
of modern naval vessels also improved the fleet� In March 1934, Representative 
Vinson ensured passage of the Vinson-Trammell Act (also known as the Naval 
Parity Act and the First Vinson Act), which made it U�S� policy to build ships up 
to the treaty limits and to replace ships as they aged, as the treaties then in effect 
allowed� These efforts combined not only to provide the U�S� Navy with a modern 
fleet to counter Japanese assertiveness in Asia but also to promote the strength-
ening and growth of the U�S� shipbuilding industry, which had languished in the 
1920s owing to the lack of work�
Executive Order (EO) 6174, issued on June 16, 1933, the day after Roosevelt 
signed the NIRA into law, granted the Federal Emergency Administrator of Pub-
lic Works “authority to allot the sum of not to exceed $238,000,000 to the Depart-
ment of the Navy for the construction of certain vessels, the construction whereof 
conforms to the London Naval Treaty and has heretofore been approved by me�”17 
Coupled with the FY 1933 appropriation, the Navy now had nearly $282 million 
to spend on new construction—a figure twice that allocated for shipbuilding in 
any year since 1920� Naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison credits Roosevelt’s use 
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of NIRA funds to restart the naval building program as the principal impetus of 
the U�S� Navy’s rebirth�18 
On August 3, 1933, less than two months after Roosevelt’s executive order, the 
Navy awarded contracts for the aircraft carriers USS Yorktown (CV 5) and USS 
Enterprise (CV 6), one heavy cruiser, two Brooklyn-class light cruisers, twelve 
Gridley-class destroyers, and three submarines to private shipyards, and con-
tracted for two more destroyers on August 20, 1933� Orders for an additional two 
light cruisers, ten destroyers, and two submarines went to government yards� The 
funds allocated from the NIRA resulted in the construction of thirty-two war-
ships, in addition to the five ships already contracted under the FY 1933 naval 
appropriation� One heavy and five light cruisers authorized by the 1929 Cruiser 
Act remained unfunded�19
After the initial surge of naval construction funded under the aegis of employ-
ment relief, Congress, led by Representative Vinson, acted to provide the presi-
dent and the Navy with permanent authority to build to treaty limits and replace 
overage ships� Vinson’s powerful influence resulted in passage of the aforemen-
tioned Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, which provided what Vinson referred to 
as blanket authority for ship construction and replacement to treaty limits� Naval 
historian Norman Friedman describes the Vinson-Trammell Act as “fundamen-
tal legislation” that called for the Navy to maintain an underage treaty fleet�20
Vinson and the Navy wanted a long-range plan for naval construction rather 
than an emergency program that was executed only when a crisis arose� Such a 
plan allowed for several improvements, including steady employment of available 
shipyards, incorporation of changes in ship design on the basis of operations, and 
prevention of block obsolescence� Vinson stressed that spreading ship construc-
tion out over several years allowed for the testing of various types and making 
improvements� It also allowed for delaying construction of smaller, more quickly 
built vessels, so that they would be delivered when the larger ships they were 
designed to support became available� Additionally, Vinson argued that building 
ships at a steady, predictable rate reduced unit costs, saving the American people 
money�21
The Vinson-Trammell Act authorized expansion of the Navy from its current 
state, but only to the limits permitted under the Five-Power Treaty of 1922 and 
the 1930 London Naval Treaty� An excerpt from the act follows:
That[,] subject to the provisions of the treaties signed at Washington February 6, 
1922, and at London, April 22, 1930, the President of the United States is hereby 
authorized to undertake prior to December 31, 1936, or as soon thereafter as he 
may deem it advisable (in addition to the six cruisers not yet constructed under the 
Act approved February 13, 1929 (45 Stat� 1165), and in addition to the vessels being 
constructed pursuant to Executive Order Numbered 6174 of June 16, 1933), the 
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construction of: (a) One aircraft carrier of approximately fifteen thousand tons stan-
dard displacement, to replace the experimental aircraft carrier Langley; (b) ninety-
nine thousand two hundred tons aggregate of destroyers to replace over-age destroy-
ers; (c) thirty-five thousand five hundred and thirty tons aggregate of submarines to 
replace over-age submarines�22
Several critical elements in this section of the act demonstrate the close 
coordination between Congress and the Navy that proved critical to restoring 
the fleet� First, the act acknowledged and provided congressional authoriza-
tion for the ships ordered under President Roosevelt’s EO 6174 of the previous 
summer� Second, the act directed completion of the 1929 cruiser program that 
had languished under President Hoover� Third, the act directed the replace-
ment of certain overage vessels, amounting to sixty-five destroyers and thirty 
submarines—two categories in which the American fleet fell woefully short of 
treaty limits—in an effort to build a more balanced fleet� Fourth, the act recog-
nized the intent and letter of the 1930 London Naval Treaty, calculating the avail-
able aircraft carrier tonnage to build USS Wasp (CV 7) to replace USS Langley 
(CV 1) to achieve the maximum number of aircraft carriers allowed under the 
treaty, once the latter ship was converted to a seaplane tender� This also enhanced 
balance by increasing the aviation capability of the fleet�
While these elements of the act allowed for immediate shipbuilding, the 
next section had greater implications for naval construction over the long term� 
“[The] President of the United States is hereby authorized to replace, by vessels 
of modern design and construction, vessels in the Navy in the categories limited 
by the treaties signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, and at London, April 22, 
1930, when their replacement is permitted by the said treaties�”23
This clause provided the authority for which the Navy had longed—namely, 
to plan for and build new warships as the current fleet aged� The date a vessel 
became overage could be predicted, replacements could be scheduled, and con-
struction requirements could be forecast with some accuracy� Accurate forecast-
ing allowed shipyards to hire and retain workers, knowing that a consistent flow 
of new construction was forthcoming�
On its passage, Vinson praised the act, stating that it “is no mere piece of pa-
per� It means real fighting ships� We will provide the money this session to start 
work on part of the vessels authorized�”24 Initial funding arrived when Roosevelt 
allocated forty million dollars from the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of 
1935 to augment the FY 1935 naval appropriations and start construction on the 
first twenty ships and 225 aircraft authorized in the Vinson-Trammell Act� By 
November 1934, the Navy let contracts and work began on these vessels, nine in 
private yards and eleven in navy yards�25 Although the Vinson-Trammell Act pro-
vided only authorization and not appropriation, it reversed twelve years of naval 
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retrenchment and represented the first significant action explicitly to strengthen 
the Navy between the two world wars�
Nonetheless, to the dismay of naval leaders, President Roosevelt continued to 
react to political pressure by reducing or deferring many of the Navy’s requests 
for new warship appropriations� Roosevelt remained especially sensitive to the 
political influence of those in the American peace movement and other isola-
tionists� The 1935 naval appropriation, approved after the Vinson-Trammell Act 
passed, amounted to just $11�7 million—half of President Roosevelt’s request, 
and less than the previous year’s appropriation before the influx of money from 
the NIRA�26 However, Congress gradually approved funding, but it did so with-
out fanfare, allowing Roosevelt to placate the isolationists by downplaying naval 
expansion and emphasizing that national policy aimed only to build a fleet to 
treaty limits�27
Impact on Shipbuilding Capabilities
It was the authority that the Vinson-Trammell Act granted that allowed the 
Navy to accomplish its prewar cultivation of shipyards that would be capable of 
expanding to build a wartime fleet� In wartime, private shipyards provide criti-
cal surge capacity to build the fleet rapidly� The Vinson-Trammell Act reversed 
the preceding decade’s shrinkage of private shipyards by allowing the Bureau of 
Construction and Repair to distribute construction contracts among private and 
government yards throughout the 1930s� This provided the shipbuilding industry 
with practice in the construction of new ships and new shipbuilding techniques 
in advance of World War II�
But the act authorized more shipbuilding than could be accomplished in 
available shipyards� Existing yards had to expand or more yards needed to be 
opened to build warships� Either option would mean greater employment� The 
path chosen was to expand shipbuilding infrastructure within existing private 
shipyards� No new private companies capable of building warships for the Navy 
opened yards before 1937, but each of the existing yards ramped up manpower 
and production capacity to meet the expanding demand� However, even with the 
building program implemented by the Vinson-Trammell Act and subsequent 
acts, the shipbuilding industry approached the high levels of production needed 
for wartime support only in 1941, spurred by massive 1940 building programs� In 
contrast, by 1938 just ten large private shipyards existed—only a modest increase� 
That number reached forty by 1941 and eighty by 1945, the latter representing 
the full expansion necessary to support the war effort and complete over 1,500 
naval vessels�28 While the Vinson-Trammell Act provided a reliable program and 
appropriations slowly followed, it took several years of combat before the volume 
of production needed for war was achieved� This, however, represented a marked 
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improvement over the World War I program, under which less than 10 percent of 
the projected construction was completed in time for war.
At the dawn of U.S. entry into World War II, the American fleet mustered 
337 warships, consisting of ships built both before and after the signing of the 
Five-Power Treaty (see figure 2). The peacetime rearmament efforts of President 
Roosevelt and Representative Vinson contributed 95 percent of the modern war-
ships available for the war—over 40 percent of the total active fleet on December 
7, 1941. Because few of the ships laid down in the emergency programs of the 
1940s were completed before the end of 1942, the fleet on hand when the Japanese 
attacked Pearl Harbor differed little from that which existed in the late 1930s. 
The ships already under construction soon more than quintupled the size of the 
fleet—a feat that would have been impossible to accomplish without the deliberate 
building program of the 1930s that the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 authorized.
By strengthening the shipbuilding industrial base, American shipyards 
prepared for the wartime surge to build the enormous fleet that eventually de-
feated Japan. From 1940 through 1945, American public and private shipyards 
produced over 1,500 naval vessels, from battleships and carriers to submarine 
tenders and minelayers. This number does not include the thousands of smaller 
vessels, from tugboats to landing craft, nor the massive merchant fleet that car-
ried the American war machine overseas.29
This effort would have been impossible to carry out in 1934, given the de-
pressed state of the American shipbuilding industry at that time. Rebuilding the 
U.S. Navy in the 1930s provided not only the ships that held the line in 1942 but 
also the necessary time and experience for American shipyards to recover from a 
decade of neglect. By doubling the shipbuilding industry’s workforce between 1934 
and 1938, the rearmament effort restored the nucleus of skilled labor that would 
prove so crucial over the next seven years of increased naval construction. Ship-
yards expanded their infrastructure to meet the increased number of ships under 
construction, including modernizing building ways, machine shops, and supply 
chains, thereby setting up those yards for the surge of wartime construction.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
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FIGURE 2 
SHIPS IN THE U.S. FLEET, DECEMBER 1941
Sources: U.S. Navy Dept., Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1934, pp. 17–19; Cook, Carl Vinson, pp. 90–101; Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, 
www.history.navy.mil/.
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American shipbuilding during World War II was successful because of the 
combined and concerted efforts of the president, Congress, the Navy, and indus-
try in the decade prior to the war.
AFTER THE COLD WAR: DECLINE OF THE FLEET
The decline of the American fleet in the years following the end of the Cold War 
(see figure 3) mirrors in many ways the decline of the 1920s. However, significant 
differences do exist, primarily in their respective forcing functions. In the 1920s, 
a global desire to end warfare led to international treaties that limited the size 
of the fleet, whereas no such conventions exist today. Instead, a perceived post–
Cold War “peace dividend” initiated today’s decline.
There were other significant differences between the two declines. As men-
tioned above, one reason the United States limited investment in naval construc-
tion in the 1920s was its pursuit of isolationist policies that circumscribed its 
commitment to world politics. So, although naval leaders complained that the 
fleet was inadequate to project power across the Pacific, the ships of the 1920s 
Navy were sufficient to defend the Western Hemisphere and meet the Navy’s 
peacetime constabulary missions. In contrast, America not only maintained its 
role as a global leader in the post–Cold War era but also took on the mantle of 
the world’s single hegemon. Today’s fleet of 275 ships is tasked with maintaining 
the same level of presence as the six-hundred-ship fleet of the late 1980s, and as a 
result the fleet is operating at a much higher rate than it was designed to support. 
As Vice Admiral Thomas S. Rowden, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, noted 
























POST–COLD WAR USN BATTLE FORCE
Sources: “US Ship Force Levels 1886–Present,” Naval History and Heritage Command, November 17, 2017, www.history.navy.mil/; 2050 projected battle 
force derived from FY 2019 shipbuilding plan. 
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had 600 ships and were deploying 100, and when you’ve [now got fewer than] 300 
ships and you’re deploying 100, there’s more stress on the force�”30
Just as in the 1920s, the post–Cold War decline of the fleet followed an impres-
sive naval buildup, leaving a surplus of naval capacity once the conflict ended� In 
the final decade of the Cold War, President Ronald W� Reagan’s administration 
dramatically increased military spending in an effort to defeat the Soviet Union� 
Secretary of the Navy John F� Lehman led the drive for a six-hundred-ship Navy, 
an effort that peaked at 594 ships in 1987� Lehman’s Navy relied on recom-
missioned World War II–era Iowa-class battleships; service-life extension pro-
grams for Vietnam-era ships; and large new-construction programs, including 
Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers with the new Aegis weapons system, 
Oliver Hazard Perry–class guided-missile frigates, Los Angeles–class attack sub-
marines, Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines, Avenger-class mine counter-
measures ships, Whidbey Island–class dock landing ships, and Henry J. Kaiser–
class replenishment oilers� Lehman also accelerated construction of Nimitz-class 
aircraft carriers�31
As in the 1930s, the American shipbuilding industry benefited greatly from 
this buildup� Naval ship construction provided 93 percent of all shipbuilding in 
American shipyards in 1985� This level of shipbuilding activity buoyed an other-
wise stagnant manufacturing sector, provided a robust, skilled ship-construction 
workforce, and furnished an abundance of ships from which to draw when Con-
gress curtailed shipbuilding in the 1990s�
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent dissolution 
of the Soviet Union on Christmas Day 1991 meant that America and its allies had 
won the Cold War� The aftermath brought calls for disarmament similar to those 
after World War I� While those calls did not result in an international disarma-
ment treaty as in 1922, they did persuade the United States and other NATO 
nations to make internal decisions to capitalize on a peace dividend, including 
drastically cutting military spending� Without a looming adversary, the justifica-
tion for large defense budgets vanished, and the United States abandoned its six-
hundred-ship Navy policies and building plans� From the defense budget’s peak 
in 1985, America slashed defense spending over the next sixteen years, cutting it 
to a low of 3 percent of the total budget by 2000�32
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in an immediate and 
dramatic increase in defense spending, but spending on naval construction 
remained stagnant through the first several years of the global war on terror� 
Shipbuilding and conversion appropriations remained below 2001 levels in 
current-year dollars until 2008 (see figure 4)� With the additional war appropria-
tions included, shipbuilding accounts rose slowly through the end of the decade, 
and at an average rate of 25 percent through the first half of the 2010s� But after 
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accounting for inflation, shipbuilding appropriations since 2001 have increased 
by only 9 percent.
While the 1980s provided a boom of warship and naval auxiliary construction, 
the 1990s saw curtailment of planned building programs, including truncat-
ing the Seawolf class of attack submarines to three ships from the twenty-nine 
planned. The majority of ships decommissioned in the first decade of the peace 
dividend were Vietnam War–era vessels that had reached or exceeded the end of 
their expected service lives. Since 2000, the Navy has decommissioned 143 ves-
sels, many—such as the Spruance-class destroyers and the Oliver Hazard Perry–
class guided-missile frigates—before the end of their planned service lives, to save 
the cost of maintenance and modernization. During the post–World War I and 
post–World War II drawdowns, the Navy retained large numbers of decommis-
sioned vessels in inactive reserve status. By contrast, during the post–Cold War 
drawdown, the Navy disposed of many of the ships it decommissioned through 
foreign military sales or expended them as targets, making them unavailable for 
reactivation to expand the fleet rapidly. The result is a present-day 275-ship Navy 
with little capacity for rapid expansion in a time of crisis.
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the Navy has maintained a steady but 
slow shipbuilding pace. Unlike during the 1920s, the modern Navy recognized 
the need to build a balanced fleet that included surface combatants, submarines, 
amphibious ships, and naval auxiliaries. The post–Cold War building programs 
addressed this need, but building across this range of ship types resulted in an 
overall reduction in the funds available to build warships.
The Navy and Congress also acknowledged, as Representative Vinson ar-
gued in the early 1930s, that it was necessary to maintain a minimum level of 
industrial capacity. Keeping production lines operating became one of the goals 
of the shipbuilding program during the post–Cold War drawdown. The Navy 












































U.S. SHIP CONSTRUCTION, NAVY ACCOUNT, 2001–17
Source: Derived from Department of Defense budget estimates for Navy shipbuilding and conversion for FY 2001 through FY 2018, available at www 
.secnav.navy.mil/.
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commissioned eighty-one vessels between 2000 and 2018, for an average of just 
under five per year. But that rate merely maintained the status quo for a strug-
gling shipbuilding industry, and the single-ship contracts and uncertain future 
that resulted from this build rate prevented shipbuilders from investing in future 
capacity. Naval drawdowns not only increase production costs but also degrade 
industrial capacity, which severely impacts the Navy’s ability to respond in the 
event a cold war turns hot. 
Again, as in the 1920s, the dearth of new construction caused the American 
shipbuilding industry to contract, with two significant effects. First, low-rate pro-
duction caused an increase in per-ship costs as high as 30 percent. Second, lack 
of naval-construction contracts resulted in the loss of shipbuilding infrastructure 
and the skilled shipbuilding labor force. As shown in figure 5, seventeen ship-
yards have stopped building warships for the U.S. Navy since the end of the Cold 
War. The Navy now depends on seven privately operated shipyards to build the 
future fleet—just as it did in 1932. However, unlike during the 1930s, America’s 
government shipyards no longer build new warships; thus the contraction of pri-
vate shipyards represents an even more severe reduction in capacity.
The concentration of shipbuilding capacity risks significant reduction of 
critical naval capabilities if combat losses occur, or our adversaries target these 
few shipyards, or both. Despite the Navy’s attempts to provide sufficient work 
for each shipyard to maintain a minimum operating capability, the workload 
for warship construction is concentrated in only a few of these yards. Only one 
shipyard is currently capable of building the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers 
deemed critical to the Navy the Nation Needs plan. Destroyer, submarine, and 






1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2018
 Government Private
FIGURE 5
NUMBER OF U.S. SHIPYARDS BUILDING NAVAL VESSELS, 1960 TO THE PRESENT
Source: Derived from “U.S. Builders of Large Ships,” Shipbuilding History, www.shipbuildinghistory.com/.
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remaining two yards involved in building ships for the Navy specialize in am-
phibious ships and fleet auxiliaries�
Huntington Ingalls Newport News Shipbuilding, the only yard building air-
craft carriers, is delivering them at an average rate of 5�6 years per carrier� Sub-
marines are building at an average rate of slightly less than one per year� Orders 
for Arleigh Burke–class destroyers were halted in 2005 but restarted in 2010, with 
the intent of keeping the two shipyards building them in business until the Navy 
completed plans for the Flight III guided-missile destroyers, which will have 
increased anti–air warfare and ballistic-missile-defense capabilities�33 These mul-
tiyear procurement contracts maintain a production rate of slightly more than 
two destroyers per year� But with decommissioning rates of about eight per year, 
commissioning rates of less than five per year continue the trend of a declining, 
albeit more modern, fleet�
The cumulative effect of reduced shipyard employment is that it leaves the 
United States without a viable surge shipbuilding capability� Unlike during the 
interwar period, government shipyards no longer build ships, instead focus-
ing their efforts on maintaining nuclear-powered vessels, to the exclusion of 
most other activities� These navy yards, therefore, contribute nothing to current 
shipbuilding capacity� Additionally, instead of nine navy yards, today only four 
remain, further limiting surge production capacity in time of crisis� Exacerbat-
ing the shrinking of the U�S� shipbuilding industry, over the past three decades 
the Navy severely cut ship-maintenance budgets to save money� Limiting the 
use of shipyards conducting maintenance and modernization activities led to 
the closure of additional shipyards that had specialized in ship repair and severe 
workforce reductions in those that remained in operation�
Without a significant increase in shipbuilding and without a commitment to 
funding maintenance and modernization budgets, the American shipbuilding 
workforce threatens to disappear—again—over the course of the next decade� 
Many of the same complaints heard in the 1920s and ’30s about the drain of 
skilled workers out of the shipbuilding trades echo today� The current workforce 
is aging, and shipyards struggle to recruit apprentices willing to commit to learn-
ing shipbuilding trades, because potential recruits do not foresee a secure future 
in doing so� This decline is reversible, but—as before—only with increased ship-
building contracts�
The one shipyard that has joined the naval construction effort since the end 
of the Cold War—Austal USA, in Mobile, Alabama—demonstrated that shipyard 
trades could be developed from a skilled workforce outside traditional ship-
building regions� When Austal was awarded block-buy contracts for the Littoral 
Combat Ship and Expeditionary Fast Transport, it nearly doubled its workforce� 
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But the commitment to build expeditionary fast transports ends with Austal’s de-
livery of the twelfth ship in 2018, and the last littoral combat ship order is planned 
for 2019� Unless Austal wins the contract for the next-generation frigate, its newly 
trained workforce will have nothing to do�34
Jennifer R� Boykin, president of Newport News Shipbuilding, writes of the 
shipbuilding industry’s cautious optimism resulting from the call for a 355-ship 
Navy� A long-range shipbuilding plan that calls for growing the fleet “provides 
certainty for the shipbuilding industrial base that stabilizes our workforce�” 
She goes on to remind us that shipbuilders are not the only ones depending on 
growth in naval construction� “Thousands of businesses, large and small, provide 
the material, equipment, and services necessary to build our nation’s fleet� Ship-
yards across the country depend on these businesses every day to help us meet 
cost and schedule commitments to the Navy� But that supplier base is smaller 
today than in the past, declining from almost 15,000 companies at its peak in the 
early 1990s to about 5,000 companies today, and many of them have fewer than 
200 employees�”35
Without action to reverse these trends, America risks being unprepared to 
recover this vital sector of our national defense capability� Worse, it will be un-
prepared for future conflict�
2018: REARMAMENT BEGINS?
Like President Roosevelt, President Donald J� Trump has called for rebuilding the 
Navy� His proposal for a 355-ship Navy matches the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure 
Assessment, which determined that 355 ships are necessary to meet the require-
ments placed on the Navy today, the Navy the Nation Needs�36 Congress, too, has 
taken action to make a 355-ship Navy the policy of the United States�
But there the similarities end� The Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 provided a 
specific and quantifiable shipbuilding program, to be executed within ten years� 
In contrast, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2018 contains 
a single sentence stating that “[i]t shall be the policy of the United States to have 
available, as soon as practicable, not fewer than 355 battle force ships, comprised 
of the optimal mix of platforms, with funding subject to the availability of ap-
propriations or other funds�”37 In 1934, presidential and congressional action 
resulted in real contracts for ship construction, but efforts today have not resulted 
in any significant immediate increases in warship procurement�
The current plan is too little, too late, and has little in common with the robust 
and enthusiastic commitments of the 1930s� In 1933, the Bureau of Construction 
and Repair awarded contracts for new ship construction within two months of 
the issuance of EO 6174; today’s Navy took six months to provide a shipbuilding 
plan to Congress—a plan under which increased construction does not begin 
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until a year in the future� The Navy justifies this delay by the need to conduct 
critical maintenance and modernization of the current fleet, which does repre-
sent a more immediate priority�
However, even when shipbuilding increases begin, the anticipated pace does 
not represent an urgent effort to restore fleet strength� The Navy’s FY 2019 ship-
building plan achieves the Navy the Nation Needs, including a twelve-aircraft-
carrier fleet, in 2060—over forty years in the future� The plan does meet the 
requirements for the Navy the Nation Needs in all other ship categories by 2050—
but that is still over thirty years in the future�38 Between 2019 and 2024, the Navy’s 
shipbuilding plan proposes building only ten additional ships over the previous 
308-ship building plan—an increase of merely two ships per year�39 Congress had 
asked the Navy to budget for an additional fourteen ships over the same period, 
or an increase of two and a half ships per year� Senator Roger F� Wicker (R-MS), 
chair of the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
comparing the Navy’s plan with the 2018 NDAA language, put it succinctly: 
“[T]he Navy shipbuilding plan that doesn’t get to 355 ships until the mid-2050s 
is unacceptable�”40
The shipbuilding plan includes provisions for accelerated building, with “ad-
ditional resources, service life extensions, and strong industry response�”41 Re-
sponding to Senator Wicker’s concerns, Under Secretary of the Navy Thomas B� 
Modly claimed that 355 ships could be achieved in the 2030s, and placed respon-
sibility for accelerated shipbuilding on Congress to provide additional funding� 
According to the Congressional Budget Office, that additional funding would 
amount to over three billion dollars—a sum potentially unacceptable to Congress 
and the American public� Vice Admiral Thomas J� Moore, the commander of 
Naval Sea Systems Command, provided specific plans for service-life extensions 
and delayed decommissionings of Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships, 
Cyclone-class patrol craft, and Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers, and a pi-
lot program for extending the life of Los Angeles–class attack submarines�42 These 
actions would abate the imbalance between decommissioning and commission-
ing, but, as Representative Robert J� Wittman (R-VA), chairman of the Seapower 
and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 
notes, “[T]hat is still of limited utility, you still have to build new ships�”43 Echoing 
Wicker’s concerns, Wittman also criticizes the Navy’s FY 2019 shipbuilding bud-
get submission for being so low, noting, “The floor is $26�2 billion and 13 ships� 
Anything else is unacceptable�”44 Demonstrating Congress’s frustration with the 
Navy’s less aggressive shipbuilding program, the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2018 provides $23�8 billion for ship construction, including building a to-
tal of fourteen ships—five more ships than the Navy requested� Congress’s action 
adds an additional littoral combat ship and accelerates the acquisition of a fourth 
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expeditionary sea base and the lead ship of the next-generation amphibious war-
ship, the LX(R)�45 There clearly is a disconnect between the Navy and Congress 
over accelerating fleet expansion and the mechanism by which to achieve it�
Current CNO Admiral John M� Richardson claims that sufficient current 
industrial capacity exists to increase production rates�46 Shipyards, however, 
remain reluctant to hire and train additional workers or expand their physical 
infrastructure without assurances of future orders�47 The additional ten ships 
planned, spread out over five years and across seven shipyards, averages to an 
additional 0�3 ships per year for each yard—well below the rates the CNO states 
are possible, and not exactly a level of expansion that encourages investment� 
But Boykin of Newport News Shipbuilding again offers some cautious optimism 
that things are moving in the right direction, stating that “our industry has long 
awaited a signal from the government to prepare, invest, and grow� I believe this 
budget agreement, combined with the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan to grow 
our fleet, are telling our shipbuilding industrial base that it is time for our Navy to 
grow into the larger, stronger, and more powerful force that our nation needs�”48
One similarity with the 1930s buildup is the expansion of block purchases 
of ships� Funding construction of multiple ships at a time using multiyear pro-
curement contracts results in a 10 percent reduction in unit costs by allowing 
shipyards to achieve an economy of scale not available with single-ship contracts� 
The FY 2019 shipbuilding plan and the recently passed Bipartisan Budget Act of 
2018 both allow for multiyear procurement contracts for destroyer, submarine, 
amphibious dock landing ship, and fleet oiler construction�49
In the 1920s and ’30s, America possessed the greatest industrial potential of any 
nation in the world� Although Japan’s naval construction exceeded America’s be-
fore 1941, both sides recognized America’s ability to outbuild the Japanese once 
America reached its full industrial potential� Today, America’s ability to outbuild 
its adversaries is not guaranteed� China presents the most significant threat to 
American supremacy at sea today, as the seventy-eight-ship naval parade staged 
for President Xi Jinping in April 2018 demonstrated� Chinese shipyards are build-
ing modern warships at a rate equal to U�S� yards, but the Chinese shipbuilding 
industry is not operating at full capacity for naval construction� With over a 
dozen shipyards building large merchant vessels, China has the industrial base 
to expand warship construction rapidly; America has no such commercial ship-
building base to expand�50 This disparity puts the United States in the precarious 
position that Japan occupied during World War II: unable to match its opponent 
in building a modern fleet or to make up for losses once conflict begins�
Much can be learned from the peacetime naval rearmament of the 1930s� It 
takes a concerted effort from the executive, Congress, the Navy, and industry to 
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   100 2/25/19   10:40 AM
106
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1
 M C G R AT H  1 0 1
achieve the balanced fleet required to fight and win wars at sea� Today, each of 
these players asserts the desire to rebuild the Navy in this age of renewed mari-
time competition, but coordination among them is missing� The Navy needs a 
more aggressive shipbuilding plan� Congress needs to follow up on its policy 
statement and appropriate the funds required to accelerate ship construction� 
More importantly, the Navy and Congress must work together toward a com-
mon understanding of fleet requirements� The shipbuilding industry’s response 
to calls for a larger fleet naturally lags government action� Therefore, the govern-
ment must collaborate with private shipbuilders to meet the strategic imperative 
of expanding the American shipbuilding industrial base�
Rebuilding the fleet in the 1930s prepared the nation for an unknown war that 
came in 1941� In the same way, the United States must embark on a fleet-rebuilding 
effort now to ensure the nation is ready for the next conflict when it arises�
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the plurality of american war
John T. Kuehn
Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial 
Era to the Twenty-First Century, by Matthew S� Muehlbauer 
and David J� Ulbrich. 2nd ed� New York: Routledge, 2017� 516 
pages� $74�95�
Matthew S� Muehlbauer and David J� Ulbrich have produced an admirable text 
built around Russell Weigley’s framework in his now classic American Way of 
War.1 The occasion for this review is the release of an updated, second edition of 
this work� As mentioned, the book clearly seems designed as a text, specifically for 
an upper-level undergraduate course, but possibly 
for graduate-level seminars on American military 
history as well� Accordingly, this review assesses 
the book on the basis of that pedagogical design�
The authors’ study is primarily narrative in na-
ture, but never far from the flow of facts, figures, 
faces, and the occasional military fiasco hangs the 
authors’ overarching thematic argument: there 
is no one American way of war, but rather many 
ways, determined by a complex interaction of 
factors and institutions� They have updated this 
aspect of the book in an expanded introduction 
to the second edition, but its fundamental claim 
remains unchanged (pp� 5–6)� The student or pro-
fessor wanting one-stop shopping for these ways of 
war will be rewarded here�
Dr. John T. Kuehn is a professor of military history 
at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col-
lege (CGSC). He retired from the U.S. Navy in 2004 
at the rank of commander after twenty-three years 
of service as a naval f light officer. He has taught a 
variety of subjects at CGSC since 2000. He authored 
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A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the 
Samurai to the 21st Century (Praeger, 2014), and 
Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the 
Great Campaigns (Praeger, 2015), and coauthored 
Eyewitness Pacific Theater (Sterling, 2008) with D. 
M. Giangreco. He was awarded a Moncado Prize
from the Society for Military History in 2011. His lat-
est book from the Naval Institute Press is America’s 
First General Staff: A Short History of the Rise and 
Fall of the General Board of the Navy, 1900–1950 
(2017).
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The sheer scope of the text is impressive, yet it does not descend overmuch 
into the weeds of battles and military trivia, instead remaining focused on how 
conflict involving Americans, and not just European Americans, has evolved 
over the years� Nonetheless, the narrative does start—as advertised in the title—
with the mass arrival of “modern” Europeans on the North American continent 
during the sixteenth century� However, that is preceded by cogent contextual 
discussions of native warfare prior to the arrival of the Europeans; the so-called 
military revolution in early modern Europe; and necessary discussions of tactics, 
technology, and logistics� In other words, the authors do a fine job of setting up 
the in-place “initial conditions” for the continuum of conflict that follows� This 
is good news for novices to these debates, since it gives them, up front, an under-
standing of the key definitions and concepts used throughout the text� Another 
welcome discussion is that covering the “levels of war�” All too often Americans, 
and readers and writers of military history specifically, are two-dimensional in 
their thinking about war as just tactics and strategy (pp� 4–5)� The operational 
level of warfare and the higher level of policy beyond military strategy often are 
disregarded in instruction and writing on these matters beyond what one might 
find in esoteric discussions of military doctrine�
As for the narrative itself, in something of such broad scope the biases and 
preferences of the authors are almost inescapable� But they tend to succeed in 
achieving their aim of using the most updated scholarship to avoid perpetuat-
ing the tired myths and unchallenged legends that make up so much of what 
sometimes is called popular American military history� However, no one author, 
or two, can be expected to get it all completely correct, or agreeable, as if such a 
thing is even possible� The purpose of this review is not to catalog all those places 
where the authors’ narrative differs from the reviewer’s interpretation of things, 
especially causation� A larger understanding of history includes such arguments 
about the past, but the purpose of this study is more of an ongoing refinement 
rather than a final word�
However, one minor error that occurs in the last chapter is worth correction� 
The authors claim that the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986 delineated as follows: “The chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS] � � � 
assumed a new position in the operational chain of command: Theater com-
manders reported to the chairman, who then reported to the president” (p� 
468)� Goldwater-Nichols does make the CJCS the “principal military adviser to 
the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense,” but 
under §211 it states: “CHAIN OF COMMAND�—Unless otherwise directed by 
the President, the chain of command to a unified [i�e�, regional or theater] or 
specified combatant command runs—(1) from the President to the Secretary of 
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Defense; and (2) from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the com-
batant command” (emphasis added)�2 In other words, the CJCS is simply the 
principal military adviser, and civilian control over regional or global combatant 
commanders is absolute and does not include the chairman�
That quibble aside, many of the accounts listed here are refreshing in the new 
way in which they cast American conflict, in terms of both its political context, 
owing to foreign and domestic factors, and what has been called the “war and 
society” approach�
Finally, the later chapters in particular might be regarded as the starting point 
for future conversations about events still ongoing and will serve instructors 
and teachers well in engaging their students in debates about more-recent and 
familiar events� The second edition takes the book up to the most recent times of 
President Barack Obama’s second term and, particularly, includes a heavy criti-
cal component of the (still ongoing) so-called Global War on Terror as well as a 
discussion of the impact of the neoconservative movement on the American way 
of war (pp� 478–79, 490–95)� These are welcome additions and fit nicely into the 
overall construct of the book�
Historian N� A� M� Rodger recently wrote about Americans and history as 
follows: “Our problem is not that we know too little history to understand the 
present but that we know too much, and most of it is wrong�”3 Muehlbauer and 
Ulbrich’s effort here goes a long way toward correcting that problem—if only 
more people would read it� Highly recommended for all audiences, not only col-
lege undergraduate and graduate students� 
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counting the cost of learning
Dale C. Rielage
Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. 
Navy, 1898–1945, by Trent Hone� Annapolis, MD: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 2018� 432 pages� $34�95�
There are two widely popular narratives of the U�S� Navy in the Pacific during 
World War II� On the surface, they are contradictory�
The first narrative thread is that in the interwar years the U�S� Navy created 
an extraordinary laboratory for innovation and learning� Its perceived success 
finds validation in Fleet Admiral Chester W� Nimitz’s assertion that rigorous and 
repeated Naval War College wargames had ensured that “nothing that happened 
during the war was a surprise � � � except the kamikaze tactics�”1
But there is also a second, less triumphant story� The U�S� Navy’s victories at 
Coral Sea and Midway were darkened by repeated defeats in the waters off Gua-
dalcanal� Most recently chronicled in James Hornfischer’s Neptune’s Inferno, the 
loss of ships and sailors in the face of competently handled Japanese naval forces 
reveals an organization that failed in the crucible of combat�
Both narratives, of course, describe the same navy� While conflicting historic 
narratives are commonplace, the gap between these two views is more than an 
academic exercise for serving naval officers� As the U�S� Navy contemplates how 
to meet the challenge of great-power competition, the perceived lessons of the in-
terwar years have become a touchstone� Following the lead of the wider Depart-
ment of Defense, the Naval War College is seeking to reinvigorate wargaming� 
The U�S� Pacific Fleet has resurrected the name, and to some extent the model, of 
the interwar Fleet Problem exercises as a practical laboratory for advanced war 
fighting� If the intellectual ancestors of these structures produced hidebound 
conventional wisdom rather than high-velocity learning, much of the service is 
potentially on the wrong track and needs to look at other examples�
In his extraordinary new book, Learning War, Trent Hone seeks to reconcile 
these two views, producing a nuanced understanding of the U�S� Navy as an or-
ganization� In doing so, Hone manages to view the familiar through new eyes, 
a feat he accomplishes by making two distinctive 
choices in his analysis�
First, Hone focuses his attention on the surface 
navy, reversing the view of many standard works 
that emphasize the emerging naval aviation arm� 
Dale C. Rielage is a senior civilian with the Naval In-
telligence Activity, assigned as Director, Intelligence 
and Information Operations, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
© 2019 by Dale C� Rielage
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Hone rejects as simplistic and incomplete the conventional view that the loss 
of the battle line in the attack on Pearl Harbor forced conservative admirals to 
embrace, if only out of necessity, the potential of carrier aviation� Before World 
War II, naval aviation was a small, although controversial and important, part of 
larger questions of naval strategy and tactics� As a result, the U�S� Navy’s thinking 
on naval aviation formed only a part of how it adapted to the stresses of combat 
during the first years of World War II� Senior officers’ understanding of naval 
combat, including the employment of naval aviation, was formed through the 
lens of a fleet focused on its surface line�
Second, Hone approaches the U�S� Navy as a “complex adaptive system�” Ap-
plying his professional background as a management consultant, he approaches 
the interwar Navy as if it was a business client working to adapt to a dynamic 
competitive environment� Through this approach, he touches on the commonly 
cited mechanisms—the General Board, the Fleet Problem exercises, and Naval 
War College wargames—but transcends them to address more-fundamental is-
sues of institutional culture� While previous authors have described the relation-
ship among these institutions as a “virtuous cycle,” Hone expands beyond that 
simple description� Large institutions are inherently complex systems, which 
evolve through the interactive behavior of their individual elements and their 
wider environment� He eschews the neat cause-and-effect narrative of most 
histories, describing instead a network of officers with differing understandings 
of the profession, the environment, and their roles� This network interacted, 
adapted, and learned in a nonlinear way� Even if this formal systems approach 
is new to the reader, every naval leader who has guided or shaped meaningful 
change will recognize its elements instinctively�
Adaptability—which is to say, effective evolution—is not a given in complex 
institutions� Within the considerable latitude of USN doctrine, Hone discov-
ers a strong diversity of tactics, techniques, and procedures within and among 
individual commands and warfare communities� To modern eyes, this diversity 
represents a troubling lack of standardization� In Hone’s view, it was a strength, 
ensuring that the U�S� Navy entered the war with “clouds” of possible options that 
became seeds for rapid evolution� As Nimitz suggested, while not everything that 
came to pass in the war was expected, very little was unanticipated� Effective evo-
lution requires a place where it is “safe to fail�” The Fleet Problem exercises and 
wargames provided that opportunity� Hone, however, approaches these events as 
opportunities to test and share dynamic thinking rather than create it, focusing 
on the innovative culture of the officer corps�
This war-fighting diversity was bounded by a body of doctrine that created 
a common understanding among senior and midgrade commanders of how to 
view and react to tactical and operational situations� Hone takes the doctrine 
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   108 2/25/19   10:40 AM
114
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1
 R E V I E W  E S S AYS  1 0 9
discussion a step further, describing the “tactical heuristics” that guided the U.S. 
Navy (p. 123). Heuristics can be thought of as rules of thumb or habits of thought 
that rapidly suggest an “adequate, though often imperfect, answer to difficult 
questions.”2 For Hone, the cumulative effect of the interwar Navy’s culture, learn-
ing, and doctrine caused the officer corps to internalize three tactical heuristics: 
a bias toward aggressive action, an emphasis on quick and effective gunfire, and 
a culture of decentralized command and control.
In the early days of the war, when confronting expected challenges such as the 
Imperial Japanese Navy’s long-range torpedoes and night-fighting tactics, these 
heuristics guided the reactions of the fleet. While they inherently suggested im-
perfect solutions, in the dynamic environment of combat they were more right 
than wrong. For example, while gunfire was more or less effective given the tacti-
cal situation, generations spent training officers to open fire quickly at maximum 
ranges focused the fleet on attacking effectively first—a habit that translated into 
the employment of naval aviation.
Thus, Hone arrives at one of the most difficult issues for serving officers seek-
ing to understand the U.S. Navy’s performance in the early days of World War II: 
how to understand the two views of the U.S. Navy’s performance in the Pacific. 
What Hone suggests is that there is no dichotomy in the two accounts. Rather, 
the early defeats represented a dynamic and adaptable institution of learning in 
the harshest of environments. The diversity of thought and views allowed for a 
range of approaches to combat, with the best ones emerging as models for the 
fleet. The success of the U.S. Navy was not that it correctly anticipated every part 
of the World War II combat environment. Rather, it was successful because it was 
in the position to learn from the reverses that would have rendered a less adapt-
able navy a permanent loss.
Hone also suggests that, unfortunately, the factors that created this adaptability 
could not scale to meet the needs of modern industrial warfare. In 1938, there 
were just over 6,500 USN officers, growing to almost 39,000 by December 1941. 
By the end of the war, there would be more than 325,000 commissioned officers. 
In the massive wartime expansion, new officers and sailors could not be allowed 
the time and space to learn in the old familiar ways. Out of necessity, the Navy 
moved from exploration (learning new approaches) to exploitation (using pat-
terns that had proved successful). This approach was remarkably successful in the 
critical task of transmitting knowledge and culture to inexperienced personnel. 
While there remained pockets of innovation—Hone reexamines the introduction 
of the combat information center as one such example—the interwar approach 
could not survive through the conflict.
As the U.S. Navy considers a return to great-power competition, the paral-
lels to the interwar years are attractive. As in the 1930s, navies are working to 
7256_ReviewEssay.indd   109 2/27/19   2:57 PM
115
Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
 1 1 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
understand and exploit new technologies: cyber warfare, unmanned systems, 
artificial intelligence, and long-range sensor networks� Multiple peer competitors 
are making their own plans and assessments about the future� With the purchase 
of every new ship or system, the Navy makes a multidecade bet on how the old 
assumptions will change� Unfortunately, Hone does not paint a reassuring picture 
of the post–World War II Navy� Despite the peace, the Cold War required the 
U�S� Navy to remain a large institution, requiring standardized and repeatable 
approaches� Exercises and games that had been sandboxes for experimentation 
became mechanisms to refine and reinforce established solutions�
Nonetheless, the postwar Navy did learn and adapt to nuclear weapons, 
nuclear power, electronics, space, and long-range strike� If Hone is correct that 
the interwar model was unsuitable for the modern U�S� Navy, then the question 
of how the U�S� Navy learned and evolved after World War II presents a worthy 
subject for a separate book�
Until that volume comes along, Learning War represents one of the most pro-
found contributions to the discussion of high-velocity learning in a naval setting 
in print� Few historians have captured the past in a way that raises so many ideas 
and challenges for the present� As a result, no serious consideration of the U�S� 
Navy in World War II will be complete without reference to this volume�
Quite simply, if you are a serving officer and propose to read even one work of 
naval history this year, this book should be the one�
N O T E S
 1� Chester W� Nimitz [FAdm�, USN], speech to 
Naval War College, October 10, 1960, folder 
26, box 31, RG15 Guest Lectures, 1894–1992, 
Naval Historical Collection, Naval War Col-
lege, Newport, RI, quoted in John M� Lillard, 
“Playing War: Wargaming and U�S� Navy 
Preparations for WWII” (PhD dissertation, 
George Mason Univ�, 2013), p� 1�
 2� Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 
(New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2013),  
p� 98, quoted in Hone, Learning War, p� 12�
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The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity, 1919–22: Naval and Foreign Policy under Lloyd George, by  
G� H� Bennett� London: Bloomsbury, 2016� 296 pages� $120 (paperback $39�95, e-book $28�76)�
Royal Navy captain Stephen Roskill’s 
1968 study Naval Policy between 
the Wars (Naval Institute Press) has 
dominated the historiographical scene 
on this subject for half a century� G� H� 
Bennett’s volume now successfully adds 
much depth and new understanding 
to the naval policies of Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George’s government in the 
immediate aftermath of the First World 
War� Bennett’s volume follows, but with 
a much different focus, Erik Goldstein 
and John Maurer’s The Washington 
Conference 1921–22 (Routledge, 1994)  
and Donald Lisio’s British Naval 
Supremacy and Anglo-American 
Antagonisms, 1914–1930 (Cambridge 
Univ� Press, 2014)� Rather than fol-
lowing the traditional approach to this 
period of concentrating on international 
diplomacy and external issues, Bennett 
demonstrates “a multifaceted approach 
rooted in political and naval history 
but opening up new and cutting-edge 
debates in other areas of historical study 
to transform traditional debates” (p� xiv)� 
Laudably, Bennett seeks an approach 
to naval history that breaks down the 
artificial barriers that place the study of 
navies in a watertight compartment and 
isolate it from “total history” and the 
broader patterns of relevant linkages in 
political, military, economic, business, 
social, gender, and labor history�
The works of Volker Berghahn, Jon 
Sumida, and Samuel P� Huntington 
have had an impact on Bennett’s focus� 
Significantly, Bennett’s approach reflects 
the parallels he sees in the 1919–22 
period with the issues surrounding 
British naval policies in the second 
decade of the twenty-first century�
In opening his sensitive and innovative 
study of this three-year period, Bennett 
points out that Lloyd George’s govern-
ment had a particularly tricky range of 
problems to balance after World War I� 
While other recent historians have inter-
preted the period as one of discontinuity 
in British naval and defense policies, 
Bennett sees continuity� The inability of 
the government to “get it right” in the 
area of naval policy was a direct result 
of the size and complexity of the issues 
that it faced� The difficulty lay in the 
interconnectedness of naval policy with 
government politics, the private sector, 
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and communities� As Samuel Hunting-
ton would have put it, British naval 
policy had been in a state of “disequilib-
rium” even before the beginning of the 
First World War, and this continued into 
the postwar period� Britain’s economy 
was declining in comparison with 
other national economies; changing 
technology and weapons were render-
ing obsolete Britain’s investment in its 
battleship fleet; and other countries, 
notably Japan and the United States, had 
the potential to build navies that would 
end British naval mastery� British leaders 
correctly saw these developments as 
significant threats to the security, stabil-
ity, and future of the British Empire�
In the immediate postwar era, Britain 
faced massive war debts, along with a 
range of severe social and political issues 
complicated by unemployment, labor 
unrest, and the rise of socialism� These 
issues combined to create challenges 
to the existing social, economic, and 
political order� In trying to create naval 
policies in this complex environment, 
the Lloyd George government made its 
national security decisions on the basis 
of what it might be able to afford rather 
than on preparing for the worst-case 
scenario� That worst-case situation, of 
course, was the war that would occur 
twenty years later, but that neither the 
government nor the British voter could 
contemplate so soon after the horrific 
events of World War I� Ministers were 
forced to balance naval preparedness for 
a future war against national bankruptcy 
and the fears of a socialist victory by 
election or revolution� In this situation, 
Lloyd George placed his ministry’s 
priority solely on the financial con-
sideration and the reduction of public 
spending rather than on a considered 
analysis of the strategic situation and 
the likelihood of war� The ministry’s 
institution in 1919 of the “ten-year rule” 
in defense planning effectively excluded 
the possibility of thinking about war�
As Bennett points out, this was in one 
sense a logical and pragmatic approach, 
but it forced the Royal Navy and the 
other armed services to find alternative 
explanations for keeping the service 
in a state of preparedness to deal with 
the future security of Britain and the 
empire� While the service turned to 
effective arguments such as showing that 
battleship construction helped reduce 
unemployment, Bennett argues that 
this undermined a clear understanding 
of the purpose and value of the navy, 
harming it in the long run� He goes 
on to argue that the ten-year rule had 
a pernicious and long-term effect by 
establishing the precedent that leaders 
could make competent defense decisions 
without an assessment of strategic needs 
and threats� Bennett underscores the 
lesson from this period that political 
imperatives cannot compromise stra-
tegic threat assessments and decisions� 
“Dangers must be identified and noted, 
even if the means to meet them are not 
immediately at hand” (pp� 179–80)�
Bennett’s book is a significant con-
tribution to naval history� Not only 
does it provide a new interpretation 
of historical events, but it does so by 
placing the navy in a much broader 
context� While other scholars may 
argue points of interpretation, his 
vision in bringing about a broader 
understanding of the naval dimensions 
of this period is a model for others to 
follow and apply� Equally important, 
his volume has much to say to current 
practitioners and strategic planners�
JOHN B� HATTENDORF
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The End of Grand Strategy: US Maritime Opera-
tions in the Twenty-First Century, by Simon Reich 
and Peter Dombrowski� Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ� 
Press, 2017� 252 pages� $30�
As Hal Brands wrote in his 2014 work 
What Good Is Strategy? (Cornell Univ� 
Press), grand strategy is “very much 
in vogue these days” (p� vii)� In the 
broadest sense, it is a quest to find some 
semblance of order in the intricately 
complex security environment� The 
more disorderly the global security 
system, the more expansive the change 
under way in this system; and the 
more fragile the domestic consensus 
on national priorities, the greater the 
need for some sort of unifying and 
guiding strategy� That is why Americans 
desperately are seeking one now�
Even though the body of scholarly 
literature on grand strategy is large and 
growing, in The End of Grand Strategy 
Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski 
have made an original, provocative, 
and contrarian contribution, arguing 
that Americans are inclined toward 
a “one-size-fits-all” grand strategy 
based on global primacy that has “little 
utility in the twenty-first century” (p� 
2)� Primacy, Reich and Dombrowski 
believe, “has become the default option 
of American academics and policy mak-
ers who deliberate over grand strategy” 
(p� 41)� This option leads to two major 
problems: primacy is no longer feasible 
for the United States, and the actual 
application of American power, par-
ticularly military power, does not reflect 
the grand strategy on which Reich and 
Dombrowski feel that it is based�
The authors advocate abandoning 
the “one-size-fits-all primacist” grand 
strategy and using a flexible array of six 
strategies: primacist-hegemony, leader-
ship / cooperative security / unilateral 
hegemony, formal sponsorship, informal 
sponsorship, isolationist retrenchment, 
and restrained retrenchment� Reich 
and Dombrowski then provide six 
maritime case studies to illustrate that 
the United States already is using this 
array of strategies even while claiming 
to use a unitary one-size-fits-all one�
This argument makes sense if—and 
only if—the authors’ conceptualization 
of grand strategy is accurate� But has 
anyone outside the academy ever 
claimed that there is a discernible, 
unitary American grand strategy that 
dictates the application of national 
power? The authors write: “By defini-
tion, the architectural design of any 
single, abstract strategy is relatively 
rigid if not indeed static—intellectually, 
conceptually, analytically, and organi-
zationally” (pp� 167–68)� But outside 
the academy, there is no “single, 
abstract” U�S� grand strategy� There 
never has been and never will be�
A case can be made that what Reich 
and Dombrowski are describing is 
the natural and enduring distinction 
between theoretical grand strategies, 
which often strive for logical consistency 
and internal coherence, and applied 
strategy� Just as no military operation 
ever perfectly reflects the operational 
plan behind it, there never is perfect 
congruity between a theoretical grand 
strategy and the practice of strategy� 
That is the reason that the grand strate-
gic guidelines that the U�S� government 
uses to guide its action—particularly 
the congressionally mandated National 
Security Strategy documents—do not 
constitute coherent, logically consistent 
grand strategies for a theorist or scholar�
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In practice, American political leaders 
use the national grand strategy, be it pri-
macy or something else, as a shorthand 
way of explaining the complex security 
environment to the public and its elected 
representatives, and as a very broad and 
pliable set of historically derived best 
practices and aspirations� No policy 
maker ever made a decision and no mili-
tary leader ever crafted a theater strategy 
or operational plan because it was what 
the grand strategy demanded� As John 
Gaddis phrased it in On Grand Strategy 
(Penguin Random House, 2018), grand 
strategy is simply “the alignment of 
potentially unlimited aspirations with 
necessarily limited capabilities” (p� 21)� 
It is a constantly shifting web of patterns 
and habits blending both aspirations 
and predilections, a creed, even a myth, 
and not something prescriptive, such 
as a legal code� Outright dissonance 
between its theory and its practice 
would be worrisome, but some level of 
incongruity is normal, even inevitable�
While theorists of grand strategy talk 
of primacy, in reality the United States 
is focused more on maintaining the 
system it created rather than trying to 
dominate it� Thus the configuration of 
the U�S� military, which is derived from 
a practice of reasonably being prepared 
for low-probability/high-risk threats 
such as major war, while devoting most 
of its effort to system-maintenance 
missions, makes sense� Ultimately, Reich 
and Dombrowski’s contention that the 
United States is at the end of grand strat-
egy does not stand up if grand strategy 
is conceptualized as a set of if/then state-
ments or rules of thumb, as a shorthand 
way of communicating and building 
consensus rather than official writ�
That said, The End of Grand Strategy is 
a challenging, erudite, and worthwhile 
read� It is unusual in its use of sea 
power to illustrate its points� It is 
right about the enduring centrality 
of American naval power� It is right 
that a “new” grand strategy is not the 
solution to America’s security problems� 
However, to borrow from Mark Twain, 
the authors’ report of the death of grand 
strategy may be an exaggeration�
STEVEN METZ
Hell on Earth, by Avigdor Hameiri, trans� Peter 
C� Appelbaum� Detroit, MI: Wayne State Univ� 
Press, 2017� 478 pages� $39�99�
War memoirs and war literature 
frequently intersect� Because of the 
traumas and tragedies of war and the 
impact they have on individuals, it is 
not uncommon for authors to write 
of their experiences of war using 
fiction to give voice to both literary 
creativity and personal experience� Karl 
Marlantes’s powerful novel Matterhorn 
(Grove, 2010) is one example, written 
about his experience of the Vietnam 
War as a Marine officer� So also are 
the writings of Israeli author Avigdor 
Hameiri (1890–1970) a reflection of the 
author’s experience of an earlier war�
Born in the village of Odavidhaza, 
in Carpathian Ruthenia in Austria-
Hungary (near present-day Mukacheve, 
western Ukraine), Hameiri fought 
in World War I as a soldier in the 
Austro-Hungarian army and recounted 
his experiences in two fictionalized 
memoirs, The Great Madness (1929; 
translation published by Vantage, 1952) 
and Hell on Earth (original-language 
publication, 1932)� The former recounts 
experiences of a Jewish soldier on 
the eastern front, while the latter, the 
translation of which is the subject of this 
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review, recounts a soldier’s (Hameiri’s) 
experiences as a Russian prisoner of war� 
Interestingly, Hameiri does not write of 
bearing a grudge or resentment toward 
his captors� He writes candidly of cruelty 
and deprivation, but the cruelty is more 
often on the part of other prisoners 
with different nationalities or ethnici-
ties than of his Russian captors�
Published in Hebrew in 1932, Hell on 
Earth was not translated into English 
until military historian and translator 
Peter C� Appelbaum did so in the 
present volume� Much of Appelbaum’s 
research and writings focus on the expe-
rience of Jewish soldiers during the First 
World War, and, that being the case, he 
chose an excellent project and provided 
an exceptional result� Hell on Earth 
presents a vivid and memorable account 
of the experiences of soldiers taken 
captive on the eastern front during the 
war� When readers think of the literature 
of World War I, it is often the British war 
poets or novels from other nationalities 
such as Erich Maria Remarque’s All 
Quiet on the Western Front (1929) or 
Ernest Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms 
(1927), and, perhaps, memoirs such 
as Vera Brittain’s Testament of Youth 
(1933) and Ernst Jünger’s Storm of Steel 
(1920)� Writings from the war in the 
east are often overlooked, as are writings 
about prisoners of war� Yet World War 
I created eight million prisoners of 
war� In fifty-four chapters (and each 
could be read separately with benefit), 
Hameiri brings the reader into a world 
of uncertainty and survival� His narra-
tive presents conversations, thoughts, 
and reflections on the mundane and the 
profound� Set far from the western front, 
Gallipoli and the Dardanelles campaign, 
the siege of Al Kut, or the battle of 
Jutland, Hameiri’s work is a reminder 
of the war in a locale often overlooked�
From the first words—“A rainy, filthy, 
muddy morning” (p� 27)—readers are 
drawn into the world of the soldier 
who would soon become a prisoner of 
war� The author is descriptive, detailed, 
haunting, and humane� Remarkably, 
the author ends the work on a note 
of humanity and forgiveness� In so 
doing, he provides readers with hope 
in the midst of a broken world and a 
reminder that ultimately, every prisoner 
(and person) must confront the limits 
of what others can do to them and 
wrestle with what is within the prisoner’s 
power and what is beyond the prisoner’s 
power� Such a reckoning is exactly what 
Vietnam prisoner of war and Congres-
sional Medal of Honor recipient Vice 
Admiral James B� Stockdale, USN, wrote 
of frequently with respect to his captivity 
(as have many others, such as Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn and Viktor Frankl)�
A translator’s preface and a map set the 
stage for the work and give prescient 
insight into the challenge of translat-
ing such a linguistically rich book� A 
remarkable introduction, written by 
Avner Holtzman, a professor of Hebrew 
literature at Tel Aviv University, provides 
extensive contextualization of the work 
in Jewish literature of the era and war 
literature of World War I� Hell on Earth 
is filled with drawings of captivity made 
by Hameiri, including one of his escape 
from the camp in Irkutsk� Each drawing 
adds a dimension to the work that is 
powerful and thought provoking�
The volume contains helpful endnotes 
illuminating geography, history, and 
historical characters, as well as biblical 
and Talmudic citations the author used� 
Appelbaum’s translation flows smoothly, 
such that the writing readily engages the 
reader, drawing the reader quickly into 
a world of the warrior often forgotten in 
war literature� What strikes the reader 
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frequently throughout the book is the 
almost prophetic foreshadowing of the 
experience of millions of people of the 
Holocaust—pointless cruelty, medical 
experiments, starvation, disease, louse 
infestation� Although this deprivation 
was not true of all Russian prison camps 
during the war, it was of Hameiri’s�
The book is important as war literature 
and as prisoner-of-war literature and 
deserves a wide reading� The writing 
is graphic and the horrors of war are 
presented in a manner that few will 
forget� Hell on Earth is a vivid reminder 
that the tragedy of war never should 
be forgotten or minimized� It is a book 
to read and on which to reflect� Those 
who do so will not be disappointed�
TIMOTHY J� DEMY
Brutality in an Age of Human Rights: Activism and 
Counterinsurgency at the End of the British Em-
pire, by Brian Drohan� Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ� 
Press, 2018� 256 pages� $45�
During its late-twentieth-century 
wars of decolonization, Great Britain 
employed counterinsurgency methods, 
such as indefinite detention and coercive 
interrogations, that human rights activists 
challenged� Initially in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the United States employed the same 
counterinsurgency policies and tactics the 
British had used decades earlier, and, not 
surprisingly, the United States faced the 
same legal challenges in the first decade 
of this century that the British faced from 
the 1950s through the 1970s� The U�S� 
legal battles have been well documented 
over the past decade, and now Brutality 
in an Age of Human Rights exposes the 
controversial colonial policies and 
tactics sanctioned by British civilian and 
military authorities from 1955 to 1975�
When the insurgencies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan began, U�S� leaders studying 
past counterinsurgencies had relatively 
few scholarly works to consult� Then, as 
the focus on international human rights 
law grew, so too did the number of 
books that exposed contentious wartime 
policies and methods� Brian Drohan’s 
book is a valuable resource for lawyers, 
planners, and policy writers studying 
the history of human rights and its 
effect on counterinsurgency warfare�
Brutality in an Age of Human Rights 
unequivocally dispels the myth that 
the British were anything but brutal 
in their counterinsurgency methods 
while maintaining a public façade 
of rule of law adherence during the 
Cyprus emergency (1955–59), the Aden 
emergency in Yemen (1963–67), and 
the Northern Ireland Troubles (during 
the 1970s)� Drohan, a U�S� Army officer, 
West Point history professor, and 
historian of modern Britain, expanded 
his University of North Carolina–Chapel 
Hill dissertation into this scholarly 
work that includes 847 endnotes and 
a detailed bibliography documenting 
the author’s extensive research�
Drohan uncovers what others largely 
have ignored: the role of human rights 
activists in shaping wartime policies 
and practices� Backed by colonial-era 
records, Drohan persuasively argues  
that lawyers, local and international 
societies, and political groups actively 
challenged British civilian and mili - 
tary leaders—shaping the strategic 
debates on human rights that affected  
operational- and tactical-level counter - 
insurgency methods� Relying on 
documented incidents, Drohan 
exposes Britain’s harsh tactics and 
counters the British narrative that 
mythologized its image of colonial 
rule through minimal force�
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For each conflict considered, Drohan 
describes its origin, introduces the 
activist groups, exposes the human 
rights violations, details the activists’ 
challenges to the British methods, and 
reveals the British leaders’ systematic 
and bold efforts to deny any brutal-
ity against insurgents and innocent 
civilians� Throughout the book, Drohan 
provides numerous examples of lawfare, 
a concept he describes as a strategy for 
using—or misusing—the law to achieve 
an operational military objective�
Chapters 1 and 2 cover the late 1950s 
Cyprus insurgency and the Cyprus Bar 
Council’s extensive efforts to counter 
Britain’s coercive interrogation methods 
to obtain intelligence� With parallels to 
the war on terror, Greek Cypriot lawyers 
challenged the colonial secretary’s 
Emergency Regulations that vested near-
absolute power in the British military 
commander on Cyprus� The legal 
battles continued for years, including 
an appeal to the European Commission 
of Human Rights to investigate the 
British atrocities; however, Britain 
successfully deflected the allegations 
until the conflict was resolved without 
any meaningful resolution of the abuses 
that British soldiers perpetrated�
In the 1960s, when an anticolonial 
insurgency arose in the British territory 
of Aden and Britain employed the same 
brutal tactics used in Cyprus, the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) stepped in to protect unlawfully 
detained nationalists� Chapters 3 and 
4 detail the ICRC and Amnesty Inter-
national efforts to counter and expose 
British violations on the international 
stage� With aggressive, unrelenting 
campaigns on both sides, it was, as 
Drohan notes, a protracted and messy 
affair, with numerous investigations, 
British manipulation of the process, 
and hollow victories for the advocates�
Chapter 5 focuses on British brutality 
during the Northern Ireland Troubles, 
including Britain’s approval of five 
techniques used for interrogation of 
interned prisoners: wall standing, 
hooding, white noise, sleep deprivation, 
and a bread-and-water diet� Despite 
evidence of illegal detention and 
coercive interrogations, Britain success-
fully limited government inquiries and 
shielded or absolved officials and inter-
rogators from legal liability� Years later, 
when George W� Bush administration 
officials sanctioned similar enhanced 
interrogation techniques, those officials 
likewise were shielded from liability�
Drohan’s examination and detailed 
study of the relationship between 
human rights activism and British 
counterinsurgency practices is worthy of 
review by civilian and military leaders 
with a role in shaping wartime policy, 
particularly lawyers, military planners, 
and policy writers� Brutality in an Age of 
Human Rights is eminently worthy of a 
spot on the counterinsurgency bookshelf 
next to David Galula’s Counterinsurgency 
Warfare (Praeger, 2006), John Nagl’s 
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Univ� 
of Chicago Press, 2005), and the U.S. 
Army / U.S. Marine Corps Counterin-
surgency Field Manual (Cosimo, 2010)�
JEFF A� BOVARNICK
Realist Ethics: Just War Traditions as Power Poli-
tics, by Valerie Morkevičius� Cambridge, U�K�: 
Cambridge Univ� Press, 2018� 268 pages� $34�99�
Professor Valerie Morkevičius offers 
a provocative thesis in her new book: 
the just war tradition has more in 
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common historically with realist views 
of international relations than with the 
idealist views that characterize contem-
porary just war thought� She argues that 
just war thinking will be a more effective 
constraint on the use of force if it returns 
to those realist roots, rather than 
continuing trends toward pacifism and 
“liberal crusading” that dominate much 
modern work on just war� Morkevičius 
supports her thesis with careful scholar-
ship in the Christian, Islamic, and Hindu 
just war traditions and persuasive argu-
ments about the relationships among 
religion, power, law, and the use of force�
Morkevičius was motivated by puzzling 
behavior prior to the 2003 U�S� invasion 
of Iraq� Prominent realists, such as John 
Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Robert 
Pape, vocally opposed the war as un-
necessary and inimical to U�S� interests� 
Prominent just war thinkers, including 
Michael Walzer, James Turner Johnson, 
and Jean Elshtain, expressed cautious 
support for the war� Curious about 
how realism—often associated with the 
amoral use of force by states—could be 
invoked to oppose the war, while the 
just war tradition—normally associated 
with limits on the use of force—could 
be called on to support it, Morkevičius 
studied the history of just war thought� 
“I expected—in typical liberal fashion— 
to see a constant evolution of just war 
norms toward the good� � � � What I 
found was a history of power” (p� 5)�
The book rigorously traces that history� 
Drawing on representative thinkers from 
major periods of Christian, Islamic, and 
Hindu just war thought, Morkevičius 
shows that just war thinking can be 
evaluated through an international rela-
tions lens as expressing evolving norms 
about the use of state power� Norms are 
a more efficient way for powerful states 
to enforce their desires than frequently  
going to war� Just war traditions 
represent one way to create and sustain 
norms that benefit powerful states� To be 
clear, she does not suggest that religious 
authorities cynically serve the interests 
of the state; rather, they are pragmatic 
about the scope of their influence�
Morkevičius shows how the relationship 
between religious authority and the 
state can explain the historical focus of 
just war thought� When the political 
power of religious authorities was 
tenuous, religious thinkers emphasized 
the legitimacy of the state and focused 
on questions of how believers could 
justify war—jus ad bellum questions� 
When the relationship between religious 
authority and the state was more secure, 
the religious leaders offered views 
on how political authorities should 
conduct themselves in war—questions 
of jus in bello� Thus, early Christian and 
Islamic writers were concerned with 
whether, when, and against whom war 
could be justified, while later writers 
in both traditions explored the duty to 
protect noncombatants from the evils 
of war� Hindu just war thought is more 
difficult to trace, since it relies more 
on oral traditions and less on written 
scriptures, but Morkevičius shows a 
similar development in Hindu epics and 
sacred texts� Concern with the treatment 
of noncombatants, she asserts, reflected 
not only a religiously founded moral 
emphasis on mercy but also a politically 
expedient emphasis on avoiding actions 
that would make it difficult to govern 
conquered territories by fostering bit-
terness among the defeated population�
The three disparate religious traditions 
Morkevičius examines are united by a 
pessimistic view of human nature� They 
all believe that, although humans need 
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each other to survive and thrive, people 
are naturally fractious, routinely fighting 
with one another rather than cooperat-
ing� Political realism shares this outlook� 
By contrast, much contemporary just 
war thinking begins from a secular legal-
ist perspective, which is more optimistic 
and idealistic about human nature and 
the ability of rules and norms to create a 
just society� Morkevičius argues that this 
modern idealism is responsible for both 
a pacifist tendency in modern just war 
thinking, which can weaken its power to 
create norms, since states are unlikely to 
give up the use of force entirely, and an 
interventionist tendency, which leads to 
concepts that challenge sovereignty, such 
as the responsibility-to-protect doctrine� 
While the motives are laudable, she 
asserts, these trends risk marginalizing 
the influence of just war thought�
Practitioners will find the argument 
of this book interesting and will 
benefit from exposure to Islamic and 
Hindu just war traditions, which 
are likely less familiar to them than 
the Christian tradition� Scholars 
will enjoy the rigorous research and 
careful textual analysis� Whether one 
agrees with its thesis or not, the book 
challenges readers and engages them 
in an important dialogue about how 
power, religion, authority, and norms 
interact in the international arena�
DOYLE HODGES
Cadets on Campus: History of Military Schools of 
the United States, by John Alfred Coulter II� Col-
lege Station: Texas A&M Univ� Press, 2017� 464 
pages� $50�
J� A� Coulter has done a masterful job 
tracing the evolution and history of 
military schools throughout the United 
States over the past 216 years� What re-
ally makes this book unique is the extent 
of Coulter’s research� He provides a 
comprehensive review of all the military 
schools that have been established across 
the United States� The appendices, 
notes, and references are a testament 
to the research Coulter conducted to 
prepare the manuscript� He provides 
both history and analysis to demonstrate 
the impact of each of these schools on 
American history� As a graduate of the 
U�S� Military Academy, I was fascinated 
to learn about the important role that 
the graduates of military schools 
have played in our nation’s history�
Initially, Coulter lays the foundation 
and explains the elements of military 
school culture in terms of Edgar 
Schein’s organizational culture model 
using artifacts, espoused values, and 
underlying assumptions� Artifacts 
include the cadet uniforms, rank, and 
insignia� Espoused values consist of 
the cadet honor codes and leadership 
values� “According to Edgar Schein, 
the final and most powerful element 
of organizational culture is shared 
tacit assumptions which result in 
perceptions, feelings, and behaviors 
that are learned and taken for granted 
and are not debatable” (p� 4)� These 
elements make the military schools 
unique and give them a special place 
in the history of American education�
Coulter tells the story of how just a few 
men, such as Major Sylvanus Thayer, 
USA, and Captain Alden Partridge, 
USA, who worked together in the early 
years at West Point, were instrumental 
in the growth of military schools 
and colleges across the United States� 
Partridge’s subsequent court-martial 
and removal from West Point laid the 
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groundwork for him to establish a 
military school in Norwich, Vermont, 
which later became Norwich University� 
“Partridge would eventually be associ-
ated with the citizen soldier concept 
and years later be known as the father 
of ROTC [Reserve Officers’ Training 
Corps]” (p� 38)� Thayer implemented 
systems still in use today, including 
a rigorous academic curriculum 
and the West Point honor code� “As 
superintendent at West Point, Sylvanus 
Thayer would lead that institution from 
1817 to 1833� In that role he firmly 
established an ethos and standard of 
education that led to the expansion of 
the military school concept well into 
the current century” (p� 35)� Thayer and 
Partridge planted the seeds of military 
education that would grow and prosper 
across the country� The students taught 
by Thayer and Partridge would go on to 
establish military schools and colleges 
throughout the United States on the 
basis of the model they developed�
Coulter does a superb job explaining 
how the growth and expansion of 
military schools and colleges is tied to 
events in U�S� military history� He notes 
that “[b]y far the greatest impact on 
military schools of the United States has 
been war” (p� 249)� Except for a slight 
decline immediately after the Civil War, 
the number of military schools increased 
steadily from 1802 through 1926� Thus, 
it reached its peak after World War I; the 
numbers declined steadily after World 
War II and the Korean War� But it was 
the Vietnam War and the ongoing at-
mosphere of social change that sounded 
the death knell for several military 
schools and colleges� Coulter writes, 
“The political impact of the Vietnam 
War, along with a cultural shift among 
young people, was responsible for a 65 
percent reduction in the nation’s military 
schools” (p� 250)� Military service was 
clearly not the same badge of honor 
that it had been after previous wars�
Recently, however, there has been a 
resurgence in the number of military 
schools� “Starting in 1999 and continu-
ing until at least 2014, the decline in the 
number of military schools and their 
enrollment ended, and these indicators 
have reversed” (p� 239)� There are a 
number of reasons for this� Charter 
schools increasingly are adopting the 
military school model as a means of 
improving students’ character� Women 
also have integrated seamlessly into 
many of the programs� For example, the 
first captain at West Point last year was 
a female who eventually was accepted 
as a Rhodes Scholar� Finally, the public 
image of the military profession has 
improved radically, according to recent 
Gallup polls (p� 240)� Each of these 
factors contributes to the resurgence of 
military schools in the United States�
Coulter’s research and storytelling 
indicate a level of scholarship that 
few achieve� My only criticism is that 
it would have been useful to have 
more background on the history of 
military schools in other cultures for 
comparison� Are the military schools in 
the United States unique, compared with 
the models established in other cultures? 
If so, what makes them unique?
Coulter has done an exceptional 
job tracing the history and factors 
that influenced military schools 
across the United States� I would 
recommend this book wholeheart-
edly to anyone interested in learning 
about the military school model�
THOMAS J� GIBBONS
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Soft War: The Ethics of Unarmed Conflict, ed� Mi-
chael L� Gross and Tamar Meisels� Cambridge, 
U�K�: Cambridge Univ� Press, 2017� 294 pages� 
$27�99�
Over the last twenty years and arguably 
long before that, the line between 
“war” and “not war” has become more 
blurred than it ever has been� In part, 
this is because of a greatly increased 
number of actors using force to achieve 
a variety of goals, but also because 
new technologies and applications 
present grave challenges to attempts to 
determine what are “acts of war�” Cyber 
attacks, economic sanctions, so-called 
media warfare, and lawfare now exist 
in the increasingly large and complex 
gray zone separating peace and war�
There has been little examination 
of applicable rules and guidelines to 
encourage and ensure right behavior 
in this growing gray zone� Soft War 
examines the potential benefit in 
applying the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC) and the just war tradition to 
these arenas of soft conflict� The result is 
a collection of fourteen eclectic chapters 
examining eight separate areas related to 
soft war� Not surprisingly, some chapters 
make their case much more strongly 
than others, but together they make for 
provocative and interesting reading�
Although the quality of individual chap-
ters is uneven, the editors are sincere in 
their efforts to examine the role of ethics 
and rules in an area where currently all 
but none exist� The lineup of authors is 
impressive and includes such notables 
as Cécile Fabre of All Souls College, 
Oxford University; Joy Gordon of 
Loyola University; and George R� 
Lucas, the recently appointed Vice 
Admiral James B� Stockdale Professor 
of Ethics at the U�S� Naval War College�
Those who adhere to a traditional view 
of security, peace, and war will find 
many of their assumptions and beliefs 
challenged by Soft War. Concepts such 
as jus ad vim (the use of force short 
of war) raise questions about the sort 
of operations that would belong in 
this category and what, if any, ethical 
framework could be applied to these 
operations� One of the strengths of Soft 
War is the identification of operations 
conducted by both state and nonstate 
actors that do not meet the threshold 
of war but definitely are not peace�
The book’s introduction and first 
chapter suggest a new definition of 
war that is thought provoking and 
useful� Given that formally declared 
war apparently is passé, efforts to define 
just what the term war encompasses are 
overdue� For example, does the use of 
force against an opponent remain one of 
the prerequisites for moving from peace 
to war? Or can the effects of nonlethal 
actions produce outcomes so severe 
as to be considered an act of war?
The book’s strongest chapters are 
those dealing with subjects that are 
better known to the larger security 
profession� Authors of these chapters 
tend to produce the best arguments 
and convincing conclusions� For 
example, chapter 7, “State-Sponsored 
Hacktivism and the Rise of ‘Soft’ War” 
by George Lucas, is excellent� The 
other chapters in this section on cyber 
warfare, media warfare, and lawfare 
are also among the best in the book�
That said, editorial sincerity and 
several excellent chapters likely will not 
convince traditional security profession-
als to support applying the LOAC as a 
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guide to dealing with these emerging 
threats� Whether soft war is actually 
war still remains up for debate, despite 
Soft War’s well-crafted arguments�
Having examined cyber war, media 
war, and lawfare, Soft War takes on the 
general category of nonviolence, and 
the more-specific questions of hostage 
taking and prisoners� One of the 
more-provocative chapters examines 
the use of unarmed bodyguards� This 
title applies primarily to unarmed 
civilians performing the role of 
peacekeepers without UN authoriza-
tion� Some readers will be surprised to 
learn that some small-scale operations 
of this nature have been undertaken, 
but no reader should be surprised 
at the complications deriving from 
attempts to conduct such operations 
on a much broader scale� Even more 
surprising is the argument that under 
some circumstances, civilians might 
be conscripted, morally and legally, 
to conduct such an operation�
Soft War’s concluding chapter, “Pro-
portionate Self-defense in Unarmed 
Conflict” by Michael Gross, is not a 
summation of the book’s content but 
a separate piece of scholarship that 
stands on its own merit� Gross discusses 
appropriate responses to sanctions, 
lawfare, and cyber warfare/terrorism, 
and he also identifies and examines 
some of the very significant challenges 
in constructing a valid response to 
unarmed attacks� His conclusion that 
“soft war poses an abiding challenge for 
just war theory” (p� 232) is somewhat 
anticlimactic; for all that, it is defensible�
In the end, Soft War is much more an 
invitation to a conversation than it is 
a set of ready-to-use solutions� It does 
raise questions to which, so far, there are 
no answers� It proposes solutions, some 
of which are likely to create additional 
and potentially worse problems� Its 
contributors do not hesitate to challenge 
status quo thinking and deliver new 
perspectives� Perhaps most impor-
tantly, this book recognizes that ethical 
considerations must be part of opera-
tions in the gray area between peace 
and war and that the time to identify 
tools and guidelines for resolving those 
associated ethical issues is now�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Patton’s Way: A Radical Theory of War, by James 
Kelly Morningstar� Annapolis, MD: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 2017� 352 pages� $35�
When most people think of General 
George S� Patton Jr�, USA—even people 
who should know better—they tend to 
confuse him with George C� Scott, the 
actor who played him in the 1970 movie 
Patton� In many ways, that is a tribute 
to Scott’s acting and the power of film 
in contemporary society, but there is a 
reason the motion picture was made in 
the first place: Patton was an exception-
ally good general who got results�
James Kelly Morningstar reminds us of 
that fact in this powerful and significant 
account of Patton’s approach to war 
fighting� Much of Patton’s unique 
approach to combat operations has been 
obscured by a number of factors� He 
died soon after the war, which allowed 
other Allied generals to offer accounts 
in the form of interviews, speeches, and 
memoirs that emphasized their contri-
butions and, in turn, downplayed those 
of Patton� In addition, many people, 
including historians and army officers 
studying his battles, did not understand 
or appreciate fully his approach, and 
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attributed Patton’s results simply to 
“daring � � � intuition � � � determination�”
Morningstar chooses to differ� He 
quotes Brigadier General Oscar W� 
Koch, USA, Patton’s chief intelligence 
officer, on this matter: “If one can call 
anticipation of enemy reactions based 
on a lifetime of professional training 
and on thinking and application 
‘intuition,’ he had it” (p� 7)� Morningstar 
argues that “Patton was one of the 
Army’s few deep thinkers and an astute 
theoretician” (p� 16)� He contends that 
Patton’s theories were the subject of 
careful study of military history and 
geography and an understanding about 
the logic of power—in particular, the 
combination of time, space, and mass�
Patton rejected the U�S� Army doctrine 
of the day that emphasized firepower 
and attrition� In a sense, he was the rebel 
against the system that the George C� 
Scott movie presents� “Patton developed 
a new calculus of war: fire to enable 
maneuver, maneuver to create shock, 
shock to frustrate enemy decision-
making, frustrate decision-making to 
destroy enemy morale, and destroy 
morale to collapse the enemy’s will” 
(pp� 3–4)� To do these things, Patton 
encouraged subordinate initiative, speed, 
and flexibility at the tactical levels� He 
relied on intelligence, not only to know 
where the enemy was but to get a sense 
of how a battle would unfold, which gave 
him an understanding of how to beat his 
adversary� As in the game of chess, he 
wanted to cut off his opponents’ options 
and beat them before they had a chance 
to take action� Many contemporaries 
looked at what Patton was doing and 
failed to understand� Subordinate 
initiative looked like poor command 
and control� Maneuver and the applica-
tion of firepower against lightly held 
positions often made others think his 
units were never battle tested, which 
ignored the fact that he was not trying 
to get into an attritional engagement�
This book is one that every serious 
specialist of World War II should 
read� More importantly, it is an ac-
count that any individual involved 
in developing doctrine in any 
professional army—be it the U�S�, 
British, or South Korean—should 
read, study, and consider carefully�
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES
Enlisting Faith: How the Military Chaplaincy 
Shaped Religion and State in Modern America, by 
Ronit Y� Stahl� Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ� 
Press, 2017� 384 pages� $39�95�
Ronit Y� Stahl, a professor of history at 
the University of California, Berkeley, 
has written a detailed and fascinating 
book on the American military chap-
laincy� Of the piles of books on military 
topics that authors, historians, analysts, 
and academics publish each year, books 
on emergent military technology, histor-
ical battles, and biography dominate the 
stacks; religion and the chaplain corps 
responsible for tending to servicemem-
bers’ ecumenical needs tend to get short 
shrift� And when religious matters—and 
in particular chaplains—are written 
about, these works often focus on larger 
matters of ethics or morality in military 
service� Thus, it is welcome to see Stahl’s 
scholarly work on a military specialty 
that is one of the smallest across all 
military services but whose effect on 
servicemembers and their culture is 
often directly inverse to its size�
Stahl begins the story in the early twenti-
eth century, when the modern American 
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military chaplaincy constituted one of 
the World War I–era progressive reforms 
of the military services� It probably is 
not a surprise that in 1917 the American 
military chaplaincy involved three major 
religious groups: Catholicism, Judaism, 
and Protestantism� Stahl notes that what 
the U�S� government and U�S� military 
needed was ministers, priests, and rabbis 
to perform three vital functions for the 
servicemembers fighting in Europe: bury 
the dead, perform religious services, and 
provide training to military members�
At the crux of Stahl’s story is a military 
with a chaplain corps that from its 
creation always has lived a precarious 
balance: the need to minister spiritually 
to the men and women in uniform 
while refraining from making the state 
a proponent of any one church or moral 
teaching� In fact, Stahl summarizes this 
quite nicely, saying, “When Americans 
live, fight, and die together, religion 
does not reside on the margins or 
evaporate from communal compounds� 
Instead, the military chaplaincy tries 
to navigate a careful course that 
enables religious practice without 
trampling on the rights of others or 
establishing a state religion” (p� 264)�
Also, from the genesis of the chaplaincy 
to its current form, in each decade 
and during every war, there has been 
friction� Stahl walks the reader through 
these challenges, beginning in World 
War I with the building of a young 
chaplaincy in the services and simply 
efforts to recruit enough chaplains to ad-
minister ecumenical rites to thousands 
of servicemembers serving in Europe� 
From World War I and into the interwar 
years and through World War II, other 
issues arose� How should chaplains 
serve a segregated military? Which 
religions should the military officially 
recognize, and how quickly should they 
do so? (Interesting fact: Stahl notes that 
we began with three religious groups 
and now the Department of Defense 
[DoD] recognizes 221 “faith group 
codes�”) In World War II, questions of 
sex caused plenty of headaches among 
chaplains� With religious groups such 
as Catholicism advocating abstinence 
until marriage and prohibiting the use 
of prophylactics, how were Catholic 
chaplains to remain faithful to their 
church’s teachings while realizing that 
DoD distributed condoms to service-
members to minimize sexually transmit-
ted diseases, with the goal of preserving 
an effective fighting force? These 
issues and others—female chaplains, 
homosexuality, grooming standards, 
food observances—have been conten-
tious points for many religious groups�
Religious clashes were inevitable—and 
will continue to be� As Stahl notes, one 
of the long-standing points of friction 
is “the military’s unbending insistence 
on the appearance of uniform bod-
ies” (p� 252)� Here, the professor, of 
course, is referring to years and years 
of prohibitive grooming standards or 
dress exemptions� The most well-known 
standards and exemptions are beards for 
Sikhs and yarmulkes for Jews� In 2014, 
DoD took additional steps to encour-
age commanders to give members of 
various religious groups the latitude to 
practice their beliefs and authorized 
beards, for instance, as long as they did 
not disrupt good order and discipline�
The only criticism I have about the 
book is that, frankly, it would have been 
interesting to read more about the role 
of the chaplaincy in the past twenty 
years� Stahl stays away from detailed 
analysis of anything after Vietnam� I 
suppose, however, that the Afghanistan 
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   124 2/25/19   10:40 AM
130
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1
 B O O K  R E V I E WS  1 2 5
and Iraq wars deserve their own books 
on how religion and the chaplaincy 
shaped servicemembers who served in 
those conflicts� Also, as noted earlier, 
this is a scholarly work—it is detailed, 
includes extensive bibliographic notes, 
and, thankfully, has a fine index� Stahl’s 
work is a great addition to any military 
chaplain’s library and valuable to the 
military historian interested in under-
standing how sometimes the society that 
military members serve affects them in 
the most basic of human spheres—the 
spiritual and religious ones�
Ironically, Stahl’s book shows that for 
religion, the military, and the men 
and women who are bound by a creed 
and worship something greater than 
themselves, the relationship among 
them is one that is always changing and 
evolving—sometimes contentiously� 
To paraphrase Stahl, the chaplaincy—a 
point of tension between church and 
state—will be a battleground in the 
future, as it has been in the past�
CHRISTOPHER NELSON
The 1st Infantry Division and the US Army Trans-
formed: Road to Victory in Desert Storm, 1970–
1991, by Gregory Fontenot� Columbia: Univ� of 
Missouri Press, 2017� 526 pages� $36�95�
Retired U�S� Army colonel Gregory 
Fontenot’s excellent book details the 
transformation of the Army’s famous 
1st Infantry Division—“the Big Red 
One”—following the end of the Vietnam 
War and culminating in its combat 
success in the First Gulf War� Fontenot, 
a retired U�S� Army armor officer, is 
well qualified to write this book, having 
served in the division, including com-
mand of the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor 
before and during DESERT STORM� As 
the former commander of the Army’s 
Battle Command Training Program 
(now called the Mission Command 
Training Program), he is an expert on 
collective military training� He is also a 
coauthor of the Army’s initial history of 
the more recent Gulf War, On Point: The 
United States Army in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (Naval Institute Press, 2005)�
Fontenot’s latest book, The 1st Infantry 
Division and the US Army Transformed, 
begins with an Army racked with train-
ing and disciplinary problems at the end 
of the Vietnam War� Fontenot describes 
how senior Army leaders responded 
with a strategy designed to reestablish 
military standards by improving training 
programs and professional military 
education for officers and noncommis-
sioned officers (NCOs) alike� Central to 
this was the development of the National 
Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, 
California� Located on a site larger than 
the state of Rhode Island, the NTC is a 
world-class training center with a robust 
opposing force, instrumented ranges, 
sufficient equipment, and a profes-
sional cadre of observer-controllers 
who watch every action throughout the 
training rotations� The adoption of and 
adherence to a rigorous and thorough 
after-action review process enables those 
participating in the training to improve 
on every aspect of their performance� 
Functioning not only as a training 
center that duplicates near-combat 
conditions for brigade-sized Army units, 
the NTC also integrates other service 
elements into its training rotations�
Fontenot then focuses his book on 
detailing the planning and preparation 
that enabled the 1st Infantry Division—
as well as other combat units—to deploy 
successfully from the United States to 
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Saudi Arabia during the DESERT SHIELD 
buildup of 1990� He does not shy away 
from discussing the matériel shortcom-
ings and the significant logistical 
challenges encountered in achieving 
this unprecedented deployment of 
soldiers, vehicles, equipment, and 
supplies into the theater of operations�
As DESERT SHIELD prepared to become 
DESERT STORM, the book explores how 
senior military leaders wrestled with 
operational planning for the attack on 
and defeat of the Iraqi military� With the 
commencement of military operations, 
Fontenot discusses DESERT STORM from 
the operational and tactical-level per-
spectives of the VII Corps commander, 
Lieutenant General Fred Franks; the 1st 
Infantry Division commander, Major 
General Thomas G� Rhame; and numer-
ous brigade, battalion, and company 
commanders� Fontenot especially is 
attentive to identifying by name the 
NCOs and soldiers of the division, 
and highlights their many individual 
contributions to the unit’s collective 
success as he follows the 1st Infantry 
Division through the course of the war�
Fontenot provides similar detail in his 
consideration of the very real problems 
faced at the operational-strategic and 
strategic leadership levels—where the 
most senior decision makers were 
hundreds, even thousands, of miles from 
the action on the battlefield’s frontages� 
Some of these commanders’ expecta-
tions were frustrated by the battlefield’s 
ever-present “friction,” famously 
described in Carl von Clausewitz’s 
classic study On War� Indeed, lessons 
drawn from Clausewitz and other 
military philosophers are peppered 
throughout the book� Fontenot uses 
these historical touchstones to validate 
the study of military history and its 
continued operational relevance�
I heartily endorse this well-written 
and well-researched analytical study 
of the experiences of the 1st Infantry 
Division� It is a success story that 
provides invaluable insight into the 
training renaissance the U�S� Army 
experienced following the Vietnam 
War—a transformation that led directly 
to the successes of Operations DESERT 
SHIELD and DESERT STORM� This insight 
speaks to ongoing questions about 
military education and training as the 
nation continues to wage a war on terror�
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RUNNING SILENT AND ALGORITHMIC
The U.S. Navy Strategic Vision in 2019
 As of January 2019, the U�S� Navy does not possess a coherent, public, strategic vision�1 The official statement of strategy, or the Navy’s strategic concept, to 
use a term inspired by the late Samuel P� Huntington’s term, remains A Coopera-
tive Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready of March 2015, 
whose acronym is CS21R (R for revised)�2 The Department of the Navy (DON) 
leadership has never declared CS21R to be superseded, nor has anything been 
published to supplant it�3 However, CS21R was written to support (and possibly 
shape) the foreign policy proclivities of the administration of President Barack 
H� Obama; its predecessor document, CS21 of October 2007, was released dur-
ing the administration of President George W� Bush� Both of these presidents 
endorsed engagement with the international community (albeit in contrasting 
forms)�4 The public statements of President Donald J� Trump appear to indicate 
that some of the principles articulated in CS21R may no longer be a good fit, 
and indeed the emergence of an international system dominated by great-power 
competition is now more apparent� Outsiders who study the policies of the U�S� 
Navy are well aware of this disconnect�5
Yet the U�S� Navy does, in fact, have a strategic vision that reflects the tenets of 
former Secretary of Defense James N� Mattis’s National Defense Strategy (NDS)� 
Within the Chief of Naval Operations staff (OPNAV), this strategic document 
has been referred to as “the Navy’s response to the NDS” or “the Navy’s contri-
bution to the joint force�” Like the NDS, it is classified “Secret” and not available 
publicly� Unlike the NDS, however, the Navy document does not have an unclas-
sified summary, and there is little indication that one eventually will be prepared�
If the Navy’s strategic vision is not available publicly, how can we make sense 
of the service’s future policies, resource requirements, dispositions and deploy-
ments, and budget submissions? Likewise, how can the U�S� Navy convince the 
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American people—and obviously the political decision makers—of the validity 
and logic of its course? How do we know what the naval leadership intends? 
In the spirit of the descriptions (and hype) of current discussions of artificial 
intelligence (AI), we can apply human intelligence by analyzing the sum of what 
can be described metaphorically as a complex algorithm� In other words, we 
can combine the current white papers and program guidance(s) of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) and Secretary of the Navy, along with related official 
and semiofficial sources, to generate an approximate outline of the U�S� Navy’s 
strategic focus�6
STRATEGIC VISION BY ALGORITHM
Included in this algorithm are (1) the 2018 National Defense Strategy and its 
publicly released Summary; (2) CS21R, which lays out what remains the official 
(DON) strategy but appears overtaken by events and out of sync with presidential 
guidance; (3) three white papers that provide general direction from the current 
CNO, Admiral John M� Richardson, USN; (4) remnants of the officially super-
seded Air-Sea Battle, a victim of joint ideology; (5) the report to Congress from 
an officially unofficial Navy future fleet architecture study team; (6) a numerical 
goal—355 ships—that appears largely in the rhetoric of senior officials; and (7) a 
book-length monograph attempting to define the current Navy in terms of naval 
war fighting that was commissioned by a previous CNO but released only weeks 
before his retirement (and thus is of questionable authority)� Unlike the seven 
samurai (or seven gunfighters) of legend and film, these seven share a similar 
cause but do not necessarily fight well together�
In addition to these seven items there are statutory reports to Congress, such 
as the thirty-year shipbuilding plan and the Secretary of the Navy’s annual report, 
from which can be gleaned particular details or other clues about the Navy’s navi-
gational track�7 Additionally, as previously noted, classified top-level guidance or 
guidances from the Secretary of Defense exist—including the 2018 NDS—that 
cannot be ignored and, under Secretary Mattis, shaped (and changed) the Navy’s 
approach to building its vision�
Meanwhile, the U�S� Navy also has its classified guidance prioritizing its 
resource requirements for its program objective memorandum (POM) sub-
mission to the defense budget�8 This strategic planning guidance, long-range 
planning guidance, Navy strategic plan for program objective memorandum, or 
simply guidance (the name changes with CNOs) is used by Navy program ana-
lysts and resource sponsors in lieu of translating a loftier strategic vision from 
strategy-speak to programese�9 The current Chief of Naval Operations guidance 
(CNOG) for the fiscal year 2020 program objective memorandum actually was 
written ahead of the then-under-draft “response to the NDS�” So, in fact, the 
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programming transliteration actually appeared (within the OPNAV staff) prior 
to the written strategy narrative.10
In a well-planned deployment, all these sources would synchronize to create 
a whole greater than the sum of their parts. Alas, conflicting perceptions of the 
post–post–Cold War world and rival political and bureaucratic ambitions have 
created crosscurrents that subtract as well as add. For example, some of these 
documents were written under the assumption of increased defense resources, 
whereas the midterm election of November 6, 2018, led to new House Armed 
Services Committee leadership that has been warning of leaner defense budgets.11 
SEVEN PRIMARY SOURCES FOR DETERMINING NAVY’S STRATEGIC VISION
Document Type Source Release Date Status
1 Secretary of  
Defense guidance
Summary of the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy (Summary NDS)
2018 Dominant joint/DoD guidance
2 Preexisting  
strategic vision
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, 
Ready (CS21R) 
March 2015 Current Navy official vision




a. Design for Maintaining Maritime 
Superiority, 1.0 (Design 1.0)
b. The Future Navy
c. Design for Maintaining Maritime 







Affirms majority of 1.0; adds 
specific guidance
4 Air-Sea Battle 
remnants
a. Admiral Greenert, USN, and 
General Mark Welsh, USAF, Breaking 
the Kill Chain
b. Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea 
Battle: Multi-service Collaboration 
to Address Anti-access and Area Denial
c. Hutchins et al., “Joint Concept for 
Access and Maneuver in the Global 
Commons,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 




Publicly subsumed by Joint 
Access and Maneuver in the 
Global Commons (JAM-GC) 
joint concept paper (however, 
JAM-GC is applicable only  
tangentially to antiaccess  
challenges)
5 Navy Project 




Report to Congress: Alternative Future 




Overtaken by events and 355 
number?
6 Directive for 355-
ship Navy
Executive Summary, 2016 Navy 




2018–19 FSA is under way





How We Fight: Handbook for the 
Naval Warfighter
July 2015 Unclear and unpublicized
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The intent of this article is to sum the algorithm and provide an outline of the U�S� 
Navy’s current service strategic vision�
DOES IT REALLY MATTER?
Before describing each of the seven algorithmic inputs, we first need to deal 
with the question whether having a public USN strategic vision really matters� 
To the naval analyst operating in fleet commands, or even in the trenches of the 
Pentagon, and other navalists in general, the probable answer is “not really�” As 
Admiral Carlisle A� H� Trost, USN (CNO, 1986–90), stated, “Over the years our 
Maritime Strategy has been very much like the British Constitution—unwritten 
but thoroughly understood by those who practice it�”12 Indeed, for those who 
serve in the fleet, the objectives of deterring war, maintaining U�S� access to 
the materials and markets of international trade, intervening in crises when so 
ordered, fighting terrorist groups, and providing a sovereign, forward presence 
are quite evident� For those who work on future Navy programs and budget, the 
CNOG and other classified documents are more directly useful�13
Ultimately, however, it is not the Navy or even the Secretary of Defense that 
actually determines Navy programs and budget, but rather the members of 
Congress as representatives of the American people� The fact that congressmen 
who normally are supportive of the naval services recently have expressed their 
desire that the Navy articulate a clear vision should be of concern to the service�14 
Yet, taking its cue from Secretary of Defense Mattis, who showed a penchant to 
discourage “too much” openness to media, the Navy has continued to run (rela-
tively) silent�15
There are at least three likely explanations for the secretary’s caution with the 
media� First is the official reason: too much information should not be trans-
mitted to potential enemies� But in the case of the U�S� Navy, whose strategic 
predilections were made clear through media speculation (and some public 
discussion) of the air-sea battle concept (circa 2009–15), that reason seems a 
bit implausible� The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and others know toward 
whom the Navy’s operational planning is directed�16 Second might be his desire 
that the services tightly conform to the jointly focused NDS� Since the Navy is 
known for its independently derived strategic visions—primarily on the basis of 
applying its own traditional operating concerns against changing conditions and 
emerging threats—this seems a more plausible concern� Third, more specula-
tively, is that the Secretary of Defense wants to ensure that the Navy—along with 
the other services and the rest of the Department of Defense (DoD)—does not 
get crosswise with future tweets and other sudden proposals emanating from the 
White House�17 The president announced his desire for a 350-ship Navy at ap-
proximately the same time as he announced his proposals for a reduced federal 
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budget�18 Quiet might be prudent at this particular moment� However, silence 
over its service visions never has seemed to help the Navy’s long-term viability in 
the past, particularly in terms of budget and force structure�
THE CASE OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY
The public release of the Cold War–era Maritime Strategy in 1986 is one example 
of how public discussion—particularly by influential academics, with all the dis-
putation and opposition that implies—actually improved the vision, raised public 
awareness of the Navy’s mission, and generated considerable congressional inter-
est�19 With strong presidential interest and support for the strategy (which justi-
fied the political goal of a six-hundred-ship Navy), the public discussion served 
the Navy’s institutional interests�20 Primarily through media reports of reactions 
and resulting controversies, American citizens who might never have given their 
Navy a thought became aware that the Navy was doing something important�21
Additionally, a case can be made that public release of the Maritime Strategy 
actually heightened Cold War conventional deterrence, since the cacophony of 
debate reinforced a belief in the minds of Kremlin decision makers that the U�S� 
Navy / Marine Corps actually would employ its major forces in carrying out 
audacious and high-risk attacks on the Soviet periphery in the High North and 
Pacific in the event of a war in central Europe�22 If the U�S� Navy was willing to sail 
its carrier battle groups (in conjunction with its attack submarines [SSNs]) in the 
face of long-range Soviet bombers and attack aviation in an attempt to penetrate 
ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) bastions and destroy the Soviet fleet within 
home waters, what else might it attempt?23
Interestingly, there are continuing indications that, similarly, analysts working 
for the CCP today frequently are concerned that they might miss critical policy 
nuances revealed in cacophonous American public debates, even while many 
American decision makers treat that cacophony as background noise�24
VISION AMID AUSTERITY
There is yet another purpose for creating and updating a clear strategic 
vision—but one that naval decision makers hesitate to contemplate, lest their 
fears become reality� A clear strategic vision helps to maintain the motivation and 
morale of naval personnel and public support for the naval services during times 
of fiscal austerity� Samuel Huntington identified this factor in his argument for 
a naval strategic concept in the 1950s� Huntington noted that “if a service does 
not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and political leaders will 
be confused as to the role of the service � � � and apathetic or hostile to the claims 
made by the service on the resources of society�”25 At that time, both a shrink-
ing (or, rather, already shrunk) budget and the arguments of the U�S� Air Force 
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threatened to strip the U�S� Navy and Marine Corps of their wartime missions� 
Initially, the DON seemed unable to articulate its purpose in the nuclear age� 
After all, having defeated imperial Japan in the greatest joint campaign in mili-
tary history, the service’s relevance seemed evident—at least to the Navy itself� 
However, by accepting the need to develop and promulgate a strategic concept 
understandable to the public as well as political decision makers, Navy and Ma-
rine Corps leaders were able to reestablish an internal sense of purpose as well as 
regain public and congressional support� Having a vision that was both internal 
and public was a particular priority under the extended tour of duty of Admiral 
Arleigh A� Burke (CNO, 1955–61)� As an internal guide, an unclassified Naval 
Warfare Publication (NWP) 1, Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, was created as 
the foundation for all other naval publications� It was updated routinely until its 
quiet demise in the 1990s�26
The post-Vietnam Navy (circa 1974–81) was racked by personnel problems, 
arguably because of both reduced funding for readiness and a lack of a motivat-
ing sense of purpose� The creation of the Maritime Strategy was instrumental in 
regaining this sense of purpose�
There are strong indications that the promise of a 350- or 355-ship Navy by 
the Trump administration—whatever its degree of commitment—may give way 
to a reduction in the overall defense budget under new Democratic leadership 
in the House of Representatives� There had been previous stirrings among fiscal 
hawks in both parties, and Secretary of Defense Mattis never committed himself 
to the 355 number�27 Thus, the Navy’s anticipated increase actually may turn into 
a winter of decreased resources�28 Such winters are times when strong and clear 
vision seems to be needed most�
In sum, a clear, publicly articulated Navy strategic vision has mattered—for 
congressional and public support, as well as for internal morale and sense of 
purpose� Its absence does have effects�
NDS AND THE NAVY
If NDS is the driver of the current Navy self-vision, what is in the document that 
directly affects the Navy?
Working from the unclassified Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
of the United States of America (hereafter Summary NDS), one first observes that 
its strategic change toward a “balance of power” approach to deterrence should 
mean a tilt toward the Navy’s traditional missions� The Summary NDS states 
unequivocally, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the pri-
mary concern in U�S� national security�”29 Although the U�S� Marine Corps, Naval 
Special Warfare (SEAL), and explosive ordnance disposal units and naval tactical 
aviation were involved deeply in countering jihadists—who also occasionally 
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were targeted by Tomahawk-firing ships and submarines—most of the blue- 
water Navy had but tangential roles in countering terrorism, even if one counts 
the Navy individual augmentees in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq�30 The Na-
vy’s primary purposes—of ensuring access to the markets and materials that con-
stitute international trade and deterring, fighting, or facilitating power projection 
in interstate war—were not part of what former Defense Secretaries called “the 
wars we are in�” If interstate conflict is now “where it’s at,” with the primary list of 
likely opponents being represented by the 2+2 construct of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) and Russia, followed by Iran and North Korea, then the Navy has 
to be a primary fighting component, given that all the above are separated from 
the United States by oceans�31
However, as one reads through the Summary NDS, a subtle ground force– 
centric approach to strategy can be detected� For example, the global operat-
ing model for joint force posture is described by the four terms contact, blunt, 
surge, and homeland (CBSH)�32 The first three are general descriptions of phases 
of a land campaign that do not have exact naval equivalents� Would forward-
deployed naval forces constitute a contact layer, or are they a standing blunt 
force? Both terms imply a classic ground engagement among armies, whereas 
modern naval combat is described most persuasively as “a struggle for the first 
salvo” (even if that is a Cold War Soviet concept) or an attempt to “attack effec-
tively first” (in the words of Captain Wayne P� Hughes Jr�, USN [Ret�])�33 The U�S� 
Navy never actually has surged in a war against a powerful naval opponent� In 
the World War II Pacific War, most high-value units were already at sea or within 
range of the enemy; instead, the surge occurred in industrial production and 
mobilization—a feat that many doubt could be replicated today� Likewise, the 
maritime defense of the homeland is largely the responsibility of the U�S� Coast 
Guard, although SSBNs remain the most survivable leg of strategic nuclear deter-
rence, and naval theater ballistic-missile defense, along with Aegis Ashore, could 
be integrated into national missile defense (a mission the Navy has avoided)� 
It simply is tough to fit naval war fighting into the CBSH formula—a fact that 
may have deeper implications� One can shoehorn naval force structure into the 
formula for comparative modeling with land forces, but only by “fuzzing” their 
designed operational employment�
Following a fairly traditional description of objectives, strategic objectives, 
and desired capabilities—none that would be completely out of place in a Cold 
War document—the Summary NDS sets goals of “building a more lethal force” 
and “modernizing key capabilities” in such areas as “forward force maneuver 
and posture resilience”—presumably a Navy forte� Although the Summary NDS 
calls for prioritizing investment in forces that “can deploy, survive, operate, ma-
neuver, and regenerate in all domains while under attack,” the sole detail offered 
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for this force investment is the effort to transition from “large, centralized, un-
hardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive basing�”34 Since 
the Navy has advertised itself long and loudly as the strategic alternative to large, 
centralized, unhardened (land) infrastructure, one might assume that unique 
naval capabilities might be mentioned briefly at that point in the Summary NDS 
document—but they are not�
What does the absence of the quite standard praise of naval forces (even in 
joint documents) as maneuverable and dispersed sovereign territory not fettered 
to land infrastructure and capable of crisis response (blunting, perhaps?) mean? 
One merely can speculate, but perhaps the Secretary of Defense really did not 
believe that the fleet is actually as effective or survivable in an antiaccess scenario 
(or the current preferred term of contested environment) as the Navy perceives 
itself to be� In any event, the Summary NDS does not contain a lot of hooks on 
which the Navy can hang its narrative hat—unless it wants to challenge joint 
ideology� A search of the Summary NDS failed to detect a single use of the word 
ocean�35
The Summary NDS does devote a full two pages (out of eleven total) to DoD’s 
desire to “strengthen alliances and attract new partners�”36 It focuses on three 
elements: “uphold a foundation of mutual respect, expand regional consulta-
tive mechanisms and collaborative planning � � � and deepen interoperability�” 
Regional alliance and partnership networks are delineated (Indo-Pacific, NATO, 
Middle East, Western Hemisphere, and Africa)� In this, the Summary NDS could 
fit easily into an Obama or Bush (either forty-one or forty-three) administration 
document� It also, amazingly, could fit within CS21R—except for a few telling 
details in the “uphold” element that tie back to Trump administration themes, 
including accountability�
The first of those details alluding to the Trump administration’s particular 
viewpoint is the recognition that “alliances and coalitions are built on free will and 
shared responsibility” (emphasis added)� Then, in a possible jab at previous admin-
istrations (whether stocked with neoconservatives or liberal internationalists)— 
and, in truth, a practical and significant change—the summary proclaims: “While 
we will unapologetically represent America’s values and belief in democracy, we 
will not seek to impose our way of life by force�”37 But even as strongly, it states 
that “we expect allies and partners to contribute an equitable share to our mutu-
ally beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing 
their defense capabilities�” Those are not firm requirements found in CS21R� It is 
hard not to perceive that “accountability” is the main message of the NDS coop-
eration section and that the remaining standard alliance/partnership recitation in 
no way implies that America is absolutely dependent on its alliance structure or 
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that it expects any limits on its free will� In short, CS21R is built around alliances, 
partnerships, and (obviously) cooperation; the NDS is not�
Inclining one toward the cynical view that the two pages extolling cooperation 
are simply standard fare is the fact that they are followed by a concluding section 
titled “Reforming the Department for Greater Performance and Affordability�” 
That goal has remained beyond the power of mere humans (including Defense 
Secretaries) nearly forever�
THE STATUS OF CS21R
As previously noted, officially the Navy’s strategic vision remains A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready of March 2015, 
much better known by its acronym, CS21R� CS21R is a revision of the original 
CS21, signed by the three chiefs of the sea services (Marine Corps, Navy, Coast 
Guard) in 2007� No successor has replaced it; no naval leader has publicly repu-
diated it�
Although the original CS21 was released under Admiral Gary Roughead 
(CNO, 2007–11), it was largely a confirmation of the concept of Admiral Michael 
G� Mullen (CNO, 2005–2007; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007–11) of 
a one-thousand-ship Navy (without using that term), consisting of the U�S� fleet 
and those of its allies and partners who would cooperate to ensure security at sea 
in accordance with international law and guided by the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)�38 Thus, the changes in the 
world environment between 2007 and 2015 (primarily the expansion of a poten-
tially hostile People’s Liberation Army [PLA], along with the definite hostility of 
Russian president Vladimir Putin) necessitated a revision that—while maintain-
ing an emphasis on global partnerships—expands its discussion of U�S� naval 
missions or functions and a fleet design that describes the capabilities needed to 
carry out these functions� One could invite the PLA Navy (PLAN) to participate 
in the U�S� Navy’s annual RIMPAC exercise, but that would not mean the Chinese 
would honor any international tribunal ruling on law of the sea violations� Yet the 
flashing light of the one-thousand-ship Navy still shines through both texts; it is 
dimmer in the second (CS21R) only because the additional section was added to 
discuss naval missions and general force-design goals, making the revised docu-
ment twice as long as the original�
Consider the contrast� The Summary NDS devotes two of eleven pages to alli-
ances, partnerships, and international cooperation (18 percent of the document); 
CS21R devotes almost twenty of thirty-seven pages to alliances, partnerships, 
and international cooperation (54 percent)� This provides the initial clue that 
the CS21R does not quite fit the Trump administration’s focus on deterring (or, if 
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necessary, winning) great-power conflict with China or Russia� CS21R’s stress on 
cooperation always betrayed an optimistic view of the future roles of China and 
Russia in supporting the current international system (instead of undermining 
it) and often referred to their roles as “responsible stakeholders�” In contrast, the 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America of December 2017—
parent of the NDS—envisions a world of great-power competition in which 
cooperation cannot be assumed� Quite simply, CS21R is out of sync with current 
higher directives�
So, what can be salvaged? The second half of CS21R, beginning with “Seapow-
er in Support of National Security,” contains the traditional description of naval 
missions, including deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime se-
curity�39 But it also adds a fifth mission that had not appeared previously in other 
higher-level documents: “all domain access,” a focus on defeating the antiaccess 
“reconnaissance strike networks” of potential opponents�40
To achieve all-domain access requires the U�S� Navy, U�S� Marine Corps, and 
U�S� Coast Guard (to whatever extent it can) to commit to investments in bat-
tlespace awareness (persistent surveillance), assured command and control (resil-
ient networks that can fight jamming), cyberspace operations, electromagnetic- 
maneuver warfare (EMW) (i�e�, electronic warfare spread across domains), and 
integrated fires� This is certainly an appropriate list of capabilities necessary for 
countering antiaccess strategies� Additionally, it is similar to such lists contained 
in all subsequent USN public documents� If one added unmanned systems, ma-
chine learning, and AI as means of achieving the above capabilities, one would 
have a depiction of the Navy’s current desired investments� These desired capa-
bilities permeate discussions of the Navy’s future fleet designs�
THE CNO, THE DESIGN FOR MAINTAINING MARITIME SUPERIORITY, 
AND THE FUTURE NAVY
The current CNO, Admiral Richardson, has released a series of three white pa-
pers that describe a design for maritime superiority and the characteristics of the 
future navy� Although they would seem disconnected from some of the premises 
of CS21R, the first document, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, 
Version 1.0 (hereafter Design 1.0), describes itself as a step “along a future course 
to achieve the aims articulated in [CS21R] in this new environment�”41 (Notably, 
the subsequent Design 2.0 does not mention CS21R�)
Design 1.0
Design 1.0 is a total of eight pages that are intended to “guide our behaviors and 
investments, both this year and in the years to come�”42 However, it also states 
that “[m]ore specific details about programs and funding adjustments will be 
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reflected in our annual budget documents,” undoubtedly referring to, among 
others, the CNOG�
Design 1.0 begins by describing the U�S� Navy’s mission in the joint-approved, 
domain-specific fashion: as conducting “prompt and sustained combat incident 
to operations at sea�” But it subtly broadens this to include “protect[ing] America 
from attack and preserv[ing] America’s strategic influence in key regions of the 
world,” presumably through persistent naval presence� It follows with a descrip-
tion of the “strategic environment,” which links Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer 
Mahan’s articulation of the need for a navy that could guarantee access to inter-
national trade and overseas markets and materials to the technological changes 
driving prosperity� Later in the document, the CNO acknowledges the funda-
mental truths of the nature of war: “a violent human contest between thinking 
and adapting adversaries for political gain�” He cites the thinkers whose wisdom 
has shaped the Naval War College course curriculum: Mahan (obviously), Thu-
cydides, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao (strangely), and Corbett�43
Design 1.0 describes the strategic environment in terms of three trends, all 
of which have been articulated in previous Navy documents: increased interna-
tional trade across seas, and potentially through the Arctic; a continually growing 
global information network; and increased rates of technological creation and 
adoption, including robotics, energy storage, three-dimensional printing, low-
cost sensors, genetic sciences, and AI�
Adapting is the key point, and the CNO sees a peacetime competition in stra-
tegic technology among global powers: the United States, China, and Russia� This 
is a view that CNO Richardson has espoused frequently since the beginning of 
his tenure, before the election of President Trump, and in sync with proponents 
of the Third Offset Strategy such as former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Un-
der Secretary of the Navy Robert O� Work (albeit not in the same words)� Unlike 
CS21R, Design 1.0 very clearly refers to China and Russia, pointing out that the 
“Russian Navy is operating with a frequency and in areas not seen for almost two 
decades, and the Chinese PLA(N) is extending its reach around the world�” (The 
+2 of North Korea and Iran also are mentioned, but very briefly�) Here is where 
technological advancement links with the Navy’s desired capabilities, as identi-
fied in the second half of CS21R; they are elements of the strategic competition 
with two regional powers that have antiaccess networks�
CNO Richardson does not use his predecessor’s assured access term, and he 
has made his dislike of antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) terminology evident�44 
Yet it would seem that the Navy’s goal is to adapt emerging technologies so as to 
retain (or regain) the ability to penetrate opponents’ A2/AD networks� A2/AD 
remains a regularly used term throughout DoD�
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Design 1.0 also lists the CNO’s view of Navy “core attributes of our profession” 
as consisting of “integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness�” These are 
distinct from the also-cited Navy core values of honor, courage, and commit-
ment� In the CNO’s guidance, “[i]f we abide by these attributes, our values should 
be clearly evident in our actions�”45 Although his predecessor expressed these 
attributes somewhat differently, the desire to define naval attributes provides a 
link to the quietly released How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval Warfighter, 
document number seven in our algorithm, of Admiral Jonathan W� Greenert, 
USN (CNO, 2011–15)�
The heart (and conclusion) of Design 1.0, however, is found in three pages 
describing the CNO’s “four lines of effort,” which are his objectives that are in-
tended to guide current Navy decision-making� Since each of the four lines of 
effort is individually color coded, it has become common for Navy staff officers 
to explain their projects or tasks in the form of “it supports purple (or blue, green, 
or yellow)�”
The first of the four lines (blue) is to “strengthen naval power at and from 
sea,” an obvious and continuing goal�46 Within this goal resides a prioritization 
of programs to align “our organization to best support generating operational 
excellence�” First is to “[m]aintain and modernize the undersea leg of the strategic 
deterrent triad,” described as “foundational to our survival as a nation�” Indeed, 
CNO Richardson consistently has identified the forthcoming Columbia-class 
SSBN as his priority acquisition program�47
The second program priority in the blue line is to develop and test new 
concepts through fleet exercises for war fighting in “highly ‘informationalized’ 
and contested environment[s]” in “partnership with the Marine Corps�” Since 
contested environment is a euphemism for A2/AD, one can speculate that this is 
intended to patch over some of the fraying between the two naval services that 
occurred during the development of the air-sea battle concept� The third priority 
calls for expansion of the EMW capabilities identified in CS21R�
This is followed by a related fourth priority: to “explore alternative fleet 
designs, including kinetic and non-kinetic payloads and both manned and 
unmanned systems” capable of operating in the “highly ‘informationalized’ en-
vironment�” Indeed, as we shall see, this is a task to which OPNAV is devoting a 
considerable amount of effort�
The two final tasks of the blue line are organizational examinations of U�S� 
Fleet Forces Command (FFC); Commander, Pacific Fleet; and OPNAV itself� In 
reality, the comprehensiveness of this task has been impacted by the more im-
mediate studies of the western Pacific warship collisions� However, a Second Fleet 
command has been created out of operational elements of FFC�
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The second line of effort (green) is to “achieve high velocity learning at every 
level�”48 Tasks in this line include the incorporation of best practices, expanding 
the use of “learning-centered technologies, simulators, online gaming, analytics 
and other tools,” and “[o]ptimiz[ing] the Navy intellectual enterprise�” Of per-
sonal concern to the CNO is his desire to make Navy wargaming—a learning tool 
for which the service is justifiably famous—more iterative, possibly via the use of 
AI or AI-assisted systems�
The third line of effort (yellow), to “strengthen our Navy team for the future,” 
focuses on improvements in personnel management and leadership, including 
information-technology learning in a Sailor 2025 program�49 It does not discuss 
radical changes to personnel accessions, however� Most of the language of yellow 
has been used before�
The fourth line of effort (purple) is to “expand and strengthen our network of 
partners�”50 But international partnerships (à la CS21R) are but a small piece of 
this effort, while partnerships with other services and agencies (including future 
planning and assessments), private research and development labs, and commer-
cial industry are emphasized�
Design 1.0 concludes with an exhortation for all to adopt a sense of urgency: 
“We will remain the world’s finest Navy only if we all fight each and every minute 
to get better� Our competitors are focused on taking the lead—we must pick up 
the pace and deny them� The margins of victory are razor thin—but decisive!”51 
No one could deny that the CNO sees the U�S� Navy locked in a strategic and 
technological competition with very capable opponents�
The Future Navy
However, by 2017, CNO Richardson, possibly concerned that his Navy continued 
to lack his sense of urgency, issued a supplemental white paper, The Future Navy� 
There have been some contending interpretations of the impact and importance 
of The Future Navy�52 In its defense, it is not designed to impart new direction or 
tasking beyond that already laid out in Design 1.0� Rather, as noted, it is intended 
to ratchet up the intensity of the Navy’s analytical efforts for determining how to 
integrate unmanned systems and other technological developments�
In part, The Future Navy white paper likely was a reaction to several future 
force architecture studies that were performed at the direction of Congress as 
part of defense legislation for fiscal year 2016 (FY16)� Congress (led by the late 
Senator John S� McCain) required three alternative studies of future Navy force 
structure (for the 2020–35 period) to use in checking the Navy’s thirty-year 
shipbuilding plan� The first was by an independent study group made up of Navy 
staff members from OPNAV N8, Fleet Forces Command, and the Naval War Col-
lege, and other naval analytical organization representatives� This report was not 
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staffed by the normal OPNAV process and was not endorsed by a cognizant flag 
officer but simply was forwarded to Congress by the CNO along with the other 
two alternative studies (via the Secretary of the Navy) without endorsement� This 
is the officially unofficial unclassified Navy Project Team report (source number 
five in table 1) that will be described later�53
At a total of nine pages, The Future Navy begins with its conclusions up front 
concerning the FY16 studies: (1) “the nation needs a more powerful Navy, on the 
order of 350 ships, [but] that includes a combination of manned and unmanned 
systems”; (2) “more platforms are necessary but not sufficient� The Navy must 
also incorporate new technologies and new operational concepts�” This is fol-
lowed by a section header intended to get across the sense of urgency: “Faster and 
More Complex� And Faster�”54
The Future Navy does add statements of the value of naval forward presence 
back into the dialogue, pointing out that the “presence of capable platforms 
enables naval forces’ inherent responsiveness” and that “U�S� ships are sovereign 
American territory” and “are self-sufficient when they respond�” However, this is 
couched as enabling the U�S� Navy (and Marine Corps) to be “full partners with 
the Army and Air Force as conflicts unfold,” being “often first on the scene, and 
continu[ing] to preserve U�S� interests in the long term, after the conflict sub-
sides, through continued and routine operations forward�”55
The Future Navy also attempts to clarify that, regardless of whether the opti-
mum fleet size is 355 ships, numbers of ships do matter, because “[t]he number 
of ships in the Navy’s fleet determines where we can be, and being there is a key 
to naval power�”56 In other words, a modern, highly capable warship may have the 
firepower of two less capable vessels, but—unlike the pair—that one ship cannot 
be in two oceans at the same time� Quantity does have a quality that quality alone 
cannot replicate�
The remaining text of The Future Navy concentrates on the need for greater 
force connectivity (even while dispersed), technological advances such as those 
identified in Design 1.0, and unmanned and autonomous systems as both exten-
sions of existing platforms and sources of new capabilities�
One observation that does appear in The Future Navy and not in the other 
sources discussed here is CNO Richardson’s conviction that the defense indus-
trial bases can increase their speed of production to build a larger fleet faster than 
some analysts suggest� “Multiple shipbuilding and aircraft production lines are 
‘hot’—currently producing”—but “[t]hey can do more� � � � Buying aircraft car-
riers at the economically-optimal rate—three or four years apart instead of the 
current five or more years—will not only get us a more powerful fleet faster, but 
also will save considerable money� � � � [Likewise,] an analysis of the industrial 
base shows we could build up to seven additional destroyers in the near term, 
NWC_Spring2019Review.indb   142 2/25/19   10:40 AM
148
Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1
 TA N G R E D I  1 4 3
and up to 14 more small surface combatants�”57 Similar industrial base statistics 
are cited for other ship types, adding to a total of “29 more ships and almost 300 
more aircraft over the next seven years than our current plan�” Therefore, if there 
is the will, the sense of urgency can be answered with action�
Design 2.0
In December 2018, the CNO released A Design for Maintaining Maritime Supe-
riority, Version 2.0� Advance CNO briefings about the document indicated that 
it would note both areas in which progress had been made and where more or 
different types of progress would be needed� It does both, and, more importantly, 
it attempts to balance an ever-increasing sense of urgency against the need for 
“sustainability”—the avoidance of “overextension in the short- and long-term�” 
Overextension is defined as “the pursuit of ends that are beyond the ways and 
means of the force�”58 Although the remarks on overextension appear in a section 
entitled “Our Response” (to the challenges of competition with China and Rus-
sia), it is buttressed by an earlier statement on the security environment: “We can-
not become overwhelmed by the blistering pace� This is a long-term competition� 
We must think in terms of infinite, instead of finite, time frames� Only sustainable 
approaches will prevail�”59
Design 2.0 continues the four color lines of effort; however, “yellow” has been 
changed to “gold�” Their overall substance remains the same, but they are packed 
with much more detail, which is why Design 2.0 is twenty pages, whereas Design 
1.0 was eight� The green line of effort is modified significantly from “achieve high 
velocity learning at every level” to “achieve high velocity outcomes,” which allows 
for inclusion of very specific acquisition goals that did not appear in the previous 
version� These acquisition goals include the following: “Award the Future Frigate 
contract by 2020 to deliver as soon as possible (ASAP)� � � � Develop and field an 
offensive hypersonic weapon by 2025,” and other equally specific items�60 There 
is a bit of irony, however, in having these goals as directives in a CNO-authored 
document since—as the CNO himself admits—DoD reorganizations in the past 
three decades have resulted in very limited CNO control over the acquisition pro-
cess� The program executive officers of Navy acquisition programs largely report 
to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition), 
with the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense critiquing almost every 
step along the way�
The green line also splits Navy analytical efforts into a “concept development 
hub” centered on the East Coast (DEVGRUEAST) and a “capability development 
hub” centered on the West Coast (DEVGRUWEST)� Of the Navy’s advanced edu-
cational institutions, the Naval War College would be a core of the former and the 
Naval Postgraduate School a core of the latter�
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Meanwhile, the revised blue line identifies continuing Navy support to recent 
operational changes: the reestablishment of Commander, Second Fleet in the 
Atlantic, and the implementation of the dynamic force employment concept 
outlined in the NDS to make warship deployments more situational and less 
predictable�61 The gold line adds the establishment of a three-star Director for 
War fighting Development (including education, experimentation, and analysis) 
as N7 in OPNAV� The purple line’s discussion of partnerships specifically delin-
eates supporting NATO and maturing Joint Forces Command–Norfolk “as the 
NATO headquarters for high-end naval operations and warfare in the Atlantic 
theater�”62
Additionally, the CNO attached two letters to Design 2.0 as addenda� The first, 
a “Charge of Command” to commanding officers, clearly reiterates that “[t]he 
responsibility of the Commanding Officer for his or her command is absolute,” 
under all circumstances� The second, “One Navy Team,” emphasizes inclusion 
and diversity within the Navy�
AIR-SEA BATTLE: FROM VISIBLE FOCUS TO UNDER THE RADAR
If broadened beyond its (presumably) exclusive focus on the PLA, the air-sea 
battle concept that consumed so much of the Navy’s intellectual capital (along 
with some of the U�S� Air Force’s) earlier in this decade could make a coherent 
Navy strategic vision by itself� Similarities to the Maritime Strategy are evident� 
The basic concept was to integrate Navy and Air Force capabilities to deal more 
effectively with the toughest potential war-fighting challenge of the day: to defeat 
the PRC’s antiaccess strategy and respond to PRC aggression by conducting op-
erations within Chinese-claimed water and airspace, including targeting military 
forces ashore� In short, it attempted to answer the A2/AD problem�
A detailed argument has been made that the Cold War–era Maritime Strat-
egy was itself a counter-antiaccess strategy, with the U�S� Navy and Marine 
Corps attempting to penetrate the layers of Soviet long-range bombers, cruise- 
missile-firing submarines, and the Soviet naval fleet to breach the Soviet Union’s 
periphery and take pressure away from NATO’s central land front in Europe�63 
Ironically, the title Air-Sea Battle is a reference to the air/land battle doctrine 
that the U�S� Army and Air Force fashioned jointly to blunt a Soviet offensive 
on the central front� Similar to the Maritime Strategy, Air-Sea Battle acquired a 
number of influential academic and policy opponents, whose resistance gave the 
appearance of official doctrine to what, in reality, was a combination of think 
tank publications and an Air-Sea Battle Office assigned the task of coordinating 
USN and USAF programs appropriate to an antiaccess scenario in the East Asian 
maritime and littoral regions�64
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However, by 2015, the air-sea battle concept was devitalized and finally con-
sumed by joint ideology� It was a very logical approach to containing potential 
PRC expansion—so logical that it frightened the U�S� Army (which naturally 
had focused its force structure on “winning the wars we are in”) into believing 
it could lose its appropriate share of the defense budget� Obviously, no one was 
contemplating a land war in East Asia� If counterterrorism would no longer 
be the primary fight for U�S� armed forces, what would be the role of decisive 
land forces? (At the same time, the Marine Corps—which would have a role in 
a maritime campaign—became concerned that its permanent partner, the U�S� 
Navy, might be spurning it for greater integration with the Air Force�) The result 
of bureaucratic and political pressure was that the Navy–Air Force Air-Sea Battle 
Office was converted into a joint staff with the inclusion of Army and Marine 
Corps representatives and outside contractors, under the supervision of the Joint 
Staff, to develop a concept for joint access and maneuver in the global commons 
(JAM-GC)�
JAM-GC is another document that is classified but whose drafters have dis-
cussed it in open-source literature�65 However, it is focused on a problem that is 
different from the air-sea battle concept� Its primary focus—access of military 
forces into and within the global commons of sea, airspace over the oceans, and 
space, all of which are not contested seriously—is not the same challenge as the 
penetration of PRC antiaccess networks, the hardware of which is located largely 
within sovereign PRC territory�66
Thus, the Navy lost control of a concept and narrative that could define its 
de facto strategic focus: deterring potential PRC aggression by holding at risk 
China’s antiaccess networks and its protection of its military capabilities and 
homeland territory, and doing likewise to the potential threats of Russia, North 
Korea, and Iran� Such an effort would require capabilities to defeat the PLA’s 
maritime and conventionally armed rocket forces and to suppress its land-based 
air defenses, hence requiring close Navy / Air Force collaboration� Inclusion of 
decisive ground forces simply would not seem to be a part of this mission—the 
approximation of a Cold War Maritime Strategy without any central-front battle 
on land� Such an independent strategic vision of the Navy’s primary war-fighting 
purpose conflicts with the twenty-first-century version of joint ideology that 
mandates participation (or at least veto power) of every service in every mission�
Given the reluctance of the Obama administration to identify the PRC as a pri-
mary security threat, slipping the premises and operational concepts of Air-Sea 
Battle under the radar in favor of the joint examination of a much more theoreti-
cal threat could be justified� However, the Trump administration’s National Se-
curity Strategy and the NDS provide the justification for its resurrection� There is 
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much in the air-sea battle concept that could shape a naval strategic vision—and, 
because of the Navy’s focus on the Indo-Pacific region, it already has�
PACIFIC FLEET DOMINANCE OVER NAVAL STRATEGY
Although there is no one public document at which to point, the dominance of 
the U�S� Pacific Fleet in defining the Navy’s de facto strategic vision is evident and 
deserves some comment�
The Obama administration’s pivot to the Pacific may have required an adjust-
ment for other U�S� agencies, but the USN pivot occurred prior to the 2006 trans-
formation of U�S� Atlantic Fleet into FFC� The Atlantic’s numbered war-fighting 
command, U�S� Second Fleet, also was disestablished in 2006� This move could 
be viewed as a delayed response to the collapse of the Soviet navy (and Soviet 
Union)� The change also was prompted by the conversion of the joint combatant 
command (COCOM) U�S� Atlantic Command into U�S� Joint Forces Command 
(JFCOM) in 1999, an obvious indication that American decision makers did not 
envision a challenge from the Russian navy (or anyone else) in the Atlantic Ocean 
region�67 FFC retained responsibility for training and readiness for Atlantic-based 
U�S� naval forces but also took a lead position in “providing” naval forces for all 
COCOMs� Additionally, FFC was assigned “command and control of subordinate 
Navy forces and shore activities during the planning and execution of assigned 
service functions in support of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)�”68 This par-
alleled the tasking of JFCOM to support the Joint Staff� (Ironically, JFCOM was 
disestablished in 2011 and its functions were transferred back to the Joint Staff�)
The result of the former Atlantic Fleet taking on staff responsibilities that 
might otherwise be directed by OPNAV was that its focus on naval war planning 
became diluted in comparison with U�S� Pacific Fleet, which, additionally, has a 
present potential threat in an expansionist PRC� Because of this circumstance and 
the force of personality of the commanders, Pacific Fleet increased its influence 
on naval strategy as a whole, with the creation of Air-Sea Battle as but one result� 
Through a series of articles and statements, and with heavy use of the Navy’s 
wargaming and analytical assets, Commander, U�S� Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT), 
Admiral Scott H� Swift, USN (COMPACFLT, 2015–18), became a primary 
spokesman not only in identifying the PLAN as the U�S� Navy’s primary “pacing” 
threat but in elucidating the changes the U�S� Navy would make to meet it�69 It 
became obvious that U�S� Pacific Fleet sought its direction directly from the CNO, 
not through FFC, and, in turn, sought to influence the CNO’s vision�
With the tremendous expansion of the PLAN, it is logical that the Pacific 
region would focus and dominate Navy thinking in the same way that impe-
rial Japan did during the interwar years� However, with the reactivation of U�S� 
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Second Fleet on August 24, 2018, as a subordinate of FFC, it is possible that this 
dominance eventually will be challenged�
AN OFFICIALLY UNOFFICIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY16 required DoD to furnish 
Congress with three studies of the composition of the future U�S� fleet that would 
function as alternatives to the U�S� Navy’s thirty-year shipbuilding plan� As previ-
ously noted, the first of these studies was conducted by a Navy team consisting of 
subject-matter experts from naval analytical organizations without the concur-
rence or endorsement of DON leadership� The other two were conducted by a 
federally funded research and development center, MITRE Corporation, and an 
independent think tank, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analyses (CSBA, 
which previously had devoted a considerable amount of its own research to Air-
Sea Battle)�
The three reports took significantly different approaches to evaluating a future 
fleet� MITRE evaluated requirements against an air-sea approach to defeating 
the antiaccess “reconnaissance strike network” of the PRC� The result was a set 
of specific recommendations concerning new capabilities and platforms� CSBA 
proposed a new concept for naval operations, dividing the fleet between tailored 
regional presence forces and a powerful maneuver force that would surge to a 
region of conflict� Meanwhile, the Navy team centered its recommendations on 
three concepts then under investigation by FFC and Pacific Fleet: distributed 
fleet lethality; EMW; and distributed, agile logistics�70 The visibility and viability 
of these three concepts have been challenged and their relative prominence has 
changed since then because of changes in operational Navy leadership� However, 
it is fair to conclude that they still might be, or eventually will be, aspects of a 
Navy strategic vision�71
The guiding premise of the Navy Project Team was that the Navy needs a 
distributed fleet, which would be created by breaking the current methodology 
of battle-force deployments centered on an aircraft carrier strike group (CSG, 
formerly known as CVBG for “carrier battle group”) consisting of an aircraft car-
rier, destroyers as escorts, and associated logistics ships� In contrast, a distributed 
architecture “would field a widely dispersed force, operating in dozens of areas, 
netted to mass firepower, and supported by robust kill chains and survivable 
logistics�”72 The study views the proposed change from CSG-centered operations 
to a distributed architecture of dispersed forces as a significant change in the 
Navy’s operational strategy (and thereby in its strategic concept or strategic vi-
sion)� The distributed fleet architecture integrates the three mutually supporting 
concepts of distributed fleet lethality; EMW; and distributed, agile logistics�
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Distributed lethality was a concept championed by Vice Admiral Thomas S� 
Rowden, USN, former Commander, Naval Surface Forces, and Naval Surface 
Force, Pacific�73 In its simplest expression, the concept proposed placing offensive 
weapons on platforms that previously had not carried them—particularly the 
littoral combat ship (LCS) and, presumably, amphibious warships and combat 
logistics force ships� Unfortunately, the details for the latter two types of vessels 
were never elucidated prior to Vice Admiral Rowden’s retirement in February 
2018, and choosing a missile for the LCSs took an unexpectedly long time� Vice 
Admiral Rowden tied distributed lethality to his desire to shift the focus of the 
surface navy away from the power-projection (strike against land) mission em-
phasized by Air-Sea Battle and toward sea control against the PLAN fleet�74 With 
the change in surface navy leadership, the status of distributed lethality is now 
unclear�
The EMW concept is described by the Navy team study as promoting “im-
provements in protected, assured datalinks and communications paths � � � to 
support a geographically distributed force � � � [including] unmanned vehicles,” 
as well as providing “soft-kill” of enemy communications and weapons systems�75 
EMW is also an element contained in CS21R and can be considered almost a 
traditional operational concept for the modern U�S� Navy, since it was clearly a 
major component of war-fighting operations in previous conflicts�
The third concept on which the study was built—distributed, agile logistics—
is described as combining “new technologies, more secure shore-based hubs, 
afloat sea-based hubs, afloat sea-bases supporting maneuver forces, and assured 
and resilient logistics command and control networks to sustain distributed fleet 
operations in a contested environment�”76 Unfortunately, there is no program-
matic evidence or public, professional discussions that indicate that distributed, 
agile logistics is a developed or developing concept� Improvements in the Navy’s 
current logistics capabilities remain marginal, incremental, and secondary to 
acquisition of new combat platforms� Since 2017, the distributed, agile logistics 
nomenclature has been used only rarely� However, there has been public discus-
sion of improving capabilities for rearming vertical-launch system missiles at 
sea, a capability in which the U�S� Navy chose not to invest during the unipolar 
moment� There also is a recognition within the Navy that greater planning and 
resources need to be directed toward improving logistics capacity in contested 
environments�
In responding to Congress, the Navy team report argues that shifting to a dis-
tributed fleet requires a much greater number of platforms over the thirty-year 
shipbuilding plan that had proposed building up to 314 vessels (identified as 304 
manned, ten unmanned)� However, the report proposes a vast increase in large, 
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unmanned platforms and a comparatively modest increase in manned ships� 
Proposed numbers are 321 manned, 136 unmanned, for a total of 457 vessels�77
What elements of the Navy Project Team report would constitute new aspects 
of a Navy strategic vision? There are at least two: (1) a move away from a CSG-
centered employment/deployment concept toward a distributed fleet, and (2) 
adoption of unmanned systems as equivalents to ships� Both would change both 
internal and public conceptions of naval operations and force structure� The 355-
ship goal postdates the submission to Congress of the Navy Project Team report�
THE RHETORIC OF 355 SHIPS
Most critics view the Navy as opportunistic in publicizing a goal of 355 battle-
force ships for a future fleet�78 There seemed to be little coincidence in the fact 
that presidential candidate Trump suggested the number of 350 ships as an ap-
propriate size for the American fleet during his campaign� (This was first suggest-
ed on September 7, 2016, in a campaign speech in Philadelphia� In subsequent 
speeches as president, he has adopted the 355 number�)79 At the time, few inside 
the Beltway possibly could conceive of a Trump victory and the Navy was content 
to urge a fleet size of 308, derived from a Navy Force Structure Assessment (FSA) 
conducted in 2014� Once President Trump achieved his unexpected electoral 
victory, the Navy issued a new FSA on December 14, 2016, “justifying” the 355 
number, with the claim that the assessment had been conducted in a thoroughly 
analytical manner� Critical doubts about the thoroughness of the analytics have 
prompted the Navy more recently to conduct a new, 2019 FSA (already under 
way) that “is expected to better detail the types of ships needed�”80
However, as noted in the Navy Project Team report to Congress (source num-
ber five in table 1) and the competing independent reports, the 355 number (de-
pending on how calculated) is actually a lower estimate of the fleet size required 
for a full-scale conflict versus the PRC or Russia, let alone a fleet to handle some 
mix of dispersed 2+2 contingencies� The Navy Project Team called for a total of 
457 ships, although 136 of those would be large, unmanned vessels� The com-
peting reports from CSBA and MITRE called for 382 (arguably 340, by current 
ship-counting rules) and 414 ships, respectively�
It is difficult to find a single independent naval analyst who will argue that 
fewer than 355 ships would be sufficient to ensure victory in a naval campaign 
against the antiaccess network of the PRC� Instead, many will argue that the cur-
rent defense budget cannot support the acquisition and subsequent operations 
and maintenance costs of a 355-ship fleet—making that estimate moot�81 How-
ever, that is a different assessment from whether the current fleet would prevail 
in war or even match peacetime COCOM requirements�
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What, then, does the 355 number really mean? It simply means that the U�S� 
Navy recognizes that in a world of 2+2 threats (as opposed to the assumption of 
global cooperation that laces CS21R), neither the current number of approxi-
mately 285 total ships, nor the thirty-year shipbuilding plan total of 304 ships, 
nor the previous 2014 FSA total of 308 would be enough when the potential op-
ponent (the PRC) simply is building ships—with designed capabilities similar to 
U�S� warships—at a much faster rate� Unlike under previous administrations, the 
Navy leadership now is willing to say so� In previous administrations, the rhetoric 
was that, even if fewer in numbers, U�S� warships were more capable� Yet again, 
rigorous and detailed unclassified/open-source analyses of that claim have not 
been conducted in recent years� And they particularly have not been done in the 
context of planned PLA capabilities (such as indigenous aircraft carrier construc-
tion)� From the perspective of an aspirational goal, and given the lack of detailed 
analyses, 355 ships is as good a number as any other that is greater than today’s�82
The wrinkle, however, is that the acquisition of a 355-ship Navy now has 
become law! The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act includes a provision 
requiring a buildup to 355 ships “as soon as practicable�”83 Of course, the weak-
ness of the statement (“as soon as practicable” could be 2050) and the inability 
to enforce such a provision—even if it were to be placed into a subsequent ap-
propriations act—is well evident to the rest of Congress� As noted, changes in 
House of Representatives leadership following the 2018 midterm elections augur 
fiscal restraints�
HOW WE (MIGHT) FIGHT
Of all the inputs to the algorithm, How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval War-
fighter is the least authoritative but originally was intended to be the most pub-
licly accessible�84 It remained on CNO Greenert’s “to do” list from his first day in 
office but with a low priority, so attending to other events frequently superseded 
work on it, and it was released only several months before his retirement from 
office in September 2015� It was placed on the Navy’s professional reading list 
immediately, but—since it never was endorsed by his successor, Admiral Rich-
ardson, and never was publicized—its impact on public debate can be described, 
charitably, as minimal�
CNO Greenert envisioned a public monograph that would explain the mis-
sions, attributes, capabilities, current operational concepts, and combat history 
(in brief) of the U�S� Navy to new officers and petty officers and the American 
public at large�85 It was meant to highlight the uniqueness of the Navy (with all 
the consequences for public and congressional support that implies)� With a final 
product at 166 pages, it obviously is a more extensive exposition than a standard 
official document� It is not a service strategic vision, per se, but describes its 
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purpose thus: “to articulate in a single volume the elements that determine the 
way we [the Navy] operate, as well as some of the overall concepts that guide 
our methods.” The book proceeds in a logical sequence, describing the shaping 
factors of “the maritime environment, our Service attributes, our history, and 
our current and projected future missions,” in that order.86 This is more akin to 
Samuel Huntington’s strategic concept approach to articulating the Navy’s pur-
pose than the more recent strategic vision approach.
The value of How We Fight as an evocation of the Navy’s strategic vision is 
that it gathers many of the justifying arguments used by the strategic-level docu-
ments into one source. Many of the justifying arguments are captured succinctly 
in tables and, more importantly, are presented in context rather than the isolated 
factoid manner in which they appear in other documents. As an example, the 
“political characteristics of the maritime environment” (which, incidentally, are 
not mentioned at all in the Summary NDS) are listed as the following: 
 • Customary Law of the Sea (LOS) provides rights of ships, delineates high seas 
from territorial seas
 • Warships are the sovereign territory of their nation wherever they operate in  
accordance with LOS
 • Freedom of navigation must be demonstrated against unlawful claims
 • Sea provides a base for power projection, forward presence and crisis  
response
 • Littorals are population, economic and political centers
 • Operating forward, navies have considerable political influence and deterrent  
effects and can provide humanitarian assistance87
Similar concise depictions and tables are provided for physical characteristics, 
economic characteristics, strategic and tactical attributes, basic types of naval 
warfare, future trends with operational effects, and others—all often incorpo-
rated into Navy strategic documents but rarely roped into one corral in mutual 
support. The ties to the other sources also include expanded discussions of all-
domain access and EMW, both introduced in CS21R and, in the case of EMW, 
remaining in subsequent documents. Access and EMW are placed in the context 
of more-traditional naval warfare areas such as air warfare and missile defense, 
expeditionary warfare, strike warfare, surface warfare, and undersea warfare. 
Resilience is discussed as an attribute required of sailors as well as ships, which 
resonates with CNO Richardson, even if he prefers the word toughness.
In bringing the seven sources into a Navy future vision, How We Fight could 
be put in the “background information and detailed explanation” category, 
supporting the more authoritative documents. However, given its content and 
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structure, perhaps the work would be better subtitled “Handbook for Drafting 
Navy Strategic Visions�”88
GLEANING FROM OTHER SOURCES
Other sources from which may be gleaned additional clues about the Navy’s 
strategic vision include the DON Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Financial Report, a 
report that appears to have taken the place of what once was the Annual Report 
of the Secretary of the Navy to Congress�89 The title and format of the report have 
changed throughout different presidential administrations, but it still is meant to 
be a DON report created independently of the Office of the Secretary of Defense� 
To deconflict potential parochial statements by the Secretary of the Navy from 
more-authoritative statements by the Secretary of Defense, the report’s scope has 
been narrowed to focus on the DON budget� However, it still gives the Secretary 
of the Navy some room to discuss priorities and objectives that could shape a 
new naval narrative�
Other sources are the congressional testimonies of the Navy leadership as well 
as speeches and articles, primarily by the Secretary of the Navy and CNO, to a 
wide variety of audiences� As in political stump speeches, frequently repeated 
themes indicate elements of the Navy strategic vision� Such speeches and articles 
might be expected to coincide with the NDS, CS21R, and the other five sources 
we have examined� However, they often are tailored to audiences in a way that 
can identify emerging concepts not elucidated previously� Other naval leaders 
also may expound on emerging concepts�
Many of the speeches can be obtained from official Navy websites (such as 
www�navy�mil)� However, much more can be gleaned from the independent 
professional publication U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings, which routinely pub-
lishes articles by senior naval leaders alongside critiques, alternative ideas, and 
criticisms by other serving naval personnel and civilians in a continuing debate 
on the future of national security� Few ideas make it into naval documents that 
have not been discussed—perhaps debated fiercely—in Proceedings previously�
Authoritative information also can be obtained from reports on the Navy 
prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO)� Even OPNAV staffers rely on CRS and CBO 
reports as quick sources for data�
AND THEN THERE IS THE POM
The longest-running debate concerning DoD is whether it is strategy or budget 
that drives its programs and force structure�90 In theory, national strategy should 
be the driving factor� The military is a tool the nation uses to achieve its security 
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objectives in a dangerous world� Of course, the economic reality is that wants are 
generally unlimited, while resources are limited� In battle, the commander wants 
every possible resource available to defeat the enemy while preserving the lives 
of his or her own troops� History indicates that overwhelming force applied deci-
sively ends most wars quickly� Yet no one can determine fully how much money 
to spend on security since—at least for democratic states—wars can be predicted 
only in the abstract, not their precise occurrence in time and space�
In peacetime, a democratic state may use a security strategy to determine 
the details of its military, but funding these details becomes a political process 
requiring compromise among competing domestic requirements� This is a weak-
ness that democratic states do not necessarily share with authoritarian states 
having command (or mostly command) economies� The situation provokes 
critics to argue that public strategy documents are poor guides for determining 
a democratic state’s defense strategy�91 Better, they argue, to “follow the money” 
in the president’s budget submission and congressional legislation� Others have 
argued that a realistic strategic vision should be designed primarily on the basis 
of resources available, rather than the service’s (or defense agency’s) self-concept 
or aspirations�
For the Navy, CNO Richardson attempted to end the debate by directing in 
October 2016 that the Navy’s POM process be initiated by the Deputy CNO 
(DCNO) for Operations, Plans and Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5) and consist of 
three phases�92 First is the strategy phase, led by OPNAV N3/N5, with other 
OPNAV staff codes participating, followed by a requirements program-integration 
phase, led by the DCNO for Warfare Systems (OPNAV N9), and a resource-
integration phase, led by the DCNO for Integration of Capabilities and Resources 
(OPNAV N8)� At the CNO’s direction, “under this new process, POM-19 and 
subsequent POMs [began] three months earlier than historical POMs � � � [with] 
the end product of the POM development process [being] a strategy-based, fis-
cally balanced, and defendable Navy Program for submission to OSD [Office of 
the Secretary of Defense], which appropriately implements OSD fiscal and pro-
gramming guidance, addresses [Secretary of the Navy] and CNO priorities, and 
achieves the best balance of strategic guidance as provided in the CNOG�”93 To 
achieve this result, the CNO also directed an OPNAV staff realignment�
The significance of the CNO’s directive is that it again reinforces the theoreti-
cal role of strategy as the determinant of program requirements and force struc-
ture� In turn, this also should reestablish the importance of a Navy strategic vision 
in guiding future Navy decision-making� Of course, thorough implementation of 
the renewed process under the congressional mandate of a 25 percent headquar-
ters staff reduction throughout DoD may prove challenging�
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A MURKY MIX
If we metaphorically sum up the algorithm, what can we determine concerning 
the U�S� Navy’s collective vision of its appropriate future?
Although the Navy always has had a reputation for independent views that 
make the staunchest joint ideologues livid, it is clear that CNO Richardson and 
the Navy leadership are committed to a vision that conforms to the 2018 NDS and 
its joint requirements� The problem they face is that the NDS (at least in its Sum-
mary) betrays a land-centric approach to understanding warfare that is hard to 
translate into a naval strategy� It is not only that the terminology does not fit naval 
campaigns; it is that, although there can be a tactically defensive naval posture, 
there is no such thing as a strategic defensive posture in naval warfare except not 
to fight at sea� Unlike in a land campaign, there are no physical spaces to defend, 
only forces� Thus, wartime forces at sea exist only to attack; there are no contact 
or blunt phases in naval warfare�
This problem is magnified by the fact that the great-power competition, which 
serves as the premise of the NDS, is not inherently a land-centric competition� If 
conflict were to break out today or in the immediate future with the potentially 
toughest opponent, the PLA, the fighting would not take place on the land� It 
primarily would be (for the United States) a counter-antiaccess campaign in the 
maritime, air, space, and electronic spectrum / cyber dimensions�94 No planner 
has suggested that it is in the interest of the United States and its allies to fight a 
land war in East Asia� Victory in a counter-antiaccess campaign would require 
strikes on military targets in mainland China (C4ISR nodes, missile TELs, air-
fields, command structures, etc�)� However, most of these strikes would not come 
from ground forces� Such a campaign simply does not fit a land-centric approach�
In the case of Russia, there could be ground combat, but—given the methods 
the Putin regime has demonstrated—it likely would be small-unit combat in a 
hybrid/gray-zone scenario� However, the likely locations of such scenarios—the 
High North, the Baltic region, the Black Sea—largely would require a naval and 
air response by U�S� forces, at least in the initial phases�
The other two potential opponents, Iran and North Korea, have unique char-
acteristics but would not present the regional-to-global character of great-power 
war� However, in both cases, the majority of U�S� forces would be located outside 
the contested territory and would require an initial maritime response to reenter�
Thus, it is very difficult to craft a naval strategic vision to satisfy the challenges 
of the great-power competition world while remaining within the confines of 
the public Summary NDS� A great-power-competition strategy for naval forces 
would be more similar to the Cold War Maritime Strategy than any recent con-
ception� However, a Maritime Strategy approach to describing the Navy’s vision 
rams into joint ideology�
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The NDS does discuss the need for allies and coalitions� CS21R is premised 
completely on such cooperation� However, the Trump administration does not 
appear willing to make the sacrifices necessary to maintain the tight alliance 
structure on which America’s Cold War posture was predicated and that is the 
overarching assumption of CS21R� If preserving the alliance structure is no lon-
ger a priority, much of the front section of CS21R cannot be a rallying point for 
the Navy’s public image�
There is nothing in the 2016 Design 1.0 that contradicts the 2018 Summary 
NDS� However, much of Design 1.0 is concerned with Navy organization, leader-
ship, and training—all subjects that are of great importance to the CNO and that 
have an impact on operations, but that are not involved primarily in defining the 
service’s force structure or employment� The sections that discuss force structure 
assessments have stimulated debate and resulted in considerable internal discus-
sion concerning gaps in naval capabilities and employment of unmanned and 
potentially autonomous platforms, but it was not the CNO’s intent to define an 
answer to such questions� Design 1.0 does emphasize the complexity of contested 
environments, particularly the need for the Navy to examine how it would op-
erate in severe electromagnetic warfare conditions that would interfere with its 
objective to conduct dispersed but networked operations� This is a problem that 
OPNAV and the fleet commands previously had a tendency to ignore, although 
the Naval Postgraduate School has been examining the need for “network op-
tional” operations for some time�95
CNO Richardson’s The Future Navy also is in sync with the NDS and willing 
to name names concerning the threats from the PRC, Russia, North Korea, and 
Iran� The paper’s emphasis is new technology development, and in its own way 
it casts doubt on the 355-ship number as a defining metric by maintaining that a 
“355-ship Navy using current technology is insufficient for maintaining maritime 
superiority�”96 Rapid introduction of technology is the CNO’s measure of success�
There is a significant contradiction within the CNO’s white paper series, how-
ever� This contradiction begins to show itself in Design 2.0, in the remarks on 
sustainability and the call to avoid being overwhelmed by the blistering pace� It 
is the CNO who is directing—throughout the three papers—the sense of urgency 
in response to the security environment� One could surmise that, in adding the 
caution in his second version of the Design, he is reacting to analyses of the recent 
Seventh Fleet ship collisions that blamed them, in part, on a sense of operational 
urgency that required the crews to skip necessary training and certification� 
Indeed, Design 2.0 does direct the “execution of the Comprehensive Review and 
Strategic Readiness Review program” resulting from the accident investigations�97 
Yet the sense of great urgency remains at the forefront, and there are no details on 
how to achieve a balance between that and sustainability�
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Moreover, there seems to be no final, identifiable goal� In saying that “[w]e 
must think in terms of infinite, instead of finite, time frames,” the CNO is giving 
the Navy an endless quest�98 How can one maintain morale and conviction in the 
face of a perilous and absolutely infinite voyage? Even in the high-tempo/high-
pressure competition of the Cold War, American leaders held to the expectation 
that someday the internal contradictions in Communism would bring about its 
own collapse� There was, therefore, light at the far end of the tunnel, a victory 
(through deterrence) for which to strive� Not only does Design 2.0 not define an 
end state, but it seems to imply that—except through a major war—there is no 
possible end to the urgent, relax-not-a-minute military competition� It is hard to 
establish a pace or balance if there is nothing but an endless loop ahead� And it is 
hard to construct a persuasive public Navy strategic vision if endless competition 
is the only goal—a reason why the Design series, in itself, cannot fill the role of 
Navy vision�
The air-sea battle concept certainly would support the objectives of the NDS, 
but it only defines one particular Navy mission, in one particular theater� On 
the other hand, it does define a victory� Unfortunately, Air-Sea Battle effectively 
has been declared “not joint enough�” The whole premise of its joint successor, 
JAM-GC—that the struggle is over access to the global commons—is, in contrast, 
anemic�
The various force-structure assessments and the 355-ship number together do 
not constitute a strategic vision� Meanwhile, How We Fight is obviously too long 
for executive reading and does not have the narrative arc that makes modern 
nonfiction popular�
Therefore, the overall conclusions are as follows:
 1� The Navy leadership recognizes that CS21R does not fit the Trump 
administration’s needs for a Navy strategic vision� Some sections could 
be recycled, but the overall package has been overtaken by events�
 2� The current Navy leadership does want to have a Navy vision that fully 
supports the NDS focus on great-power competition, but the NDS (at 
least in its Summary) is not written in a way that the Navy can parrot� 
The tenor of the NDS seems to be that because strategy should be 
joint, there is no distinction in the strategic approaches to land and 
naval combat� (We will put traditional airpower doctrine aside for this 
discussion�)
 3� At present, the Navy leadership still is following Secretary of Defense 
Mattis’s concerns about the negative effects of extensive public 
discussion�99 A publicly articulated strategic vision is not a current 
priority�
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 4� Design 1.0 and its subsequent statements do give the Navy internal 
directions and tasks that conform to the NDS; however, they are 
not written in a way that would provide for a public strategic vision 
that captures the Navy’s current and future missions (and resulting 
structure)� Both Design 1.0 and 2.0 contain one-paragraph summaries of 
the Navy mission, but they are too brief to present a full image� Perhaps 
the most important inclusion from the CNO’s Design in a public vision 
would be his sense of urgency in experimentation and technology 
adoption�
 5� Nevertheless, a public, unclassified, strategic vision could enhance 
public and congressional support for the U�S� Navy� The correlation 
between a compelling public vision and enhanced support has been 
demonstrated historically�
 6� On the other hand, the internal programs and operations of the U�S� 
Navy do not need a publicly articulated and elegantly crafted vision to 
conform to the direction of the NDS. Highlighted by the pivot to the 
Pacific, the Navy largely had conformed to Secretary of Defense Mattis’s 
NDS even before the 2018 NDS existed�
 7� A Navy strategic vision that focuses on great-power competition as it 
exists and that conforms to the objective, although not the strategic, 
philosophy of the NDS would look more like Air-Sea Battle (with an 
appropriate addition of U�S� Marine Corps capabilities) than any other 
strategic concept currently extant� However, joint ideology and U�S� 
ground forces have defeated Air-Sea Battle. The air-sea battle concept 
had the misfortune of coming into prominence when the presidential 
administration did not want the word China spoken except in the 
context of that country inevitably being a “responsible stakeholder�” This 
prohibition does not apply, necessarily, to the current administration�
 8� The 355 number is a program and budgetary marker that, in itself, has 
no dependence on—nor does it provide a basis for—a Navy strategic 
vision�
 9� The panoply of Navy and independent force-structure assessments are 
useful for exposing appropriate debates—such as how much of the fleet 
should be unmanned, and why� The most-detailed analyses have been 
done appropriately on the basis of an Air-Sea Battle approach, even if it 
is not mentioned� Yet it is difficult to explain why the fleet should have 
355 ships instead of 354 or 353 or 350� The consensus is that the current 
number of approximately 285 is too low for war fighting and, possibly, 
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for great-power deterrence� What the actual number should be has not 
been assessed thus far to conclusive and persuasive rigor� What the new 
Congress will fund may be another number entirely�
 10� To provide the number of platforms necessary in a conflict against a 
great power, the Navy intends to pursue aggressively the development 
of unmanned surface and undersea vessels (as well as aircraft), some of 
which will be self-deploying and comparable in size to manned vessels� 
This could help operationalize the distributed fleet and distributed 
lethality concepts� The assumption, however, is that unmanned vessels 
can be acquired and operated more cheaply than manned platforms�
 11� A summarized How We Fight could provide the keel for an updated 
public Navy strategic vision, with appropriate NDS themes and Design 
1.0 and 2.0 concerns added� In its current state, however, How We Fight 
is an unread textbook�
What should a Navy strategic vision appropriate to the objectives of the NDS, 
the CNO’s directions, and Trump administration objectives overall say? Sum-
ming the algorithm and adding other clues, a concise recommended summary 
follows�
In the peacetime, military-technological competition with great powers, the 
U�S� Navy will experiment continually with new technologies and concepts so 
as to remain ahead of competitors and profit from the ideas of competitors, 
when appropriate� New technologies and concepts will be introduced to the fleet 
when matured and engineered for sea� These will include substantial numbers of 
unmanned, partly manned, and optionally manned vessels and aircraft, which—
combined with EMW capabilities—could enable a more widely distributed 
fleet� These experiments and developments—necessary for achieving victory in 
future conflicts—will take priority over the peacetime deployment and forward- 
presence requirements of the COCOMs� Additionally, a dynamic force- 
employment model will modify the previous predictability and length of forward 
deployments, allowing for greater experimentation�
The U�S� Navy will be sized and structured to support and win a conventional-
weapons joint campaign that likely will be primarily maritime (which includes 
air over sea, space, and electromagnetic/cyber warfare) in character against the 
PRC, as led by the CCP, or Russia, as led by President Putin� Being able to win 
such a conflict will provide the most effective deterrence against its occurrence� 
It is assumed that all other missions can be accomplished successfully by tailoring 
this force structure in scope to other assigned tasks�
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 1� The term strategic vision is used instead of 
strategy (as in the Maritime Strategy) because 
of the controversy over which Department 
of Defense component “does strategy�” Under 
joint ideology, the services man, train, and 
equip the forces, but do not create strategy, 
which is the exclusive purview of the combat-
ant commanders� While this may seem to be 
merely an argument over terminology, and 
despite the fact that the services and defense 
analysts routinely refer to service plans as 
“strategy,” use of the term strategic vision side-
steps that whole debate� Many of the plans 
are indeed visions that do not survive contact 
with the reality of the budget�
 2� The term strategy concept is from Samuel 
P� Huntington, “National Policy and the 
Transoceanic Navy,” U�S� Naval Institute 
Proceedings 80/5/615 (May 1954), pp� 483–93� 
From the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s, the 
U�S� Navy was enamored of using strategic 
concept to describe its definition of purpose, 
but it largely has been dropped in the last two 
decades� (For example, after the Cold War, 
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ 
Strategic Concepts Branch was renamed 
the Strategy and Concepts Branch�) This 
is another reason this article uses the term 
strategic vision�
With these capabilities, the U�S� Navy will carry out its enduring function 
as the guarantor of access to the global commons and to overseas markets and 
materials on which America’s economic prosperity depends� Access to the global 
commons also ensures the ability of the joint force to transit foreign areas of 
crises and conflict when called on� The U�S� Navy also will provide for defense of 
the U�S� homeland by maintaining the most survivable leg of the strategic nuclear 
triad, and the Navy can function as the forward edge of U�S� missile defense when 
necessary�
A perusal of U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings would indicate that the Navy has 
the narrative and speechwriting talent to write an updated public strategic vision 
quite well�
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 3� A bureaucratic reason that CS21R remains in 
the public vision is that it is a DON docu-
ment signed by the Secretary of the Navy as 
well as the heads of the three sea (not only 
naval) services: the U�S� Navy, U�S� Marine 
Corps, and U�S� Coast Guard (the latter is 
not actually part of the DON)� To negotiate 
a document approved and signed by all four 
individuals (thus representing all their equi-
ties) is a prodigious and lengthy effort�
 4� Like all endeavors done well by military offi-
cers and defense civil servants, the drafting of 
naval strategic visions takes time and energy 
that spill over between administrations, and 
the process does not necessarily follow the 
drafting of higher-level guidance (such as the 
National Security Strategy) in tight, sequential 
order� In the case of CS21R, drafting of the 
document—which involved Navy and Marine 
Corps staff officers, scholars at the Naval 
War College and Naval Postgraduate School, 
and other members of the naval analytical 
enterprise—began in the waning months 
of the George W� Bush administration, 
even though it eventually was issued under 
President Obama� For an assessment of the 
drafting of CS21R, see Peter Swartz, William 
Rosenau, and Hannah Kates, The Origins and 
Development of A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower (2015) (Arlington, 
VA: CNA, September 2017), available at www 
�cna�org/�
 5� An underlying theme found in Simon Reich 
and Peter Dombrowski, The End of Grand 
Strategy: US Maritime Operations in the 
Twenty-First Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Univ� Press, 2017)� The book, however, does 
not necessarily endorse the Trump adminis-
tration’s foreign policy perspective�
 6� There is an existing official USN web page 
that holds links to so-called strategic docu-
ments ranging from the Summary NDS and 
2018 Nuclear Posture Review to the U.S. Coast 
Guard Arctic Strategy and DON Innovation 
Vision. See “Strategic Documents,” Navy�mil� 
However, this is a nonhierarchical mixture, 
and there is no attempt to explain how they 
relate to each other or whether they are direc-
tive or aspirational� The site also includes 
links to Secretary of the Navy and CNO 
speeches and transcripts�
 7� The full name of the thirty-year plan is 
the Report to Congress on the Annual 
Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval 
Vessels� Officially overlaid on all these is joint  
doctrine—but a good portion of joint doc-
trine is so banal or boilerplate that the ser-
vices often can ignore it with some impunity�
 8� The POM is the formal document each 
DoD entity prepares for submission to the 
Secretary of Defense outlining its spending 
on new systems acquisition, operations and 
maintenance, personnel, and other costs� 
All programs of record must be included in 
the POM to ensure sustained funding� The 
internal DoD approval process, now referred 
to as PPBE (planning, programming, budget-
ing, and execution), is complex, with multiple 
(and sometimes redundant) phases� Not all 
POM submissions necessarily make it into 
the defense budget the Secretary of Defense 
presents to the president, or that the president 
transmits to Congress, or that Congress  
approves�
 9� On the most recent title changes, see Swartz, 
Rosenau, and Kates, Origins and Develop-
ment, p� 88�
 10� Stuart B� Munsch [RAdm�, USN], unclassified 
phone conversation with author, October 2, 
2018�
 11� Jeff Schogol, “Rep� Adam Smith: Trump’s 
Military Spending and Planning Needs a 
Reality Check,” Task & Purpose, February 
19, 2018, taskandpurpose�com/; Katie Bo 
Williams, “What the Midterms Mean for 
National Security,” Defense One, November 7, 
2018, www�defenseone�com/�
 12� Carlisle A� H� Trost [Adm�, USN, CNO], 
“Looking beyond the Maritime Strategy,” U�S� 
Naval Institute Proceedings 113/1/1,007 (Janu-
ary 1987), p� 15�
 13� Swartz, Rosenau, and Kates suggest that the 
OPNAV programming organizations (codes) 
do not always see the need for a formal strate-
gic vision document, since they “have tended 
to believe that they have more than enough 
other guidance to get their jobs done without 
an additional product � � � to accommodate in 
the POM process” (p� 102)� My own view is 
that the absence of a formal document allows 
the programmers and budgeteers to cherry-
pick preferred guidance statements from the 
CNO and Secretary of the Navy documents 
and speeches� On this point, a good discus-
sion can be found in Irv Blickstein et al�, Navy 
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Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Ex-
ecution: A Reference Guide for Senior Leaders, 
Managers, and Action Officers (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2016), p� 10�
 14� Joe Gould, “Wittman to US Navy: ‘You Have 
to Say 355 Is the Number,’” Defense News, 
April 11, 2018, www�defensenews�com/�
 15� Jason Schwartz, “‘We Are Fighting for Infor-
mation about War’: Pentagon Curbs Media 
Access,” Politico, July 26, 2018, www�politico 
�com/�
 16� The reference to the CCP is deliberate, be-
cause the People’s Liberation Army is pledged 
to the party, not to the state of China�
 17� Kevin Baron, “Pentagon Began Clampdown 
on Senior Leader’s Public Speaking Months 
Ago,” Defense One, November 14, 2018, www 
�defenseone�com/�
 18� Donald J� Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “I  
am certain that, at some time in the future,  
President Xi and I, together with President 
Putin of Russia, will start talking about a 
meaningful halt to what has become a  
major and uncontrollable Arms Race� The 
U�S� spent 716 Billion Dollars this year� 
Crazy!,” Twitter, December 3, 2018,  
twitter�com/realdonaldtrump/status/ 
1069584730880974849�
 19� An excellent example of a discussion by an 
influential academic is John J� Mearsheimer, 
“A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy 
and Deterrence in Europe,” International 
Security 11, no� 2 (Fall 1986), pp� 3–57, avail-
able at mearsheimer�uchicago�edu/� There was 
also concern that implementing the Maritime 
Strategy might spark a nuclear exchange� See 
Barry R� Posen, “Inadvertent Nuclear War? 
Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank,” 
International Security 7, no� 2 (Fall 1982), pp� 
28–54, available at www�jstor�org/� A detailed 
assessment that is supportive of the Maritime 
Strategy is found in Norman Friedman, The 
U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 1988)� The best source 
for the briefings and documents that built 
the Maritime Strategy is John B� Hattendorf 
and Peter M� Swartz, eds�, U.S. Naval Strategy 
in the 1980s: Selected Documents, Newport 
Paper 33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College 
Press, December 2008), available at  
digital-commons�usnwc�edu/�
 20� William Schneider Jr�, “Financing the Reagan 
600-Ship Naval Modernization Program, 
1981–89” (statement at the “Options and 
Considerations for Achieving a 355-Ship 
Navy from Former Reagan Administra-
tion Officials” hearing before the Seapower 
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, July 18, 2017), pp� 1–4, available 
at www�hudson�org/�
 21� John T� Hanley Jr�, “Creating the 1980s Mari-
time Strategy and Implications for Today,” 
Naval War College Review 67, no� 2 (Spring 
2014), p� 22, available at digital-commons 
�usnwc�edu/�
 22� In addition to articles in such journals as 
International Security, the Soviets undoubt-
edly were aware of some of the results of the 
Navy-sponsored Global War Game series 
(conducted at the Naval War College) in 
which both DoD civilian appointees and indi-
vidual academic experts participated as game 
decision makers� Elements of the Maritime 
Strategy were gamed at this forum even before 
its public release� For details, see Bud Hay and 
Bob Gile, Global War Game: The First Five 
Years, Newport Paper 4 (Newport, RI: Naval 
War College Press, June 1993)�
 23� In a special issue of Journal of Strategic Studies 
edited by Lyle J� Goldstein, John B� Hatten-
dorf, and Yuri M� Zhukov, two Russian schol-
ars maintain that the Kremlin did not see a 
credible threat to their SSBN bastions but 
were concerned about Tomahawk land-attack 
cruise missiles carried on U�S� SSNs, which 
could be used to attack military installations 
ashore from positions in the northern seas� 
See Vladimir Kuzin and Sergei Chernyavskii, 
“Russian Reactions to Reagan’s ‘Maritime 
Strategy,’” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no� 2 
(April 2005), pp� 429–39� In a review of John 
Lehman’s Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold 
War at Sea (New York: W� W� Norton, 2018), 
Dov Zakheim insists that Soviet leaders did 
take notice of the U�S� naval threat to their  
SSBNs and that “[i]t is no exaggeration to 
assert, as Lehman does, that the Navy played 
a vital role in bringing the Cold War to a 
successful conclusion in America’s favor�” Dov 
S� Zakheim, “Lehman’s Maritime Triumph,” 
review of Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold 
War at Sea, by John Lehman, Naval War 
College Review 71, no� 4 (Autumn 2018), pp� 
141–46�
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 24� An interesting recent commentary on this 
from a reputable source is found in George 
Friedman, “A Speech by Mike Pence and 
the Sum of All Chinese Fears,” Geopolitical 
Futures subscription e-mail list, November 
9, 2018� Friedman contrasts U�S� media 
disinterest in a speech that was given by the 
vice president and whose themes had been 
expressed previously by subordinate officials 
with Chinese parsing of it and resultant 
perceptions of it heralding increased tensions� 
In reference to CS21R, Swartz, Rosenau, and 
Kates maintain that by failing to engage aca-
demic “carpers” the Navy lost opportunities 
to reinforce its message publicly (Origins and 
Development, p� 109)�
 25� Huntington, “National Policy and the Trans-
oceanic Navy,” p� 483� Also cited in Swartz, 
Rosenau, and Kates, Origins and Develop-
ment, p� 2�
 26� The final version of NWP 1 is available at 
www�history�navy�mil/� During the shift of 
responsibility for drafting naval doctrine 
from OPNAV to the short-lived Naval Doc-
trine Command in the early 1990s, NWP 1 
fell through the cracks� There was a stillborn 
effort within OPNAV to revive it in 1998–99�
 27� John Grady, “Congress Presses SECDEF 
Mattis on US Navy Path to 355 Ships,” USNI 
News, June 13, 2017, news�usni�org/�
 28� David B� Larter, “Will Looming Budget Cuts 
Bust Up the Navy’s Plans for an Enormous 
Fleet?,” Defense News, November 16, 2018, 
www�defensenews�com/�
 29� U�S� Defense Dept�, Summary of the 2018 
National Defense Strategy of the United States 
of America [hereafter Summary NDS] (Wash-
ington, DC: 2018), p� 1�
 30� Individual Navy personnel played surprising 
roles� For example, a nuclear submarine com-
mander served as the commanding officer of 
the provincial reconstruction team in Khost, 
Afghanistan�
 31� Although the 2+2 shorthand is not used in 
the Summary (despite the military’s proclivity 
for acronyms and numerical descriptions), 
those four states are identified clearly as the 
threats� U�S� Defense Dept�, Summary NDS,  
p� 4�
 32� Ibid�, p� 7�
 33� Wayne P� Hughes Jr� [Capt�, USN (Ret�)], Fleet 
Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd ed� (An-
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), pp� 
40–44�
 34� U�S� Defense Dept�, Summary NDS, p� 6�
 35� However, Secretary of Defense Mattis has 
made some independent statements concern-
ing the need for U�S� strategy to have a more 
maritime focus� See, for example, Mike Gal-
lagher, “How to Save the U�S� Navy,” National 
Interest, October 15, 2018, nationalinterest 
�org/� Gallagher quotes Mattis as follows: 
“I believe we are moving toward a more 
maritime strategy in terms of our military 
strategy to defend the country”; quoted from 
Office of Sen� Roger Wicker, “Wicker Asks 
Mattis about Shipbuilding Schedule, Russia 
Threat,” press release, April 26, 2018, www 
�wicker�senate�gov/� In the press release, the 
Secretary of Defense continues, “It is the 
nature of our time, so I would be support-
ive if the Senate found a way to increase the 
shipbuilding budget�”
 36� U�S� Defense Dept�, Summary NDS, pp� 8–10�
 37� It does seem strange, however, that this state-
ment appears in the midst of a section on 
alliances rather than threats�
 38� The United States has never ratified the Law 
of the Sea Treaty officially� But it has adhered 
to and demonstrated support of its provi-
sions, and therefore still can be considered a 
participant in UNCLOS�
 39� U�S� Navy Dept�, A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, 
Ready (Washington, DC: March 2015), pp� 
19–26�
 40� The reconnaissance strike network construct 
was popularized in the publications of the 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary As-
sessments� For a study in antiaccess and its re-
lated terminologies from all aspects, see Sam 
J� Tangredi, Anti-access Warfare: Countering 
A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2013)�
 41� John M� Richardson [Adm�, USN, CNO], A 
Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, 
Version 1.0, Navy�mil, January 2016, p� 1�
 42� Ibid�, p� 4�
 43� Ibid�, pp� 1, 4�
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 44� John M� Richardson [Adm�, USN, CNO], 
“Deconstructing A2/AD,” National Interest, 
October 3, 2016, nationalinterest�org/�
 45� Richardson, A Design for Maintaining Mari-
time Superiority, 1.0, p� 5�
 46� Ibid�, p� 6�
 47� Several fellows of the Brookings Institute, an 
influential and long-standing Washington 
think tank, have suggested that the Navy will 
find it unaffordable to fund both the replace-
ment SSBNs and a 355-ship “conventional” 
fleet� John Grady, “Panel: Navy May Have to 
Choose between New Ballistic Missile Subs 
or 355 Ship Fleet,” USNI News, November 23, 
2018, news�usni�org/�
 48� Richardson, A Design for Maintaining Mari-
time Superiority, 1.0, p� 7�
 49� Ibid�
 50� Ibid�, p� 8�
 51� Ibid� Emphasis in original�
 52� See Peter Dombrowski, “One Cheer Only,” 
and Sam J� Tangredi, “A Powerful Helm Or-
der,” both in U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings 
143/7/1,373 (July 2017), pp� 62–64�
 53� The CNO also convened his own advisory 
panel (October 2016–March 2017) to analyze 
the three reports, during which many of the 
themes that later appeared in The Future 
Navy were discussed�
 54� John M� Richardson [Adm�, USN, CNO], The 
Future Navy, Navy�mil, May 17, 2017, p� 1�
 55� Ibid�, p� 3�
 56� Ibid�, p� 4�
 57� Ibid�, p� 7�
 58� John M� Richardson [Adm�, USN, CNO], A 
Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, 
Version 2.0, Navy�mil, December 2018�
 59� Ibid�, p� 4�
 60� Ibid�, p� 9�
 61� Ibid�, p� 8�
 62� Ibid�, p� 15�
 63� A point used to illuminate the origins and 
outlines of the concept of antiaccess warfare 
in Tangredi, Anti-access Warfare� See espe-
cially pp� 36–40�
 64� An example of academic opposition is Amitai 
Etzioni, “Who Authorized Preparations for 
War with China?,” Yale Journal of Internation-
al Affairs 8, no� 2 (Summer 2013), pp� 37–51, 
available at yalejournal�org/�
 65� Michael E� Hutchins et al�, “Joint Concept for 
Access and Maneuver in the Global Com-
mons: A New Joint Operational Concept,” 
Joint Force Quarterly, no� 84 (January 2017), 
pp� 134–39� JAM-GC is also one of the most 
cringe-worthy acronyms ever to come out of 
DoD�
 66� For a discussion on aspects of and threats 
to the maritime commons—which includes 
the airspace over the water and, arguably, 
aspects of space and cyberspace—see Sam 
J� Tangredi, “The Maritime Commons and 
Military Power,” in Conflict and Cooperation 
in the Global Commons: A Comprehensive 
Approach for International Security, ed� Scott 
Jasper (Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ� 
Press, 2012), pp� 71–88�
 67� Properly, the term COCOM refers to the 
individual in command of a U�S� unified com-
batant command (UCC), not the organization 
itself� However, COCOM has become stan-
dard usage inside and outside the Pentagon 
to refer to an entire UCC organization, not 
only its commanding officer� This discussion 
continues that bad habit�
 68� “U�S� Fleet Forces Command Mission,” U.S. 
Fleet Forces Command, www�public�navy�mil/� 
My own view is that many of these func-
tions should be returned to the OPNAV staff, 
under tighter control of the CNO�
 69� For example, Scott H� Swift [Adm�, USN], 
“A Fleet Must Be Able to Fight,” U�S� Naval 
Institute Proceedings 144/5/1,383 (May 2018), 
pp� 28–33, available at www�usni�org/�
 70� U�S� Navy Dept�, Report to Congress: Alterna-
tive Future Fleet Platform Architecture Study 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations [N8], November 2016), pp� 
3, 11–13�
 71� For example, one commentator proclaimed 
distributed lethality as the surface navy’s 
“strategy for the Trump era�” See Loren 
Thompson, “‘Distributed Lethality’ Is the 
Surface Navy’s Strategy for the Trump Era,” 
Forbes, January 10, 2017, www�forbes�com/�
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 72. U.S. Navy Dept., Report to Congress, p. 3.
 73. Thomas S. Rowden [VAdm., USN], Peter 
A. Gumataotao [RAdm., USN], and Peter J. 
Fanta [RAdm., USN], “‘Distributed Lethality,’” 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 141/1/1,343 
(January 2015), pp. 18–23, available at www 
.usni.org/.
 74. Thomas S. Rowden [VAdm., USN], “Sur-
face Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control” 
(presented at the 29th Annual Surface Navy 
Association Symposium, Arlington, VA, Janu-
ary 9, 2017), available at www.public.navy 
.mil/. 
 75. U.S. Navy Dept., Report to Congress, p. 12.
 76. Ibid., p. 13.
 77. The question of what size an unmanned 
system must reach to be designated a “ship” 
remains unresolved.
 78. Steven Stashwick, “The U.S. Navy’s New 
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Slowly,” The Diplomat, February 16, 2018, 
thediplomat.com/.
 79. Amy Sherman, “Trump Touts 350-Ship 
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Politifact, May 25, 2018, www.politifact.com/.
 80. Joe Gould, “US Navy to Launch Force Struc-
ture Assessment,” Defense News, September 5, 
2018, www.defensenews.com/.
 81. The Congressional Budget Office estimates 
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an increase to 355 ships. “CBO: 355-Ship 
Fleet Will Cost $6.7 Billion More per Year 
Than Current Navy Budget Request,” USNI 
News, March 15, 2018, news.usni.org/.
 82. In fact, there are indications that the 2019 
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of ships. Vice Adm. William R. Merz, USN, 
Deputy CNO for Warfare Systems (OPNAV 
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Secretary Mattis’s National Defense Strategy, 
that will give us any indication we’ll be com-
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Plan for 355-Ship Fleet,” USNI News, Novem-
ber 28, 2018, news.usni.org/.
 83. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1025 (a), 
131 Stat. 1283, 1549 (2017); David B. Larter, 
“Trump Just Made a 355-Ship Navy National 
Policy,” Defense News, December 13, 2017, 
www.defensenews.com/.
 84. U.S. Navy Dept., How We Fight: Handbook for 
the Naval Warfighter (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2015), available at news.usni.org/.
 85. In their discussion of the drafting of CS21R, 
Swartz, Rosenau, and Kates suggest that there 
were some differences among the drafters 
regarding the intended audience. The authors 
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document that was generally authoritative for 
any audience: The naval officer corps, Capitol 
Hill, [Office of the Secretary of Defense], 
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 86. U.S. Navy Dept., How We Fight, p. 1. Admiral 
Greenert specified this order himself, and it 
has a nuclear-power training program–type 
logic: mathematics background, scientific 
principles, systems design, and then engineer-
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 87. Ibid., p. 32.
 88. There is an excellent brief that details 
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Stubbs, “Personal Observations on Creating 
Navy Strategy” (presentation to the Naval 
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(N50), OPNAV, the presentation is unofficial. 
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 89. U.S. Navy Dept., Accountability to America: 
Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2017 An-
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October 18, 2016, available at www.public 
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 95. See Todd Wyatt and Donald Brutzman, “Net-
work Optional Warfare,” NPS Wiki, May 3, 
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Institute Proceedings 144/2/1,380 (February 
2018), pp. 28–33, available at www.usni.org/.
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
 As we have noted in previous articles in this series, one of the primary mis-sions of the CNO Professional Reading Program is to encourage sailors at 
all levels to develop the habit of reading books of consequence� In this article, we 
would like to share with you some short excerpts (somewhat paraphrased) from 
writings by influential leaders about how much reading contributed to their lives 
and successes� Perhaps one or more will inspire you to take the time to make 
reading a part of your professional development�
• “When I want to discover something, I begin by reading up everything that 
has been done along that line in the past—that’s what all the books in the 
library are for� I see what has been accomplished at great labor and expense 
in the past� I gather the data of many thousands more� The three essentials to 
achieve anything worthwhile are, first, hard work; second, stick-to-it-iveness; 
third, common sense�”—Thomas Edison
• “I really had a lot of dreams when I was a kid, and I think a great deal of that 
grew out of the fact that I had a chance to read a lot�”—Bill Gates
• “The function of education is to teach one to think intensively and to think 
critically� Intelligence plus character—that is the goal of true education�”—
Martin Luther King Jr�
• “If you cannot read all your books � � � fondle them—peer into them, let them 
fall open where they will, read from the first sentence that arrests the eye, set 
them back on the shelves with your own hands, arrange them on your own 
plan so that you at least know where they are� Let them be your friends; let 
them, at any rate, be your acquaintances�”—Winston Churchill
• “I insist on a lot of time being spent, almost every day, to just sit and think� 
That is very uncommon in American business� I read and think� So I do 
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more reading and thinking, and make less impulse decisions than most 
people in business� I do it because I like this kind of life�”—Warren Buffett
• “Of all things, I liked books best�”—Nikola Tesla
• “If we encounter a man of rare intellect, we should ask him what books he
reads�”—Ralph Waldo Emerson
• “From a child I was fond of reading, and all the little money that came into
my hands was ever laid out in books�”—Benjamin Franklin
• “Once you learn to read, you will be forever free�”—Frederick Douglass
• “My definition of an educated man is a man who never stops learning and
wants to learn� I am not interested in whether a man has a PhD or not, or an
MA for that matter, or a diploma� Mao never had one, neither had Khru-
shchev, nor Stalin�”—Lee Kuan Yew, first prime minister of Singapore
• “When I decided to return and work in Africa in the early 1980s, I sold all
my few possessions—things like my stereo systems, my color TV (big thing
in those days!), my prized music albums � � � everything I could sell� I then
used all the cash to buy books, because I wasn’t sure if I’d be able to find
some of my most important books� When one of my friends asked me why
I was doing this, I said books were my most important possession, because
with the knowledge they give me, I can make enough money to buy anything
else!”—Strive Masiyiwa, international entrepreneur and philanthropist
• “Balance your reading� Read broadly� Include people you don’t agree with�
This is how we are stretched�”—Rick Warren
• “Reading is important� If you know how to read, then the whole world opens
up to you�”—Barack Obama
• “Years ago I got hooked on a habit that turned out to be one of the most
valuable of my life: reading at least 30 minutes a day� Jim Rohn, one of my
teachers, told me that reading something of substance, something of value,
something that was nourishing, something that taught you distinctions, was
more important than eating� ‘Miss a meal,’ he said, ‘but don’t miss your read-
ing�’ Remember: leaders are readers�”—Tony Robbins, personal development
coach
• “If there is education, there will be everything in life� Government can make
roads, hospitals, and also construct school buildings� But your homes can
brighten up only if your children are educated� I am confident that if we fo-
cus on education, our society will certainly develop�”—Narendra Modi, prime
minister of India
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So there you have it: words of wisdom and encouragement from billionaire 
businessmen, world leaders, and noted philosophers� We could not agree more!
JOHN E� JACKSON
(adapted from an article on SmartandRelentless.com posted on October 20, 2016)
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